JULY, 1964

Philosophy East and West

A QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF
ORIENTAL AND COMPARATIVE THOUGHT

University of Hawaii Press

VOLUME XIV, NUMBER 2

BOARD OF EDITORS

CHARLES A. MOORE, UNIVERSITY OF HAWAII, EDITOR
WING-TSIT CHAN, DARTMOUTH COLLEGE
N. K. DEVARAJA, BANARAS HINDU UNIVERSITY
DANIEL H. H. INGALLS, HARVARD UNIVERSITY
ABRAHAM KAPLAN, UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN
G. P. MALALASEKERA, UNIVERSITY OF CEYLON, EMERITUS
CHARLES MORRIS, UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA
HAJIME NAKAMURA, TOKYO UNIVERSITY
JOHANNES RAHDER, YALE UNIVERSITY
WILLIAM S. WEEDON, UNIVERSITY OF VIRGINIA
KENNETH K. INADA, UNIVERSITY OF HAWAII; KARL H. POTTER, UNIVERSITY OF MINNESOTA; VINCENT Y. C. SHIH, UNIVERSITY OF WASHINGTON—*Book Review Editors*

In co-operation with the Department of Philosophy, University of Hawaii:

CHUNG-YING CHENG
A. J. GIMIGLIANO-GREGOR
RICHARD P. HAYNES
KENNETH K. INADA
HAROLD E. McCARTHY
CHARLES A. MOORE
WINFIELD E. NAGLEY
MICHAEL D. RESNIK
S. K. SAKSENA

ADVISORY EDITORS

EDWIN A. BURTT, CORNELL UNIVERSITY
WILLIAM RAY DENNES, UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA, BERKELEY, EMERITUS
HOMER H. DUBS, OXFORD UNIVERSITY, EMERITUS
CORNELIUS KRUSÉ, WESLEYAN UNIVERSITY, EMERITUS
FILMER S. C. NORTHROP, YALE UNIVERSITY, EMERITUS
S. RADHAKRISHNAN, NEW DELHI
DAISETZ TEITARO SUZUKI, OTANI UNIVERSITY, EMERITUS
JOHN WILD, YALE UNIVERSITY

THOMAS NICKERSON
Managing Editor

ALDYTH V. MORRIS
Assistant to the Editor

NOTE TO AUTHORS: The editors of *Philosophy East and West* welcome articles in the field of Oriental and East-West comparative philosophy from all parts of the world. Articles should not exceed 25 typewritten pages (20 legal-size pages). The editors also welcome brief papers presenting the results of studies, and comments, queries, and notes. Manuscripts should be typewritten and double-spaced throughout.

All articles and features are printed in English. If a contribution is written in another language, the original and an English translation are requested. Should the author be unable to provide a translation, the editors will endeavor to do so.

The system of transliteration of foreign terms and names should be consistent within each article and, as far as possible, should conform with generally accepted practice, such as the Wade system for Chinese. Diacritical marks must be used except in contemporary personal names.

Documentation must be complete in all respects and should conform to accepted bibliographical style. For each work cited or explicitly referred to, the writer must give the author's full name, complete title of the work, place and date of publication, and publisher, as well as specific page references.

Contributions should be addressed to the Editor, *Philosophy East and West*, University of Hawaii Press, Honolulu, Hawaii 96822.

EXCHANGES: Exchanges are limited to journals of philosophical interest. Requests should be addressed to the Editor.

Philosophy East and West

A Journal of Oriental and Comparative Thought

VOLUME XIV, NUMBER 2 • JULY, 1964

THE WORLD AND THE INDIVIDUAL IN CHINESE METAPHYSICS,
Thomé H. Fang 101

THE STATUS OF THE INDIVIDUAL IN INDIAN PHILOSOPHY,
Kalidas Bhattacharyya 131

THE STATUS OF THE INDIVIDUAL IN THERAVĀDA BUDDHISM,
G. P. Malalasekera 145

THE WORLD AND THE INDIVIDUAL IN MAHĀYĀNA BUDDHIST PHILOSOPHY,
Yoshifumi Ueda 157

THE DIREMPTIVE TENDENCIES OF WESTERN PHILOSOPHY,
John N. Findlay 167

BOOK REVIEWS 179

PROCEEDINGS OF THE DELHI PHILOSOPHICAL COLLOQUIUM, October 10–19, 1962, *Michael David Resnik*; Gino K. Piovesana, S.J., RECENT JAPANESE PHILOSOPHICAL THOUGHT 1862–1962, *Dale Riepe*.

BOOKS RECEIVED 185

CURRENT PERIODICALS 187

Published quarterly by the University of Hawaii Press,
Honolulu, Hawaii 96822, U.S.A. Subscription, $4.00
a year; single copy, $1.25. Payment in U.S. currency
by check, money order, or dollar draft preferred.

Contributors to this Issue

THOMÉ H. FANG. Professor of Philosophy, National Taiwan University. Member of the Executive Committee, Chinese Philosophical Society, 1937–1948. Awarded the Medal of Distinguished Service Professor by the Chinese Ministry of Education, 1956 and 1964. Principal writings (in Chinese): *The Sentiment of Life and the Sense of Beauty*: *Essentials of Chinese Philosophy of Life; Science, Philosophy, and the Significance of Human Life—A Study in the History of European Ideas; Joint Studies in the Philosophy of Change* (in collaboration with Professor Li Chengkang); *Collected Poems (1938–1953); Philosophy of Hegel*, 2 vols. (in co-operation with various authors); (in English): *Chinese View of Life: the Philosophy of Comprehensive Harmony.* Educated at the University of Nanking, Ohio State University, and the University of Wisconsin.

KALIDAS BHATTACHARYYA. Director, Centre of Advanced Study in Philosophy; Professor and Head of the Department of Philosophy, Visva-Bharati University. General Secretary, Indian Philosophical Congress, 1961–1964. Honorary Fellow, Indian Academy of Philosophy, Calcutta. Author of *Alternative Standpoints in Philosophy; Object, Content and Relation; The Concept of Cause in India and the West; The Indian Concepts of Knowledge and Self; Language, Logic and Philosophy*; and many articles in professional journals. B.A., 1932, M.A., 1934, Ph.D., 1945, Calcutta University.

G. P. MALALASEKERA. High Commissioner for Ceylon in London. Emeritus Professor, University of Ceylon. Panel Member, East-West Philosophers' Conference, 1949. President: World Fellowship of Buddhists, 1950–1958, Indian Philosophical Congress, 1957. Among his publications are: *The Pali Literature of Ceylon; Dictionary of Pali Proper Names; The Buddha and His Teachings; Commentary on the Mahāvaṁsa; The Extended Mahāvaṁsa.* College, Panadura, Ceylon, 1918, M.A., Ph.D., D.Litt., University of London, D.Phil. (Honorary), Moscow University.

YOSHIFUMI UEDA. Professor of Buddhist Philosophy and Chairman, Department of Indic and Buddhist Studies, Nagoya University. Director, Japanese Association of Indian and Buddhist Studies. Director, Japanese Association for Religious Studies. Publications (in Japanese): *A Study of the History of Buddhist Thought; On the Concept of "Karma" in Buddhism; On the Fundamental Structure of Mahāyāna Buddhist Thought; An Introduction to Yogācāra Philosophy*; and articles in learned journals. Graduated from Imperial University of Tokyo, 1933, D.Litt., University of Kyushu, 1948.

JOHN N. FINDLAY. Professor of Philosophy, King's College, University of London. President, Aristotelian Society, 1955–1956. Fellow of the British Academy since 1956. Author of *Meinong's Theory of Objects and Values; Hegel: A Re-Examination; Values and Intentions; Language, Mind and Values*; and many journal articles. Ph.D., University of Graz, 1933.

EDITOR'S NOTE

The articles in this issue and those in the October, 1964 issue are papers which were presented at the Fourth East-West Philosophers' Conference held at the University of Hawaii during the summer of 1964. The theme of the Conference was "The World and the Individual in East and West," the status of the individual in reality, thought, and culture.

In six one-week Sections, members of the Conference studied the status of the individual in Metaphysics, in Methodology, in Religion, in Ethics, in Social Thought and Practices, and in Legal and Political Thought and Institutions—in Asia and the West. The papers from the first two sections—the two more technical aspects of the Conference—are being published in this Journal.

"Comment and Discussion" reactions to the papers in these two issues are encouraged.

The volume containing all the Conference papers, plus some of the discussions at formal Conference meetings and some of the public lectures given during the Conference, will be published by the University of Hawaii Press. A tentative date of publication will be announced later.

THOMÉ H. FANG[a]

The World and the Individual in Chinese Metaphysics

I

IN THIS PAPER it falls to me to speak of a type of metaphysics quite different from what may be called the praeternatural metaphysics according to which man and the world he lives in are, alike, shot through with two irreconcilables. Taken in its extreme form, it would set up a great divide between heaven and hell. Man as an individual has the make-up of a soul and a body at odds with each other.

I shall call transcendental metaphysics a characteristic Chinese doctrine of reality which, though deeply rooted in actuality, is not denuded of the importance for energizing ideality. It rejects neat bifurcation as a method; it disowns hard dualism as a truth. From its viewpoint, both the world and the individual therein are considered to be a sort of architectonic unity in which all the relevant basic facts are taken for a solid foundation on which to build up different layers of superstructure, ascending from below until the coping stone is set over them all. From what is given as actual, we can take ascending steps and look upward, aspiring to attain to the supreme ideal. And, at the same time, starting from the contemplated ideal, we are thereby enabled, through the potency of gradually clarified ideas, to explicate the great mystery involved in the existence of the world and the achievement of man.

With a mentality thus orientated, it is only natural for the Chinese philosophers of different schools to take a further step toward the establishment of a metaphysics according to which substance and function, noumenon and phenomenon, eternity and temporality, are all correlative terms conducive to the formation of integrative wholes.

Thus it is that Chinese philosophical ideas are centered around the integrative wholes explicable in terms of organicism, which, as a *form* of thought, may be bilaterally characterized. Negatively, it denounces the possibilities (1) of taking things and persons in absolutely isolated systems, (2) of reducing the plenitude of reality into an impoverished mechanical order of merely juxtaposed constituents, and (3) of squeezing the dynamic universe into a tightly closed system of complete developedness, devoid of continual creativity. Positively, it is an endeavor to encompass the integral universe in all aspects of its richness and plenitude without any indulgence in the most abstract form of an underlying unity which is never unearthed. In the midst of experiential multiplicities, there may be discerned a set of such organic wholes as the unity of being, the unity of existence, the unity of life, as well as the unity of value. But all the manifold unities are such that they can be woven and fused into an intimate embracement of mutual relevance, essential interrelatedness, and reciprocal importance.

The trends of Chinese metaphysical thought, taken in its entire range, may be roughly likened to the bar-lines across the stave. At regular or irregular intervals, different modes of speculation are marked out in bars, each running in compound triple time with beats in varying accentuation. From time immemorial to the middle of the twelfth century B.C., the metaphysical moods would be the chords sounded in the triads of myth, religion, and poetry. Thenceforward, until 246 B.C., for a creative period of more than nine hundred years, there came to be the articulation of primordial Taoism, Confucianism, and Moism.[b] This period was followed by a long epoch (246 B.C.–A.D. 960) of fermentation and absorbent creation, tending to bring forth eventually a type of highly creative speculation in Chinese Mahāyānic Buddhism. Beginning with A.D. 960 down to the present day, we have had a reawakening of metaphysical originality in the form of Neo-Confucianism somewhat imbued with the spirit of Taoism and Buddhism. In this period of regeneration, there have come into prominence three trends of metaphysics: (a) Neo-Confucianism of the realistic type; (b) Neo-Confucianism of the idealistic type; and (c) Neo-Confucianism of the naturalistic type.

Time is too limited for me to go into the details of all the movements in Chinese metaphysics. In this essay the emphasis will be laid upon primordial Confucianism, primordial Taoism, and Mahāyānic Buddhism. I group these together inasmuch as their diversified systems possess in common three ostensive features: (a) the doctrine of pervasive unity, (b) the doctrine of the *Tao*, and (c) the exaltation of the individual.

Let us ask, what kind of man is he who bespeaks himself in Chinese philosophy? He is nothing less than what Professor F. M. Cornford has called "the combination prophet-poet-sage." [1] I shall not enumerate the historical reasons for the Chinese philosophers to be so. Suffice it to say that Chuang Tzu[c] had sung so much praise to the ancient philosophers[2] before their synoptic wisdom was in later times dispersed into detailed analytical knowledge to meet the needs of social changes. It is no wonder that the great system-builders in China should have bodied forth the awakened wisdom in the capacity of a poet and a sage and a prophet. Such as they were, they would, nevertheless, have at moments personal inclination toward one special character in the combination.

---

[1] Cf. F. N. Cornford: *Principium Sapientiae* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1952), pp. 90–91, 93, 96, 102.

[2] Cf. The *Works of Chuang Tzu* (Chinese text, Chekiang: Chekiang Book Co., 1876), Vol. 10, chap. 33, p. 18.

The Taoists have special aptitudes for *poetic inspirations* in the light of which the wayward man and the boisterous world are something to be transmuted before they can reach for the ideal and authentic existence as measured by the high standard of value.[3] In the eyes of Buddhists, this was quite akin to the doctrine of *Nirvāṇa*[d] which was, at the same time, an ideal depiction of the *Tathatā.*[e] So, Taoism had made way for the Mahāyānic development of Chinese Buddhism in later times.

The Taoists turn everything within the cogwheels of special conditions into *Nothing*, a Nothing that is "really real reality" in the form of a dynamo generative of *everything.* Where the Taoists end, there the Confucians begin. As a sharp contrast, the Confucians confront Nothing at the wide open gate of the heavenly *Tao*, whose magic touch of creation has the mysterious power of transmuting it into *everything*, which is not once diminished but always augmented. Thus, a boundless horizon of creative advance is spread before man for his partaking of this infinitude, for his participation in the continuant creativity of creation, and for his assumption of a pivotal position in the universe of dynamic transformation. In short, the Confucians' world is a world of creative action, reaching out for infinite enlargement and for endless edification. As the meaning of the world is such, so is the magnificence of an ideal man who should be a sage.

Buddhism, in its early stage of development in China, found the Confucian conception of the homocentric universe too far-fetched and so it had to be allied with Taoism in drawing the human interest of life to the liberated world for an assured satisfaction. But, as time went on, it began to see anew the strong points in Confucianism and found in it a spiritual affinity in affirming the perfectibility of human nature in the form of *buddha*-nature. As Buddhism is a system of philosophy as well as a variety of religion, its exponents of high merits have the caliber of a prophet whose mind's eyes are to be fixed on the final destiny of mankind and the universal emancipation of all beings in the future.

From what has been said above, we can be brief, now, with another set of characterizations bearing out three types of individual that underlie the Chinese metaphysical contemplation. In the enterprise of theorizing, the Confucian thinks in the capacity of a time-man, the Taoist is a typical space-man, and the Buddhist is a space-time man with an alternative sense of forgetting.

---

[3] Cf. The *Works of Lao Tzu* (Chinese text, Chekiang: Chekiang Book Co., 1875), pt. II, chap. 48, p. 6; pt. I, chap. 2, p. 1.

Apropos of the systems of Chinese metaphysics, two essential points must be noted. (1) The world is not taken for what it is in natural regard; it awaits to be transmuted into a moral universe for the Confucians, into an aesthetic realm for the Taoists, and into a religious domain for the Buddhists. The world, philosophically considered, should be a *transfigured world*, taken in its ideal regard. The task of Chinese metaphysics is an analysis of facts issuing in an understanding of destiny. The transfigured world is nothing less than a teleological system of axiological importance. (2) The individual is a very complicated concept; its richness of meaning is not exhausted by a simplified unitary procedure of approach. The individual as such in the form of what Professor Guido de Ruggiero has designated as *homo novus* is a precious jewel of modern Western men who would take it for a term of praise in matters of religious, epistemological, and economico-political theorizings.[4] The status of the individual is not a problem to be simply posed once and for all; its answer is not to be found ready-made once and for all. The question about it has to be continually asked. In different epochs of time and in various contexts of thought, the answers to it would be radically different. Throughout the history of Chinese philosophy, Yang Chu[f] (521?–442? B.C.) was the only one who spoke audaciously for the actual individual. But all other thinkers have looked askance at him. To the Confucians, the individual should be ceaselessly edified; to the Taoist, he should be constantly liberated; and to the Buddhists, he should be perpetually purified before his status could be firmly established in the transfigured world of moral and aesthetic and religious perfection. In their eyes, any other way of affirming the status of the individual would be a premature mode of thought in an essential lack of wisdom.

II

Let us now proceed with the discussion of the three major systems of Chinese metaphysics in successive order.

Two important features may be discerned in the metaphysical system of Confucianism. The first asserts the creative power of the heavenly *Tao* whereby the dynamic world of all beings comes into existence; the second emphasizes the intrinsic value of human nature in congruence with the cosmic order. These two together constitute the architectonic structure of Confucianism from classical antiquity down to the present day. The most important embodiment of this mode of thought is found in the *Book of Change*, to be supplemented by the *Works of Mencius* and the *Works of Hsün Tzu*, which, apart from re-enforcing a set of original metaphysical ideas, elucidate the cardinal doctrine of a philosophical anthropology.[5]

---

[4] Cf. Guido de Ruggiero: *The History of European Liberalism* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1927), pp. 51–2; 24–28, 66–73.

The *Book of Change* is a formidable historical document. There are involved in it (1) a very complicated stratified historical frame, (2) a completed system of symbolic constructions based upon strict rules of logic, and (3) a set of interpretations making out the meanings of these symbolic constructions, expressible in the systematic syntax of language. All these three are the prelude to a theory of time conducive to the working out of a set of metaphysical principles explanatory of the cosmic order.

The technical problems involved in (1), (2), and (3) have been intensively studied by scholars from the second century B.C. down to the present day with elaborate results embodied in volumes upon volumes too complicated to be presented here.

With these results presupposed, we can come to see that the revolutionary philosophy of change, initiated by Confucius (551–479 B.C.) himself and, upon the evidences[6] of Ssu-ma T'an[g] and Ssu-ma Chien,[h] further elaborated by Shang Chü[i] (b. 522 B.C.) and others, was really a long evolutionary product. Its new features might be diversified into four different forms: (1) A new philosophy of enlivened Nature permeated with the dynamic confluence of Life. Nature is power or vital impetus creative in advance and conducive to the fulfillment and consummation of Life capable of being partaken by all beings.[7] (2) An exposition of intrinsic moral goodness in human life adorned with beauty. Such a moral-aesthetic perfection was characteristic of the unique human personality.[8] (3) A general theory of value in the form of the Supreme Good assimilating into it all the relative ranks of values prevalent in the entire universe.[9] (4) The final formulation of a value-centric ontology asserting the fullness of Being in its entirety.

---

[5] Cf. my *Chinese View of Life* (Hong Kong: The Union Press, 1957), chap. 3, pp. 87–115, especially pp. 99–115.

[6] In the *Shih-chi*[j] (General History, Royal Library edn, 1746), Vol. 67, p. 8, and Vol. 130, p. 2, Ssu-ma Chien clearly stated that his father, Ssu-ma T'an, learned the philosophy of change from Yang Ho,[k] whose intellectual heritage was traced back to Confucius through an unbroken lineage of eight generations.

[7] This cardinal doctrine was set forth by Confucius in the *Tuan-chüan*[l] (Compendiums), in the *Hsi-ts'u-chüan*[m] (Conspectus), and in the early section of the *Shuo-kua-chüan*[n] (Scholia on the Hexagrams).

[8] This idea was first formulated by Confucius in the *Wen-yen-chüan*[o] (Corollaries to the Hexagrams *Ch'ien* and *K'un*) and more systematically in the *Shang-chüan*[p] (Symbolics).

Thus it is evident that the archetypical time-man, represented by the Confucians, deliberately chooses to cast everything—whether it be the life of Nature, the development of an individual, the frame of society, the achievement of value, the attainment to the fullness of Being—into the mold of time in order of its authentic existence.

The question is, what is time?[10] The essence of time consists in change; the order of time proceeds with concatenation; the efficacy of time abides by durance. The rhythmic process of epochal change is wheeling round into infinitude and perpetually dovetailing the old and the new so as to issue into interpenetration which is continuant duration in creative advance. This is the way in which time generates itself by its systematic entry into a pervasive unity which constitutes the rational order of creative creativity. The dynamic sequence of time, ridding itself of the perished past and coming by the new in the present existence, really gains something over a loss. So, the change in time is but a step to approaching eternity, which is perennial durance whereby, before the bygone is ended, the forefront of the succeeding has come into presence. And, therefore, there is here a linkage of Being projecting itself into the prospect of eternity. Hence, in the nexus of the dynamics of time, "The *Book of Change* contains the measure of heaven and earth, enabling us to comprehend the all-pervasive *Tao* and its order."[11]

Based upon the concept of time, three metaphysical principles may be set out.

(1) The principle of extensive connection.[j] Three essentials are involved in its formulation. Logically, it is a system of consistent deduction demonstrated rigorously.[12] Semantically, it is a syntax of language in which the rules of formation and transformation of significant statements indicate unerringly a relation of co-ordination and a relation of dovetailing and mutual relevance so as to discriminate what is licit from the illicit and to change the latter into the former.[13] Metaphysically, the philosophy of change is a system

---

[9] The idea of value and the consequential value-centric ontology are developed in the *Hsi-ts'u-chüan*.

[10] I attacked this problem in *Shen-ming-ching-tiao-yu-mei-k'an*[r] (*The Sentiment of Life and the Sense of Beauty*), National Central University Monograph on Art and Literature, Vol. 1, no. 1, 1931, pp. 173–204, especially pp. 192–203.

[11] The Hsi-ts'u-chüan, chap. 4.

[12] Cf. my essay, "Logical Formulations of the Philosophy of Change," in *Yi-hsüeh-tao-lung-chi*[s] (Joint Studies in the Book of Change) (Changsha: Commercial Press, 1941), pp. 31–54.

[13] Cf. Chiao Hsün,[u] *I T'u Lüeh*[v] (Logical Structure and Syntactical Scheme Exhibited in the Book of Change), (8 vols., 1813), Vol. I, p. 4, Vol. II, pp. 13–14; *I Hua*[w] (Talks on the Philosophy of Change (2 vols., 1818), Vol. I, pp. 3, 12; *I T'ung Shih*[x] (General Commentary on the Book of Change), (20 vols., 1813); and *I Chang Chu*[y] (The Book of Change: A Study in Syntax), (12 vols., 1815).

of dynamic ontology based upon the process of continuant creativity in time, as well as a system of general axiology wherein the origin and development of the idea of the Supreme Good is shown in the light of comprehensive harmony. Thus, the principle of extensive connection asserts at the same time that the confluence of life permeating all beings under heaven and earth partakes of the creative nature of time and achieves, as a consequence, the form of the Supreme Good.

(2) The principle of creative creativity. Confucius in the *Book of Change*—the philosophical part of it designated as the *chüans*—and his followers in the *Book of Proprieties*[k]—including the *Doctrine of the Mean*—diversified the all-pervasive *Tao*[14] into (a) the *Tao* of heaven as the primordial creative power, giving rise to all creatures, comprehending them in the cosmic order of dynamic transformation conducive to a perfectly harmonious fulfillment, and issuing in the attainment of the Supreme Good; (b) the *Tao* of earth, which, as the power of procreation, is a continuation and extension of the creative origination, sustaining all forms of existence; and (c) the *Tao* of man, who, with an assured status at the center of the universe, in communion with the creative and procreative power of heaven and earth should come to the full awareness of the spirit and thereby become concreative agents in the perpetual continuance of life as a whole. With the Confucians, this spiritual awareness has given rise to a sense of individual moral excellence, a fellow feeling of the intrinsic worth of other forms of existence, as well as a rational insight into the identifiable unity of the equitable Being of all beings.

(3) The principle of creative life as a process of value-realization. In the *Hsi-ts'u-chüan* we find a theory set out by Confucius that

> what is called *Tao* operates incessantly with the rhythmic modulation of the dynamic change and the static repose, thus continuing the creative process for the attainment of the Good and completing the creative process for the fulfillment of Nature which is Life. . . . It manifests itself in the rational sentiment of humanity but conceals its great function unawares, propelling all beings in a swing of vitality without inciting the anxieties of the Holy. Its richness of virtue, its grandeur of enterprise, is of all things the most sublime. Superabundance is what is called the deed-act; forevermore creativeness is what is called the supreme value. . . . The unfathomed mystery underlying the rhythmic modulation of dynamic energy and peaceful repose is what is called the Divine.[15]

Elsewhere Confucius said: "Embracing all in its comprehensiveness and investing each with its magnificence, it ensures that anything and everything will enjoy the concordant bliss of well-being."[16] "Of all values, the Good exhibited in the primordially creative-procreative is towering in its supremacy. Concordance in the sport of bliss is the convergence of all that is beautiful. Benediction in the realm of life is the pervasiveness of all that is righteous. Consummation in the deed-act is the fundamentum of the world of enterprise." [17]

---

[14] Cf. the *Tüan-chüan*, the *Wen-yen-chüan*, and the *Hsi-ts'u-chüan*, chaps. 5, 7; *Doctrine of the Mean*, chap. 22. See also Tai T'ung-yüan[z], *Yüan-shan*[aa] (Treatise on the Good), chap. 1.

[15] The *Hsi-ts'u-chüan*, chap. 5.

In the light of the above principles, the objective order of the universe is constituted by the superabundant power of creativity in the dynamic process of time. The human individual is thus confronted with a creative world. He must be equally creative in order to fit in with it. And, therefore, the Confucian dynamical value-centric ontology, once completed, evoked a system of philosophical anthropology. It was averred in the *Doctrine of the Mean* that the most truthful and sincere man in all the world, after completely fulfilling his own nature in the course of life, would extend his boundless sympathy by doing the same with other men, as well as with all creatures and things. In doing so he could participate in the cosmic creation through the process of transformation and thereupon become a *concreator* with heaven and earth.[18]

As the natural and moral order of life was initiated by the creative power of heaven, so man can cope with the most high in creative potency. In some such way the Confucians developed a homocentric conception of the world as a prelude to the value-centric conception of man. This is why Mencius[l] (372–289 B.C.) maintained that the spiritual stream of a superior man's life was concurrent with that of heaven and earth. He went further in asserting that a real man, relying upon his own intrinsic goodness, could, in virtue of his beautiful endowment, develop himself to the utmost into a great man. This greatness of character, enhanced by a subtle touch of spiritual exaltation in the process of transformation, would make him, first, a sage and, finally, a holy man invested with inscrutable magnificence.[19]

Not only Mencius. Even Hsün Tzu[m] (313–238 B.C.), who started with the empirical observation of the ill nature of man, ventured to assert that man through a course of perseverent endeavor of cultivation could come to achieve greatness. Among the primordial Confucians, Hsün Tzu was the only one who seemed to be "fed up" with the value-centric conception of Heaven. Just for this reason, he wanted to set up the supremacy of man apart from unnecessary complication with Nature, which is nothing more than a neutral order[20] with physical energies in store for human utilization. According to Mencius, man, by virtue of his inborn goodness, is spontaneously great. In the opinion of Hsün Tzu, man's greatness is cultured in the best sense of the word. Allowing this difference between them, man is ultimately great just the same.

---

[16] The *Tuan-chüan.*

[17] The *Wen-yen-chüan.*

[18] Cf. *Doctrine of the Mean*, chap. 22.

[19] Cf. the *Works of Mencius*, VII. 25.

What, after all, is the rationale of human greatness? In the *Book of Proprieties*,[21] compiled by Senior Tai Tei,[n] Confucius is reported to have said, in a reply to the queries of Duke Ai of Lu, that there are five types of men in a rational linkage of development. Among (1) the common run of men, the individual can be educated to be (2) a learned and enlightened person who, with an insight of knowledge and with a sagacity in action, issuing in the noble art of life, will become (3) a superior man, adorned with a beauty of character and a balance of mind. Through further edification he can come to be (4) a man of excellence. His choices and forsakings are in accord with the high standard of values acceptable to mankind as a whole. He always tries to act in the right without sacrificing the least part of the fundamental principles. His utterance of truth sets a good standard to the world without a loss of his own integrity. Finally, he becomes (5) a sage, or holy man. With perfect wisdom at his own command, he acts in congruence with the ways of the great *Tao*,[o] adapting himself to any circumstance of life in the flux of change without confronting any crises of danger or encumbrance. This he does because he thoroughly understands the true nature and disposition of all things. In virtue of such perfect understanding, all his decisions of value are made in accordance with the great function of reason. And, therefore, the achievement of greatness knowingly keeps abreast of heaven and earth in creativity. This development of man from the natural capacity to the ideal perfection by way of the function of reason is what I have entitled the Confucian rationale of human greatness. In the light of this rationale man copes with the most high in potency.

All of this leads to the natural conclusion that the world and the individual must be always in reciprocal communion.[22] In such a communion, the cosmic status of the individual is firmly established for the reason that the full capacities constitutive of his personality are, of now, developed to the utmost.

To the Chinese, the Confucian type of man is near and dear like an ideal figure who has been cut by his own noble art of life in a set of expanding spheres representing the gradually enlarged and qualitatively perfected human relations, and toward whom all other persons, intimate in spiritual linkage and sympathetic in moral aspirations, are subtly attracted in such a way that there is always an interfusion and interplay of exultation in the influence of exalted personality. This is what makes of the Chinese world and Chinese society a natural domain of moral democracy incessantly leveling up to a higher plane of ethical culture which has sustained the Chinese national state ever since Confucianism has been in vogue.

---

[20] Cf. the *Works of Hsün Tzu* (Chekiang: Chekiang Book Co., 1876), Vol. 11, chap. 17, pp. 11–16, 18.

[21] Cf. Tai Te's version of the *Li-chi*[ae] (*Book of Proprieties*), edited by Lu Chien-tseng,[af] 1758, Vol. 1, pp. 4–6.

[22] Cf. the *Wen-yen-chüan* in the *Book of Change*.

III

But when we come to the consideration of the Taoists we are suddenly transferred to a different world—a visionary dream-world. The Taoists make the best type of the space-man. They are wont to take flights into the realms, unfrequented by the common run of people, to which they lift us, level after level, each more exalted and mysterious than the last. From their vantage point at a height unafraid, they gaze disinterestedly upon the stratified world below in which the tragi-comic persons are involved in the regressive lapse into folly and wit, illusion and truth, appearance and reality, all falling off from the supreme Perfection, Truth, and Reality.

Tao is the supreme category in the system of Lao Tzu[p] (561?–467? B.C.). It may be diversified into four cardinal points.

(1) Ontologically, *Tao* is the infinite ontic substance, which was multifariously characterized by Lao Tzu (a) as the fathomless unity of all beings, prior in existence even to God;[23] (b) as the fundamental root of heaven and earth, infinite in nature, invisible in shape, but really great in function because all creatures are begotten from it;[24] (c) as the primordial One having ingression into all forms of beings;[25] (d) as the unique pattern of all kinds of activities, discursive but wholesome, twisted around but straightforward, emptying out but remaining full, worn out but forever renovating, eventually comprehensive of all perfection;[26] (e) as the Great Form[q] or the receptacular Matrix, wherein all creatures are embraced, free of harm, and full of peace, like babies held close to the bosom of their mother;[27] and (f) as the final destiny whereto all creatures, after emptying out every kind of "quixotic" energetic activities in the course of life, will return for the ease and peace of rest, conceived under the form of eternity and achieved in the spirit of im-

---

[23] The *Works of Lao Tzu* (Chekiang: Chekiang Book Co., 1875), chap. 4.

[24] *Ibid.*, chap. 6.

[25] *Ibid.*, chap. 39.

[26] *Ibid.*, chaps. 5, 22.

[27] *Ibid.*, chaps. 35, 28.

mortality,[28]—thus on the score of eternity, consciously discerned, all come to be complaisant, equitable, noble, natural, and spontaneous, in full accord with the imperishable *Tao.*

(2) Cosmogenetically, the infinitely great *Tao* is the all-pervasive function with an inexhaustible store of powerful energy exerting itself in two different ways. On the one hand, being invisibly subsistent up in the transcendental realm of Nothingness[r] and deeply sheathed back in the noumenal realm of unfathomed Mystery, it darts itself out and down into the realm of Being.[s] Thus, we can say that in the beginning there was Being, and Being was with Nothingness.[29] Henceforward the *Tao* is the primordial begetter of all things. On the other hand, the supplied energy, within the bounds of Being, may be spent and exhausted through dispersion and waste. The immanent world of Being in a state of urgent want will resort to the transcendental world of *Tao* for a fresh impartation of energy. Hence, Lao Tzu has every reason to lay emphasis upon "the reversal of procedure in the dynamical transformation of *Tao.*"

The function of *Tao* is dyadic in track. Progressively, the fundamental Nothingness in the *Tao* gives rise to the Being of all forms in the world,[30] whereas, regressively, the immanent Being in the whole world depends upon the Nothingness of the transcendental *Tao* for the performance of adequate function. Hence the pronouncement: "The fulfillment of Being leads to eudaemonia, whereas the attainment to Nothingness fulfills the performance of function." [31]

(3) Phenomenologically, the attributes of *Tao* can be classified under two headings, namely, natural attributes and arbitrary attributes. The natural attributes are discerned as so many properties inherent in the *Tao* conceived under the form of eternity. They may be enumerated as follows:-

1) Integrity of *Tao* revealing itself as substance in the realm of Nothingness and as function in the realm of Being;
2) Conformation of non-action in which nothing is left undone;[t]
3) The primordial incentive in the begetting of all things with no claim of origination;
4) Accomplishment of work on the cosmic scale with detachment;[u]
5) Sustenance of all things without domination;[v]
6) Creation without possession;[w]
7) Energizing activity with no egocentric claim of merits.

---

[28] *Ibid.*, chap. 16.
[29] *Ibid.*, chaps. 40–1, 45.
[30] Cf. *ibid.*, chap. 40.
[31] *Ibid.*, chap. 11.

On the contrary, the arbitrary attributes are those which are affirmed from the subjective viewpoint of men and inappropriately portrayed in terms of inadequate human language. Apart from these, the *Tao*, conceived per se is the really real reality, or, what is the same thing, the mysteriously mysterious Mystery intelligible only to men of supreme wisdom like the sage.

(4) Characterologically, the supreme excellences, manifested as the natural attributes, originally pertain to the nature of *Tao* but will come in ingress into the integrity of the sage, who is really the exemplar of the *Tao* in this world. The sage, as an ideal man, has transcended all limitations and weaknesses by reason of his exalted spirit and by virtue of his assessment of ever higher worth. He knows how to gain a world of love and reverence by employing himself generously for the world. Having lived for the benefit of other men, he is richer in worth; having given all he has to other men, he is more plentiful in being. "And, therefore, the sage is always skillful and wholehearted in the salvation of men, so that there is no deserted man; he is always skillful and wholehearted in the rescue of things, so that there is no abandoned thing."[32] Thanks to Lao Tzu, we have come to the consciousness that the essence of each individual man, when realized in full, consists in an endeavor to attain to the ideal of the sage. Man's mission is constantly to make a campaign for the realization of this ideal. Thus the "wages" of winning a sure status in the world is his own inward sageliness.

Many perplexities in the system of Lao Tzu came to be cleared away by Chuang Tzu (b. 369 B.C.) in an attempt to push through the nullifying process far back into mystery after mystery, so that there would be no final Nothingness in the serial regress. Similarly, what was posited in the being of Being could be infinitely iterated, back and forth, thus forming a set of endless bilateral processes of progression and retrogression. The original antithesis between Nothing and Being was theoretically reconciled inasmuch as both Being and Nothing should merge into the profound mystery in such a way as to form an interpenetrative system of infinite integral reality.[33] Finally, Chuang Tzu brought out the chief tenet of Lao Tzu as positing both the eternal Nothing and the eternal Being[x] predominated over by the supreme unity, thus affirming the authentic reality in the form of vacuity, which would not destroy the reality of all things.[y] [34] For the same reason and in the same sort of way, the discrepancy between eternity and temporality was dissolved.[35]

---

[32] *Ibid.*, chap. 27.

[33] Cf. the *Works of Chuang Tzu*, Vol. I, chap. 2, p. 24; Vol. V, chap. 12, pp. 6–7; Vol. VI, chap. 17, pp. 9–12; VIII, chap. 23, pp. 9–10.

[34] Cf. *ibid.*, Vol. X, chap. 33, p. 25. Also cf. Ma Hsü-lun[ar] Chuang Tzu I Chêng (*Verifications of Meanings in Chuang Tzu*[as]) (Shanghai: Commercial Press, 1930), Vol. 33, pp. 18–19.

Chuang Tzu could accomplish so much because, besides being a great Taoist, he was, also, much influenced by Confucius and Mencius,[36] as well as by his bosom friend, Hui Shih,[z] from the logico-analytical camp. In the philosophy of change, Confucius thought of time as though it had a definite beginning in the past but an indefinite progression into the future. Chuang Tzu, however, accepted the indefinite stretch into the future but denied the definite origination in the past through the agency of creation. This is because he knew how, on the basis of "the reversal of procedure" in the function of *Tao*,[aa] to probe mystery after mystery[ab] without coming to a standstill in the remote past. Thus, time is literally infinite in respect to the past as well as to the future. Time is a long-enduring natural process of transformation without any beginning and ending. Hence, the Confucian assumption of the primordial power of creation—in fact, all necessity for the cosmic creation—is theoretically removed.

Not only time is infinite in span; space, likewise, is infinite in scope. Furthermore, with the metaphysical acumen of his poetic vision, he transformed, by a subtle touch of imagination, the obstructive mathematico-physical space into the infinite "painterly" space as a liberated realm of spiritual exultation whereunto he is to infuse "the wondrous proceeding of the *Tao*," in order that his own exalted "soul" may reach toward the most sublime for its ultimate acquirement. In a word, the metaphysics of Chuang Tzu is an elaboration of the great *Tao*, projected unto the frame of infinite space and time, into a way of exalted spiritual life.

Such is the metaphysical import implied in the story of "A Happy Excursion"[ac] described in poetico-metaphorical language. Like the great magic bird, *p'eng*,[ad] Chuang Tzu could lift himself up into an intellectual solitude unafraid and exulting insofar as the greatness of his liberated nature would partake of the omnipotent with the support of the infinite *Tao*.

The "most fantastic" story of "A Happy Excursion" has been variously interpreted by different thinkers. The true meaning should be made out in the light of the philosophy of infinity under discussion by following up the clues indicated by Chuang Tzu himself in the context of the relevant chapters.

(1) It is asserted that the supreme man should lead his own spirit up to the primordial in its infinite regress, reposing blissfully in the realm of No-

---

[35] Cf. *ibid.*, Vol. III, chap. 6, pp. 7, 10; Vol. VI, chap. 17, p. 10; Vol. VII, chap. 21, p. 24; Vol. VII, chap. 22, pp. 36, 39; Vol. VIII, chap. 23, p. 9; Vol. VIII, chap. 25, p. 34.

[36] Cf. *ibid.*, Vol. VIII, chap. 24, p. 22; Vol. X, chap. 31, p. 9 (Kuo Hsiang's notes). The monk Te Ching,[ay] in the Ming Dynasty, in a commentary on *Chuang Tzu*, said emphatically that Mencius had a tremendous influence upon this great Taoist.

where, doing away with all petty knowledge about the lowly things and getting entirely free from the bother of their burdens.[37] (2) At the culmination in the realm of perfect truth and in abidance by the fundamentum of the eternal *Tao*, his elevated spirit, being thus estranged from the physical world and disencumbered of all material allurings, would become independent and free from any restraint.[38] (3) Upon entering the gate of infinitude, and having an excursion in the realm of supreme bliss, he would immerse his unique spirit in the exuberant light of the celestial and lose his identity in the eternal harmony of cosmic order.[39] (4) At the attainment to sagehood, he would abandon himself to the vast concord of all perfection. He is now the archetype of man in the full capacity of the omnipotent (*Tao*) to be cast into the mold of cosmic life as a whole, wherein he gains nothing in particular and loses nothing in full. He forgets himself and forgets that he is really immersed in the bliss of *Tao*, just as the fish swim in the river and sea and forget all about it.[40] (5) The perfected and perfect man is now what he is in virtue of his identifiability with the "creator" imparting his potency to all the world without becoming the center of fame, the contriver of plans, the director of works, and the claimer to knowledge. He embraces infinity within the range of his experience and rambles in the realm of the infinite with levity and freedom.[41] He fulfills all that is natural in him without a sense of gain. In the spirit of vacuity, he employs his mind and heart like a mirror, impartially reflecting all that there is in the world without showing a trace of lure, dejection, or injury. It is then, and only then, that the final status of his exalted individuality is firmly established in the infinite world of *Tao.*

All these spiritual modes of life are, as it were, the rockets that launch the Taoistic type of the space-man into the realm of the infinite, in which he is to find a vantage point called by Chuang Tzu "the acme of the Celestial,"[ae] whereon he can survey the World-All from height to height, from width to width, and from depth to depth. The happy excursion into the realms of the infinite all along embodies Chuang Tzu's philosophy of spiritual liberation in the course of life. This is the Taoist temper of mind, which has incited the best of Chinese poetry as an expression of inspiration.

The exalted individual, once achieved, becomes a true sage, who, upborne by the wondrous procedure of *Tao*, can penetrate in insight into the Very One Truth comprehending the entire universe. All the partial appearances, viewed from different angles in varying heights, will be facet-symbols for beauty susceptible of being interfused into the integral whole of reality. All differences in viewpoints will be reconciled in the over-all perspective which forms a complementary system of essential relativity, going anywhere and anywhen, as well as everywhere and everywhen, with the full swing of the all-pervasive *Tao.*

---

[37] Cf. the *Works of Chuang Tzu*, Vol. X, chap. 32, p. 12.

[38] Cf. *ibid.*, Vol. V, chap. 13, p. 24.

[39] Cf. *ibid.*, Vol. IV, chap. 11, p. 26.

[40] Cf. *ibid.*, Vol. III, chap. 6, pp. 7, 9–10, 15–16.

[41] Cf. *ibid.*, Vol. III, chap. 7, pp. 22–26.

This is the pivotal point of his theory of *leveling up all things.*[42] Thus it is that the system of essential relativity is an all-inclusive system in which everything can find a place of its own fitness and in which no one thing can claim to have an especially privileged position so as to impose surreptitious importance upon all others. At the same time, the system of essential relativity is an interpenetrative system wherein all entities come to be what they are by interlacing their own essences with one another, so that nothing in it can stand alone in complete isolation. It is a system of interrelatedness and mutual relevance in which any one thing has its own intrinsic importance that will bear out valuable results as unique contributions to the make-up of any other. Furthermore, it is a system in which the infinite *Tao* operates as the unconditioned that will embrace all the conditions originally uncontrollable by any one individual outside of the system. Especially the human individuals before their entry into this infinite system have suffered limitation, restraint, and bondage. Now that they, through the spirit of liberation, being aware of what ridiculous figures they have cut within the bounds of contracting narrowness, have discovered the authentic sagely self by sharing the nature of *Tao*, they must cry for joy in unison with the Ineffable and Inscrutable in the realm of the infinite, which breaks forth entirely from the limitations of any arbitrary scheme of thought, feeling, and action in life. As a result of all these characteristics exhibited in the infinite system of essential relativity, Chuang Tzu has set out a great theme: "The Universe and I sustain a relation of co-existence; I and all beings have the same entry into the One."[43] Thus being most inward with the Infinite, the individual in the exalted mode of life has well established himself in the world in congruence with all others.

IV

For an epoch of some five hundred years (241 B.C.–A.D. 240), China in the Asian world was not unlike Rome in the West. People of all ranks were busy doing work in the conquest of the practical world. Speculative interest waned in the intellectual realm.

---

[42] Cf. Chang T'ai-yen,[ba] *Chi-wu-lun-shih*[bb] (Commentary on the Theory of Leveling All Things), pp. 1, 3, 11, 14, 18–19, 21–25, 51–55.

[43] The *Works of Chuang Tzu*, Vol. I, chap. 2, p. 25.

The real revival of metaphysical contemplation dated from the year 240 when Ho Yen[af] (190–249) and Wang Pi[ag] (226–249) came with an attempt to reconcile the differences between Confucius and Lao Tzu by laying importance upon the category of Nothingness for the interpretation of *Tao*.[44] Historically, Ho Yen was primarily a Confucian in that he had tried to absorb Taoism into the system of Confucianism,[45] whereas Wang Pi was essentially a Taoist with an intention of assimilating Confucianism into the system of Taoism. What was common in them consisted in an attempt to bring forth the unity of infinite substance as the core of metaphysical inquiry.

In his commentary on the *Lao Tzu*, Wang Pi had elucidated the central theme that all things considered as Being, taking shape in manifolds subject to limitation, should be, in the last resort, redeemable by the integral *Tao*, which, though designated as Nothing, is really everything transmuted into infinite perfection. It is in this light that he came to see the import of the philosophy of change. The whole world of dynamic Being, begotten by the creative power exhibited in a plenitude of incessant change and variegated transformation, must revert to the fundamentum of *Tao* for its primordial unity which, reposing in the form of reason and in the spirit of eternity, will prevail over all multiplicities. Confucianism, as understood by Wang Pi, reveals only the origin of all things in the world of Being, while Taoism helps it to see into the ultimate destiny, in which all of Being in every mode of change is brought back to a final consummation of perfection which is Nothing, that is, *nothing in particular but everything in full*.[46] It is the end result of all changes, borne out by the inexhaustible richness of function, that should be grasped as the infinite substance.

Such an attempt to restore the manifold being to the fundamental Nothing, explicable in terms of infinite substance, evoked three different reactions in the further development of Chinese metaphysics during the next few centuries.

(1) There was the negative reaction of Pei Wei[ah] (267–330) and Sun Shen[ai] (*ca.* 334). The former advocated the importance of Being at the ex-

---

[44] The *Chin-shu*[be] (History of the Chin Dynasty). (Shanghai: Commercial Press, 1934), Vol. 43, p. 8.

[45] Cf. Chang Chan's[bf] citations from Ho Yen in the commentary on the *Works of Lieh Tzu*[bg] (Chekiang: Chekiang Book Co.,1876), Vol. I, chap. 1, pp. 4–5; Vol. IV, chap. 4, pp. 4–5.

[46] Cf. Wang Pi and Han K'ang-po,[bl] *Commentaries on the Book of Change* (Shanghai: Chang Hua Book Co., 1922): (a) Wang's portion in Vol. III, p. 4; Vol. I, pp. 2, 5–6; Vol. II, p. 11; Vol. IV, pp. 2–3; (b) Han's portion in Vol. VII, pp. 3–4, 6–9; Vol. VIII, pp. 5–6. See also Wang Pi, *Chou-i Lüeh-li*[bm] (Sketchy Exemplifications of the Principles of Change) in the same edn, Vol. X, pp. 1–3, 6–8.

pense of Nothing for the reason that perfect Nothing incapable of giving rise to anything in the realm of life would not be substantial, and, therefore, devoid of any function whatever in the fulfillment of life.[47] The latter, on a different ground of logic, had tried to reduce the utterances of Lao Tzu to a set of absurdities in hopeless self-contradiction.[48]

(2) There was the mild reaction of Hsiang Hsiu[aj] (*ca.* 262) and Kuo Hsiang[ak] (d. 311 or 312) based upon the philosophy of Chuang Tzu. Being and Nothing are correlative terms, not to be reduced, one to the other. Everything in the infinite system of *Tao* is what comes to be by reason of natural transformation in virtue of itself. There is no need for the futile effort to derive anything from Nothing as the primordial begetter. This is spontaneous naturalism intended to be an affirmation of universal Being[49] in the guise of the infinite *Tao.*

(3) The third positive reaction was really something more than a mere reaction. It initiated a movement of metaphysical speculation which would reach to the peak comparable in height with the summits of the primordial Confucianism and Taoism. The spirit of Buddhism encompasses two alternative realms of thought: one conceived under the form of incessant change and the other conceived under the form of eternity. Should we include Hīnayāna Buddhism, we would find more causes to fight against the fluctuating mundane world in which bigoted individuals plunge themselves into the deep waters of miserable blunders and sufferings. The vehicle of deliverance would have to bear them up through the fluctuations of time before reaching the other shore. In this sense, the Buddhist is a time-man, and he is such not in the blessed spirit of a Confucian. But, if we should take Mahāyāna Buddhism into consideration, the enlightenment it attained would illuminate before us an upper world of *Dharma* and *Dharma*-fulfillment in which the tragic sense of life in the process of time would be superseded by the bliss of eternity.[50] So, in this way the liberated spirit of a Mahāyānist would undertake a happy excursion into the poetically inspired space-world with the Taoist. He could, now, afford to forget the tragic sense of life engulfed in the wheel of changing time. Under this circumstance, the spirit of a Buddhist was quite congenial with that of a Taoist.

---

[47] Cf. *Chin-shu* (History of the Chin Dynasty), Vol. 35, pp. 6–7.

[48] Cf. Sun Shen's two essays—"The Denial of Lao Tzu as a Great Sage" and "The Refutation of Lao Tzu"—in the *Kuang-hung-ming-chi*[bn] (Further Collection of Essays on Buddhism), Vol. V, pp. 6–12.

[49] Cf. T'ang Yung-t'ung,[bo] *Preliminary Treatise on the Metaphysical Schools in the Wei-Chin Period,*[bp] 1957, pp. 53–57.

[50] Cf. the *Mahā-parinervāṇa-sūtra*[bf] in Chinese trans. (Shanghai, 1913, 1926), Vol. 2, chap. 2, pp. 11, 19; chap. 3, pp. 23–25, 28; Vol. 3, chap. 4, pp. 11, 15; and the *Mahāprajñā-pāramitāsūtra,*[br] in Chinese trans., portion 16 (published in Ssuch'uan, 1940), Vol. 596, pp. 4–6.

V

It took a long epoch of more than seven centuries (67–789) for Chinese Buddhism to run its course of full development, which was, of course, conditioned by the continual works done in translation[51] and by the creative works done in system-building. From 789 until 960, the Buddhist tradition only went on and slid down in elaboration. Chiefly in the sixth century, the forerunning schools or sects were to be formed and eventually in the period of Sui-T'ang (581–960) the ten different schools of Chinese Buddhism came to be completed. I cannot here attempt to outline their systematic theorizings which, just because of their doctrinal complexity and elaborateness, should form an independent study by themselves.[52] The most that I can do here is to select some features of Buddhism as ways of expressing the singular power of Chinese mentality.

Upon its being first introduced, Buddhism could have taken its deep root in the Chinese mind only by coming under the dominant influence of Chinese thought. It goes without saying that the Chinese Buddhistic metaphysics was evoked and re-enforced by the spirit of Taoism and not vice versa.[53] The Taoists all along had claimed fundamental Nothingness to be the supreme category in their own system. And Buddhists, such as Lokākṣin[al] (resident in China during 176–189), Chih Chien[am] (192–252), and K'ang Seng-hui[an] (d. 280), continually laid extreme importance upon the category of fundamental Nothingness, which they took to be equivalent to the *Tathatā.*[54] During the fourth century, the impact of Taoism upon the philosophy of *Prajñā*[ao] was most obvious in the school of Tao An[ap] (312–385) and his contemporaries.

As regards the controversies about *wu* and *yu* or Nothingness and Being, there were, then, six or seven schools[55] diversified into twelve trends[56] of thought discriminating genuine truth from mundane creeds. On the evidences successively given by the monks Tan Chi[aq] (*ca.* 473), Seng Ching[ar] (302–

---

[51] Cf. *Collected Essays of Liang Chi-ch'ao*[bs], [bt] 1st series (Shanghai: Commercial Press, 1923), pp. 1–23; 81–134; 155–254.

[52] See Junjirō Takakusu, *The Essentials of Buddhist Philosophy* (3rd edn., Honolulu: Office Appliance Co., 1956), and Chiang Wei-Chiao,[bu] *Introduction to Buddhism*[bv] (Shanghai, 1930).

[53] T'ang Yung-t'ung has given ample evidences to demonstrate this fact in the *History of Chinese Buddhism during the Period of 67–588*[ct] (2nd edn., Taipei: Commercial Press, 1962.) Pt. I, chap. 6, pp. 89–111.

[54] Cf. the *Tathatā-parivarta* of the *Dasasahasrika*[cu] in different Chinese translations by Lokaksin and Chih-Ch'ien. See the Taishō edn. of the Buddhist Tripiṭaka in Chinese. No. 224, p. 453; No. 225, p. 474.

[55] Cf. Hui-Ta, Preface to *Seng Chao's Discourses.*[cv] See the Taishō edn. of the Buddhist Tripiṭake in Chinese, No. 1858, p. 150.

[56] Cf. Yüan-k'ang, *Commentary on Seng Chao's Discourses.*[cw] See *ibid.*, No. 1859, pp. 162–163.

475), Hui Ta[as] (*ca.* 481), and Yüan K'ang[at] (*ca.* 649), and on the further evidence[57] of Chi Tsang[au] (549–623), the above set of theories may be tabulated as follows:



a) principle	b) originator	c) consequence
1) fundamental Nothingness[av]	Tao An →	vacuity of the ontic substance
2) non-differentiation[aw]	monk Shen[ax]	
3) nothingness exhibited in the realm of matter[ay]	Chih Tun[az]	
4) nullity of mind[ba]	monk Wen[bb] →	nullity of mind (by implication: affirmation of objective Being)
5) embracement in consciousness[bc]	Yu Fa-kai[bd] →	nullity of matter (by implication: affirmation of mind)
6) illusory transformation[be]	monk I[bf]	
7) assemblage of conditions[bg]	Yu Tao-sui[bh]	

In the above tabular scheme, (1) is more fundamental than the other six, which are all derived therefrom. According to Tao An, "the fundamental Nothingness is the prius of all transformations, and vacuity is the beginning of all the visible world."[57a] All modes of the true *Dharma*[bi] are by nature vacuous and pure, spontaneously ensured from, and essentially identifiable with, the *Bhūtatahata*[bj] (thusness of being) denuded of any contamination of the defiled elements. The trends of thought in the seven schools of Chinese Buddhism during the fourth and fifth centuries were centered round the metaphysical thesis which advocated the importance of Nothingness. From now on, the Buddhists would join hands with the Taoists and form a united front against traditional Confucianism.

The influence of Chuang Tzu is even more prominent in the school of Kumārajīva[bk] (343–413). His contribution lay in the field of the philosophy of *Śūnyatā*[bl] (emptiness). The ultimate reality is that which has emptied out all fantastic whims, so as to show its own purity of essence in the form of Thusness. Among the great number of his pupils, Seng Chao[bm] (384–414) and Tao Sheng[bn] (374?–434) stood out as the double stars never waning in their spiritual illuminancy.

---

[57] Cf. Chi-tsang: *Commentary on the Mādhyamika Śāstra.*[cx] See *ibid.*, No. 1824, p. 29.

[57a] Cited by Chi Tsang.

The synoptic visions of Seng Chao are diversified into three cardinal theses:[58] (1) correlative motion and rest; (2) reconcilable Being and Nothing or inseparable substance and function; and (3) the dovetailing of knowledge and "no-knowledge" transmuted into the supreme wisdom.

(1) I cannot here go into his penetrative arguments in this regard except to note the two conclusions he had arrived at. (a) Men of the world, engulfed in the flux of change, have no sense of assurance inasmuch as life in a shifting course of action leads to death likely to destroy everything achieved in life. They are always sick of life and sick for the unattainable *Nirvāṇa.* (b) The man of wisdom can discern permanence in the midst of change. He knows how to remain non-active in a state of spiritual repose and yet will not dispense with the world of action. It is only he who, being immortal in spirit, can plunge into the deep waters of life with no danger of annihilation. In his approach to *Nirvāṇa*, he has attained it, and yet he will not stand attached to it, out of keeping with the changing world.

(2) Tao An and his associates relied too much upon the fundamental Nothingness by asserting either the vacuity of the ontic substance, or the nullity of matter, or the illusiveness of mind. Seng Chao, however, dissented strongly from all of them. Generally, in the usage of linguistic expressions or "ostensible names,"[bo] we talk about an "objective" which is neither simply real as posited in Being nor simply unreal as denied in Non-Being or Nothing. The said "objective" may be either, and it may be both. In the light of the *Mādhyamika Śāstra*,[bp] to be or not to be: that is the *one-sided* question. It takes a man of supreme wisdom to discern Nothing in all modes of Being and to observe Being in the midst of Nothing. The ontic substance and the complete truth thereof cannot be rent into grotesque pieces.

(3) Seng Chao's metaphysics is a philosophy of the supreme wisdom which is concerned with the ultimate reality, *Nirvāṇa*, the *Dharmakāya*[bq] (consummate being), the *Bhūtatathatā* (thusness of being), and the *Dharmata*[br] (reality as such). All of these are to him different names of the same "objective." In order to avoid misunderstanding, however, a distinction should be made between the supreme wisdom per se and wisdom in the form

---

[58] Cf. his *Discourses on the Perennial, on the Non-Vacuous* and *on the Prajñā as No-Knowledge.* See the Buddhist Tripiṭaka in Chinese, No. 1858, pp. 150–7.

of *upāyakauśalya*,[bs] i.e., expedient wisdom. The power of the former penetrates deeply into the objective, whereas the function of the latter adapts itself to all beings in the changing world. By virtue of wisdom per se we are to illuminate the nature of the Void, while by means of the wisdom in expedience we are to launch into the world of fluctuating Being. In dealing with Being in full, we shall have no misgivings with the nature of the Void. And, therefore, we can encounter the realm of Being without attachment. That being the case, we can illuminate what is essentially vacuous without falling back upon it tenaciously. In the midst of knowledge in acquaintance with the world we shall arrive at a wondrous state of the liberated spirit with no knowledge whatever. The reason is that, if you know something in particular, there will be numberless other things that you do not know. Just because the spirit of the divine is with no knowledge in particular, there will be nothing that it does not know, freely and all-pervasively. Hence, the knowledge of no-knowledge embraces all that there is to be known. This may sound quite perplexing, but men of great genius like Shakespeare in the West have understood it quite well.

> O, out of that "no hope"
> What great hope have you! No hope that way is
> Another way so high a hope that even
> Ambition cannot pierce a wink beyond,
> But doubt discovery there.[59]

The objective of the knowledge of no-knowledge is intent on the spirit of the divine. The divine spirit reposed in a state of vacuity, having no fumblings to get rid of, can be said to possess no knowledge. No-knowledge that way is not the same as the supposed knowledge about Nothingness, which is something nullified into nothing. It is far above mere knowledge correlative with the limited modes of Being. It is completely denuded of nescience, which is sheer ignorance. In a word, it is Enlightenment[bt] and *Prajñā* fused into the One. Enlightenment shades off what is extrinsic of itself and is essentially inner light in the form of no-knowledge, while *Prajñā* is an out-pouring of the inner light over the world-all by deunding it of fallaciousness.

I have mentioned Seng Chao and Tao Sheng as the double stars in the ethereal sky of Chinese Buddhistic speculation. But there is a difference between them. Seng Chao has formulated a system of principles explanatory of the nature of wisdom, whereas Tao Sheng has turned the Mahāyānic theory into a way of spiritual life whereby human nature is fulfilled to the extent that it can partake of *buddha*-nature.[bu]

---

[59] *The Tempest*, Act 2, sc. 1.

Hithertofore, the Chinese Buddhists had looked upon the mundane world as a case of malady and thought about the actual individual as a source of blunder. Any acceptance of the world in its illusory appearances and any affirmation of the individual in his fantastic grimaces would indicate a ridiculous view. But the monk Hui Yüan[bv] (334–416) had a different turn of mind. The world could exist in the form of permanence constitutive of the ultimate reality. The human being could come to the possession of a real self in intimacy with the Buddha. This line of thought had quite an influence upon Tao Sheng in formulating his philosophy of *buddha*-nature. For brevity's sake, his fundamental ideas[60] in this regard may be enunciated as follows:

(1) The all-pervasive function of *Prajñā* and the substantial nature of *Nirvāṇa* are inseparable in the make-up of ultimate reality, which will embody the true *Dharma* and the perfect *Buddhatā* in the unity of *Buddha-dharma.*[bw]

(2) The ideal of *Nirvāṇa* is realizable in the midst of fluctuating life and death. Hence, the pure land of the Buddha is not different from the existent realm of all creatures. By way of moral purification, all creatures dwelling in the defiled world of blunders will be reinstated in the world of the noble and sublime, won over through the employment of reason. Abidance in the enlightening reason of the Buddha enables each and all to see every facet of the world as pure as it can be.

(3) The conquest of the darkened mind by the potency of reason is the only way to emancipation. In pursuance of this, the real self of spontaneous freedom is achieved by the righteous mind, which has been restored to its original purity of nature through the exertion of reason. Thus, all human beings—not even excepting the *icchantika*[bx] (infidel)—being endowed with the intrinsic reason can come to share equally the ubiquitous *buddha*-nature and to unfold the illuminating *buddha*-wisdom implicit in their own conscience. In this sense, the human individuals are spiritual comrades, equal in cosmic importance to that of the Buddha.

(4) As the light of supreme wisdom has a most direct penetration into his own rational essence, each man through the devout devotion can come to a *sudden awakening*[by] of the *buddha*-nature within the inner constitution of his own nature and achieve *buddha*hood on his own accord. This is the chief tenet of Mahāyāna Buddhism.

---

[60] Tao-sheng's ideas are scattered in the commentaries on the *Saddharma-puṇḍarīka,*[dn] on the *Mahāparinirvāṇa-sūtra,*[do] and on the *Vimalakīrti-nirdeśa-sūtra.*[dp]

Tao Sheng's philosophy of *buddha*hood is of great importance for several reasons. (a) It had evoked a number of interpretations of *buddha*-nature during the fifth and sixth centuries. (b) His emphasis on the perfectibility of human nature after the model of *buddha*-nature is quite congenial with the Confucian theory of the original goodness of man. This is evidenced by the fact that the poet-philosopher, Hsieh Ling-yün[bz] (385–433), in hearty sympathy with Tao Sheng's idea of sudden awakening, made a very favorable comparison of the spiritual achievement of Confucius with that of the Buddha.[61] (c) His theory of sudden awakening by reverting to the inmost nature of the mind anticipated the later philosophy of Ch'an[ca] (Zenism). (d) His concept of the importance of reason in gaining an insight into ultimate reality even anticipated the Neo-Confucianism of the Sung Dynasty (960–1279). In short, Tao Sheng was, on the one hand, the culmination of that line of thought in the linkage of Buddhism with Taoism, and, on the other, a bridge over which several sects of Buddhism were to make headway in alliance with some schools of Confucianism.

In the epoch of Sui-T'ang (581–960) ten different schools of Buddhism flourished in China. "A beggar of time" like me, finally, cannot refrain from mentioning, in particular, the categorical scheme of Hua-yen—the Avataṁsaka School[cb]—as a powerful expression of Chinese comprehensive harmony. Theoretically, if not entirely historically, the Hua-yen school may be made the line of convergence along which many systems of Buddhistic thought would have their confluence.

The categorical scheme of Hua-yen[62] was an attempt to integrate all the differentiating worlds, all the noble deed-acts, and all the achieved end-results of the *buddhas* in the past, present, and future into a sum total of the true realm of *Dharma* in the form of supreme perfection with a view to showing that each human being, inherently possessed of wondrous excellences, could awaken *buddha*-nature in himself, all at once, adequately, spontaneously, and congruently. The one real Realm of *Dharma*[cc] is not far from this actual world of man if everyone knows thoroughly how to live and act wisely by way of participation in the fundamental wisdom of the Buddha. *Buddha*-nature *in toto* has the potentiality of coming in ingress into the perennial spiritual constitution of man. This is the equality and equanimity of *Dharma.* The spiritual sun sheds its exuberant light over and into all living beings, and all living beings, in turn, assimilate and reflect and interfuse and reenforce this spiritual light uniquely and reciprocally. Thus, all modes of the spontaneous function of reason, manifesting themselves in infinite varieties, would, at the same time, be actuated into a concert of life-activities, in unison with the One True Realm of *Dharma*, equanimous in essence. In the midst of enriched varieties, the light of *Tathatā* (Thusness) radiated by the Buddha and witnessed and shared by all men alike will gladden the differentiating minds and the differentiating worlds into the non-differentiation of reality perfectly embedded in the integral truth, which is enlightenment, inherent in each and interpenetrative into all.

---

[61] Cf. Hsieh Ling-yün, *Essays on the Discrimination of Doctrines*[du] in the Further Collection of Essays on Buddhism, Vol. 18, pp. 13–19.

[62] Cf. Chiai-huan[dy]; *Essentials of the Avataṁsaka-sūtra,*[dz] compiled in 1128. Nanking Centre for Buddhist Publications, 1872.

Taken in its all-inclusive unity, this One True *Dharmadhātu*[cd] (realm of *Dharma*) evinces the omnipresence and omnipotence of Mind constitutive of the noumenon of all the phenomenal worlds, diversifying itself into (a) the differential Realms of Events, (b) the integrative Realm of Reason, (c) the interpenetrative Realm of Reason and Events, and (d) the interlacing Realm of all Events.

The theoretical formulation of the categorical scheme,[63] initiated by Tu-shun[ce] (557–640), developed by Chih-yen[cf] (602–668), elaborated by Fa-tsang[cg] (643–720) and further expounded by Cheng-kuan[ch] (760–820) and Tsung-mi[ci] (d. 841), embraces three grand views,[64] i.e., (1) of the true Void,[cj] (2) of the congruence of Reason and Events,[ck] and (3) of the dovetailing of all Events in the form of universal coherence.[cl]

In the first view, an attempt is made to show (a) that the worlds of physical properties can be dissolved into the nature of the Void, just as phenomena are transmutable into the noumenon; (b) that the Void as the ultimate reality is constitutive of, and identifiable with, the assemblage of purified physical phenomena; (c) that the Void and the physical are mutually congruent; and (d) that, eventually, after the inpenetrable inertia of the physical is explained away in terms of the efficacy of mental and spiritual transmutations and through the insinuation of the ontic essence—the true nature of the Void—into the physical, all one-sided characterizations in respect of the physical and the Void are transcended in the highest integral truth of the middle path.

In the second view, it is maintained that reason and events can be melted into one another in a perfect manner. Reason is the wondrous function deeply rooted in the *Bhūtatathatā* and has its efficacy anytime anywhere in virtue of the omnipresence of the Buddha. This can be accounted for in the following ways: (a) Reason as a whole, denuded of any specification, is universally present in all the worlds of events, however differentiated the latter may be, inasmuch as the *Dharmatā* is manifesting itself incessantly without limitation. And, therefore, even the minutest event-particles are immersed in the integral truth and imbued adequately with reason. (b) The items of events which, as such, are differentiated must be restored into unity in the integration of reason, just as the wavicles, spreading forth far and away, are losing their own unique momenta and can be re-enforced and saved only by taking up continually with the oceanic ingratiation. Hence, it may be asserted that events, each and all, are constituted according to the reason which is exhibited therein and that the truth is verified by events which are the constitutents thereof. Though they are interrelated, the truth, however, is not simply events which, once constituted, would overshadow the reason inherent in them, and the events are not simply the truth which, if verified, would supersede the events limitative in their differentiation.

---

[63] For the important literature on the Hua-yen, see the Taishō edn. of the Buddhist Tripiṭaka in Chinese. No. 1836, pp. 71–76; Nos. 1866–1890, pp. 477–792.

[64] Here I am utilizing Tsung-mi's *Elucidations of the Hua-yen View of the Dharmadhātu*,[cj] which is essentially more systematic than the earlier expositions by Tu-shun and Fa-tsang, (*ibid.*, No. 1884, pp. 684–692).

In the third view, it is asserted that the dovetailing of all events will vindicate the universal coherence of truth. This can be shown as follows: (1) Reason operates for the sake of events. It makes the events what they are in the mode of existence, in the way of differentiation, qualitatively as well as quantitatively, and in the process of change and transformation. Hence, the function of reason issuing in truth will come in ingress into all the differentiating worlds of events. (2) The events, each and all, abide by reason in virtue of which they would go through the process of change in incessant successions and remain permanent in the realm of eternity. And, therefore, the events in observance of reason would permeate all modes of *Dharma.* (3) The events, as implied in reason, would bring forth the following modes of implication: (a) one implicates another; (b) one implicates every other; (c) one implicates all others; (d) all others implicate one; (e) all others implicate every other one; and (f) all others implicate all others. Thus, the whole and the parts, the one and the many, as well as the universal and the particular, will be intertwined.

The above consideration brings into prominence the principle of mutual implication, the principle of mutual relevance, and the principle of all-pervasive coherence. All these principles, taken together, are explanatory of the integral infinite *Dharmadhātu.* In the way of mutual implication, any one (*dharma*) can gather up any other one unto itself and enter into the constitution of that one; any one can gather up all others unto itself and enter into the constitution of that one; all others can gather up all others unto themselves and enter into the constitution of those others. Hence, the principle of mutual relevance needs no further elucidation. Furthermore, the principle of all-pervasive coherence holds on the following conditions: (a) one *dharma* gathers up another one into itself and enters into that one; (b) one gathers up all other *dharmas* into itself so as to enter into that one; (c) one gathers up another one so as to enter into all others; (d) one gathers up all others in order to enter into all others; (e) all other *dharmas* gather up one so as to enter into another one; (f) all other *dharmas* gather up all others so as to enter into any one; (g) all others gather up one so as to enter into all others; and (h) all others gather up all others in order to enter into them all. When all of these are melted together, the ultimate result is the integrity of the infinitely perfect *Dharmadhātu.* If the above conditions are fulfilled, then the ten approaches to the metaphysical profundity and the six characteristics of all *Dharma* will be clear in the light of day without further elucidation. In view of such a philosophy, if any person is to gain a firm footing in the One Real *Dharmadhātu*, he must live and have his being in the spirit of infinity.

VI

In the above I have tried to depict tersely the ways in which the Chinese contemplative minds have been fascinated with the world and the human individual, which are taken, however, not so much in natural as "in dramatic regard."[65] The world and the individual, taken "in natural regard," would be the exhibitions of related facts, definite in content, determinate in nature, specific in conditions, articulate in forms, full in being, or substantial in essence. All of these, characteristic of scientific explanations, are, of course, very important for the understanding of man and the world. But Chinese philosophers choose to take a step further than this in their modes of contemplation. From their viewpoints, the world taking shape in ultimate reality must transcend the limitations of relatively specific characterizations before all of its complete nature can come to the light of day. The actual world, strictly philosophically conceived, should be transformed into an ideal pattern adorned with the axiological unity of supreme perfection. The Chinese always aspire toward *the transfigured world* of liberating art, of edifying morality, of contemplative truth, and of religious piety. Any other world short of these will be a realm of anxiety making us look pale and tired.

---

[65] Cf. C. Lloyd Morgan, *Mind at the Crossways* (London: Williams & Norgate, 1929), pp. 2–4, 13–14, 20–21, 200–204, 224–227, 230–235, 267–272.

This is why the Confucians have craved so much for the continually creative potency of the heavenly *Tao* in the shaping of the cosmic order as a whole. This is why the Taoists have whole-heartedly cherished the ideal of Nothingness for its coming to the rescue of all things relative in the realm of Being. And this is also why Chinese Buddhists have vehemently struggled for the partaking of the *buddha*-nature embedded in the integral truth of the ultimate spiritual enlightenment.

As to the nature and status of man, the Chinese, either as a unique person or as a social being, takes no pride in being a type of individual in estrangement from the world he lives in or from the other fellows he associates with. He is intent on embracing within the full range of his vital experience all aspects of plenitude in the nature of the whole cosmos and all aspects of richness in the worth of noble humanity. Anything different from this would be a sign of the impoverishment in the inner constitution of personality which is miserably truncated in development. This accounts for the concerted efforts of Chinese philosophers to advocate the exaltation of the individual into the inward sageliness and the outward worthiness which together make up the intrinsic greatness of man as Man.

a 方東美
b 墨家哲學
c 莊子
d 涅槃
e 如來
f 楊朱
g 司馬談
h 司馬遷
i 商瞿，子木
j 史記
k 楊何
l 彖傳
m 繫辭傳
n 說卦傳
o 文言傳
p 象傳
q 旁通
r 生命情調與美感
s 易學討論集
t 禮記
u 焦循
v 易圖略
w 易話
x 易通釋
y 易章句
z 戴震，東原
aa 原善
ab 孟子
ac 荀卿，荀子
ad 戴德
ae 大戴禮記
af 盧見曾
ag 道
ah 老子
ai 大象
aj 無
ak 有
al 無為而無不為
am 為而不恃
an 長而不宰
ao 生而不有
ap 建之以常無有
aq 以空虛不毀萬物為實
ar 馬叙倫
as 莊子義證
at 惠施
au 反者道之用
av 玄之又玄

aw 逍遙遊
ax 鵬
ay 釋德清，憨山
az 寥天一
ba 章炳麟，太炎
bb 齊物論釋
bc 何晏
bd 王弼
be 晉書
bf 張湛
bg 列子
bh 裴頠
bi 孫盛
bj 向秀
bk 郭象
bl 韓康伯
bm 周易略例
bn 廣弘明集
bo 湯用彤
bp 魏晉玄學論稿
bq 大般涅槃經
br 大槃若經第十六分
bs 梁啟超
bt 梁任公近著第一輯
中卷
bu 蔣維喬
bv 佛學概論
bw 支婁迦讖
bx 支謙
by 康僧會
bz 般若
ca 道安
cb 曇濟
cc 僧鏡
cd 慧達
ce 元康
cf 吉藏
cg 本無
ch 本無異
ci 即色
cj 心無
ck 識含
cl 幻化
cm 緣會
cn 琛法師
co 支遁，道林
cp 温法師
cq 于法開
cr 壹法師

[cs] 于道邃
[ct] 漢魏兩晉南北朝佛教史
[cu] 道行經
[cv] 肇論序
[cw] 肇論疏
[cx] 中觀論疏
[cy] 法
[cz] 真如
[da] 鳩摩羅什
[db] 空性
[dc] 僧肇
[dd] 道生
[de] 肇論：物不遷論，不真空論，般若無知論
[df] 假名
[dg] 中觀論
[dh] 法身
[di] 法性
[dj] 漚和(拘舍羅)，方便善巧
[dk] 菩提
[dl] 佛性
[dm] 慧遠
[dn] 法華經
[do] 大般若經
[dp] 維摩詰所說經
[dq] 佛法
[dr] 一闡提
[ds] 頓悟
[dt] 謝靈運
[du] 辨宗論
[dv] 禪
[dw] 華嚴宗
[dx] 一真法界
[dy] 戒環
[dz] 華嚴經要解
[ea] 杜順
[eb] 智儼
[ec] 法藏
[ed] 澄觀
[ee] 宗密
[ef] 真空觀
[eg] 理事無礙觀
[eh] 周遍含容觀
[ei] 註華嚴法界觀門

KALIDAS BHATTACHARYYA

The Status of the Individual in Indian Philosophy

I. Introduction

Regarding the Indian attitude toward the individual, Westerners hold certain views which are not wholly correct. They are:

(1) In Indian metaphysics there is no place for a plurality of individuals. Plurality of individuals is ultimately an illusion: the ultimate reality is one ineffable Absolute (called *Brahman*).

(2) This metaphysics has so influenced the general Indian mind that in formulating the ideal of life it has ignored what concerns, or should concern, individuals as individuals. The ultimate aim of life, for Indians, is complete merging in the Absolute.

(3) It is because of this neglect of the individual that Indians could never develop systematic ethics and social philosophy, and the only spiritual religion they have developed is a mystical form of pantheism which, according to many Westerners, is no religion at all and borders dangerously on a life which is thoroughly irreligious and irresponsible.

(4) Even where they have admitted individuals, as, for example, on the empirical (*vyāvahārika*) plane, they have systematically deprived them of freedom of will. Westerners hold that the Indian doctrine of *karma* is a direct denial of the freedom of individuals.

Of these four views, the last one is wholly incorrect, and the first, second, and the third are correct only insofar as they represent the standpoint of the Advaita Vedānta. But the Advaita Vedānta is only one of the Indian systems of philosophy. There are other systems, such as the Nyāya, the Vaiśeṣika, the Sāṁkhya, the Yoga, the Mīmāṁsā, and non-Advaita Vedāntic systems, none of which is of less significance to Indian life in general than the Advaita. There are also lesser philosophers, such as the Śaivas, Śāktas, and Grammarians. Add to the list the three great heterodox systems (Buddhism, Jainism, and the philosophy of the Cārvākas) and we have all kinds of Indian views on the individual. Except for a few Śaivas and Grammarians and the philosophers of one or two schools of Buddhism, none denied plurality of selves, none recommended the liquidation of individuals, and none spoke of the Absolute as the only reality or preached pantheism of the Advaita brand.

In fact, there is no *one* Indian view of the status of the individual. There are many views, each upheld by substantial Indian thinkers and by a large section of the Indian people. The Cārvāka system apart—which somehow could not stand repeated onslaught by every other system—if there is anything common to the different Indian views of the individual, it is (1) that every individual has a spiritual side; (2) that his spiritual side is, from the valuational point of view, more essential than his material side; (3) that its autonomy has to be fully realized; and (4) that this realization is possible through progressive detachment (*vairāgya*) from the less essential sides of his being. Detachment from these has not always meant their dismissal.

II. INDIVIDUALS AS FREE AGENTS

To show now that the last one of the four views of the Indian attitude on the individual is wholly incorrect:

By the word "individual" we mean throughout this paper a human being who is not entirely an item of Nature, accepting unquestioningly what Nature offers and submitting blindly to its forces, but one who often resists it and initiates new actions, one, in other words, who is as much above Nature as in it. This over-natural status of man is called "freedom."*[1] We are told that in this sense of the word "freedom" Indians have never admitted free individuals. Their Law of *Karma*, we are told, is a direct disavowal of such freedom.

This, however, is entirely wrong.[2] Movements made by an individual have been classified by Indians into three groups—*tāmasika*, *rājasika*, and *sāttvika*. *Tāmasika* movements are those over which the individual, whose movements they are, has no control, the individual remaining in a state of stupor, as it were. These movements are absolutely unfree. Movements which are blindly biological belong to this group. *Rājasika* movements are those of which the individual is conscious, though unreflectively, as *his* actions—actions, viz., for which he is prepared to take full responsibility, but which are still not free, because they proceed through, and are determined by, emotions and sentiments, the keynote of which is positive attachment (*rāga*) or repulsion

---

*Because of continued serious illness, the author was unable to supply the documentation he had intended to provide—Editor's Note.

[1] It is because of this over-natural status that man can, in theoretical pursuit, question why Nature behaves as it does and can certify or reject what it offers and thus build science and philosophy.

[2] This is mainly the Sāṁkhya doctrine. We find it discussed in the *Gītā*, in Vyāsa's Commentary on *Yoga-sūtra*, and also in the sub-commentaries on Vyāsa's Commentary.

(*dveṣa*). These unfree movements are as much biological and blind as the *tāmasika* ones, and yet they are claimed by the individual as *his* actions only because he can, and often does, follow, though unreflectively, quite a large number of subtle varieties or *rāga* and *dveṣa*, which animals and men-in-stupor cannot. There is an important reason, again, why the individual is prepared to take responsibility for these actions. It is always possible for the individual, though this requires a good amount of effort, not to yield entirely to the operating *rāgas* and *dveṣas*, but either to keep his actions confined within his mind, preventing them from maturing into physical actions, or to channelize them into moral contexts, maintaining all through an over-all control over them.

So far, this over-all control is only possible. As and when, however, it becomes actual, the actions that result have risen to the level called *sāttvika.* The guiding principle at this level is detachment (*vairāgya*), which, however, admits of degree. Short of absolute detachment, it leads to actions which are socio-moral (*dharma*) at the lower stage and spiritual (*ādhyātmika*) at a higher. At the moral level, noted in the last paragraph, actions proceeding through *rāga* and *dveṣa* were only channelized, and in more austere forms of *dharma* attempts are made to render these two motive forces more and more inoperative. Attempts at channelizing ordinary actions or preventing them from maturing into physical movements, practiced again and again, lead in their turn to accumulation of corresponding dispositions which, as they grow stronger and stronger, sap, in proportion, the life-force of the germs of action that could mature through *rāga* and *dveṣa.* This entire course of progressive sapping constitutes the spiritual life of the individual, and, with sapping concluded, he reaches a stage which is the last doorway to liberation (*mukti*). Activities prior to that liberation, beginning with the first actual control, are *sāttvika*; and, when liberation is attained, one finds oneself in a new dimension altogether, beyond all *tamas, rajas*, and *sattva.* Through all stages, *sāttvika* actions are free in the sense that one so acting has so far detached himself from Nature.

This account is given explicitly in the Sāṁkhya, but, somehow or other, with minor variations here and there, it has been accepted in most other systems.[3]

Also, the Law of *Karma*, properly understood, is *not* against freedom of action. It is true that according to this law my present life is somehow determined by the merits and demerits of what I did in my previous life, that life, again, by the merits and demerits of what I had done in a life still previous, and so on ad infinitum, but this does not mean that everything of a particular life is determined. It has been explicitly stated that only three things in my life are determined. They are (1) the bodily and mental make-up and social position at the time of birth in that particular life (*jāti*), (2) the span of that life (*āyuḥ*), and (3) particular experiences with all the hedonic tones that they have in that life and all that is necessary as objects or direct or indirect causes of those experiences (*bhoga*). Among these direct and indirect causes are included my physiological movements and actions, which proceed through *rāga* and *dveṣa*, but not actions at the moral and spiritual levels. Moral and spiritual actions have been excepted on the following grounds:

---

[3] Except in the Cārvāka system, which is frankly materialistic, and also in the Nyāya and the Vaiśeṣika, which never took an interest in these details.

(1) We are definitely told that with the results yielded in a particular life the merits and demerits of actions done in the previous life get exhausted, and these results as experiences with appropriate hedonic tones are meant as rewards or punishments. It follows that, if the results as experiences in the present life could in their turn yield further results with hedonic tones—whether in this life or in the next—that would be the grossest form of injustice. It would amount to rewarding or punishing an individual for all eternity. That would also go against the accepted theory that merits or demerits of actions get exhausted in their results.

(2) It would also speak against all possibility of betterment of the individual, and equally against all conscious effort for liberation (*mukti*), unless, of course, the betterment and the effort in question are results of good actions in the life preceding the present one. But, then, even in the case of the latter alternative, the goodness of these previous actions has to be explained, and, should one say that it, too, is similarly the result of good actions done in a life preceding the previous one, it would follow that an individual once good in one life is good in all lives, and similarly with individuals who are bad; and that, in turn, would mean that bad individuals can never become good and the good never bad—a thesis which no Indian system would ever allow. Perhaps it would also follow that a bad soul should continually grow worse than before—a doctrine more severe than that of eternal damnation and never acceptable to Indians. It would also follow that, if as a result of non-meritorious actions an individual is born in the next life as a tree or a sub-human animal, he would lose all chance as much of betterment as of worsening, for the actions (movements) of these latter, as not proceeding through *rāga* and *dveṣa*, could never acquire merit or demerit—they are completely amoral.

(3) If the Law of *Karma* is understood as a theory of complete determination, this would go against the very spirit of scriptural or, for the matter of that, any, prescription or prohibition. If one is bound to do what one does, why should there be prescription or prohibition?

So, Indians never meant that everything of the present life is determined by what one did in the preceding life. Add to this the fact that they have distinguished moral and spiritual actions from actions that are biological, and it will follow that there is nothing against these actions being considered free. To repeat: Spiritual actions, which proceed from detachment (*vairāgya*), have maximum freedom, because there is no submission to *rāga* and *dveṣa*; moral actions as channelizing, according to prescriptions and prohibitions, normal biological activities are free in the sense that in their case there is no blind submission; and actions which proceed consciously through *rāga* and *dveṣa* and are consequently accompanied by an I-feeling are free only in the sense that in their case there is always a possibility of not having submitted to them.

III. Plurality of Individuals

It is only in one Indian system, viz., the Advaita Vedānta, along with a few sub-schools of Śaiva philosophy, and the philosophy of Grammar that the plurality of individuals has been denied an ultimate status. All other schools and sub-schools have recognized plurality as an ultimate truth. Most of these schools and sub-schools have taken this for granted, and only a few have come forward to meet the Advaita thesis on logical grounds.

The Advaita Vedāntist has denied the ultimate status of individual persons principally on three grounds. They are:

(1) The individual as we ordinarily understand him is a complex consisting of a body, a mind (*ahaṁkāra* = ego),[4] and a self. Of these three constituents, the self is the most important; it is the essence of the individual. Normally, this essence remains fused—one might even say confused—with the mind and the body, but, since in itself it is an autonomous essence, the individual, whose ultimate duty it is to realize himself, will have to distinguish this essence. He will have to dissociate it from the mind and the body, which are only accidents. This dissociation of the self has been understood by the Advaita Vedāntist in an extreme sense. He understands it as the severance of all its relations with the mind and the body, even of the slimmest relation

---

[4] The self is distinguished from the mind on the ground that it can keep itself dissociated from certain states and affairs which clearly belong to the mind. For example, one may very deliberately keep oneself undisturbed by insults and worries even while these, as mental affairs, are actually taking place in the mind, quite as much as one may calmly tolerate physical torture.

called "reference," and from this he concludes, a little too easily, that therefore this dissociate self cannot be many, for it is only the bodies and minds (*ahaṁkāras*) that are many, and, if the dissociate self—the self-in-itself—has no need of even referring to these, there is no reason why it should be many. To admit plurality of selves over and above that of minds and bodies would unnecessarily multiply entities.

(2) Often, again, the Advaita Vedāntist has denied the plurality of selves on the *ipsi dixit* of the scriptures, particularly of the Upaniṣads.

(3) Later Advaita thinkers have attacked the very concept of plurality (difference). They have pointed out inconsistencies in that concept.

The Advaita Vedāntist thus holds that ultimately there is only one self, and, as the self is the essence of the individual, all individuals must be essentially one. This one essence—the Absolute, or *Brahman* as it is called—is in no need of even referring to minds and bodies. It follows that the many individuals we normally are in this world are due only to illusory identification of this Absolute with different mind-body complexes.

However, other Indian systems[5] have rejected this Advaita doctrine. They have not indeed denied that the self constitutes the essence of the individual or that it is the duty of the individual to realize his self as the autonomous essence. What they have refused to do is to interpret this autonomy as rejection of all its relations, even the relation of reference, to the mind and the body.

The Sāṁkhya, the Yoga, and a number of Śaiva thinkers hold that the self, even in its full autonomy, constantly refers to—in the language of Indian philosophy, reveals or witnesses—mental states and, through these, as the occasion arises, objects that are non-mental. Mere reference (revealing or witnessing) need not affect the freedom of the self. One may keep oneself aloof from certain things and yet just witness their behavior. The self as just witnessing the mind and its states is what is actually found in self-consciousness. As the self, while witnessing the mind and its states, can yet retain its autonomy there is no need to reject this witnessing. The autonomy of the self need not, therefore, transcend its witnessing or reference function. The free self as just witnessing the mind and its states is called in the Sāṁkhya and the Yoga, and even in the Advaita Vedānta, *sākṣin* (witness) or *sākṣi-puruṣa* (witness-self); and, since it thus refers, of its own nature, to a particular mind (ego), which reference it has no need to transcend or abjure, it follows that the self as *sākṣin* is particular. Since, again, no *sākṣin* can refer in this way to another particular mind (ego), it follows, further, that selves, even as autonomous, are many.

---

[5] With the exception of a few Śaivas and Grammarians.

Free reference of the *sākṣin* to the particular mind corresponding to it may indeed imply that it might not have exercised that reference and is, therefore, capable of withdrawing it. But this may well be an impotent capability, just wishful thinking, not capable enough to mature into actuality. One may be reminded here of Kant's Ideas of Reason. A possible need not be a possible actual. The Advaitist has not shown that this possible withdrawal of reference is a possibility of actual withdrawal.

Advaita has indeed attributed this reference at the *sākṣin* stage to the last vestige of nescience (*ajñāna*). But what exactly is meant here by "last vestige" and how it can possibly disappear have never been clearly stated in Advaita texts. The Advaitists have only expressed their conviction that it should disappear.

We may note in this connection that the doctrine of *jīvan-mukti* (liberation in one's lifetime), to which the Advaitist, along with many others, has subscribed, is not very consistent with his denial of individuality. The Advaitist admits that some individuals may realize their autonomous essences and, therefore, their complete identity with the Absolute, even in their lifetime, still retaining their minds (and bodies). These are the *jīvan-muktas*. If, now, these *jīvan-muktas*, who have retained their minds (and bodies), can yet be completely free (liberated), it is difficult to believe that they have ceased to be individuals. If their activities were merely biological, and nothing more, we could somehow imagine them as wholly identical with *Brahman*, for it is not difficult to conceive that these activities are not appropriated by the self. But the Advaitist has, as a matter of fact, attributed to them actions which are also moral and spiritual.

The plurality of individuals was denied only by the Advaita, not even by other schools of Vedānta. The Rāmānujists and Madhvas, for example, have resolutely held that even pure selves are many. They have replied to all the Advaita charges against the concept of difference and interpreted the so-called monistic scriptural texts along different lines; and, as regards the autonomy of the self, they have distinguished it from the body only, the mind (*ahaṁkāra* = ego) and the self being the same thing in their systems. This is equally the view of Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika thinkers and Mīmāṁsakas.

That there are many individual selves in addition to many bodies is for all these thinkers an obvious truth to start with,[6] and, if the Advaitist has argued against this obvious truth, they have offered counterarguments. Their main point is that, even if the ultimate realization of the self amounts to severance of all connection with the body[7] that the individual had, even then the distinctive individuality of the self need not disappear. Appeal to the law of parsimony would be useless here, for parsimony is relevant only in the context of hypotheses, not with regard to obvious facts.

---

[6] The famous Sāṁkhya argument to which others have also subscribed, viz., that, if there were only one self for all individuals (*jīvas*), then with the birth or death of one individual other individ-

Some hold even that at no stage is there complete freedom from the body. Even God, for them, has an eternal body made of a pure stuff, and so has the self that at liberation severs connection with the gross (and subtle) body.

With the exception of the Rāmānujists, these philosophers are all deists, holding that God is one of the many selves, though infinitely superior to others in many respects. They understand God in such a way that his infinity is not in any way jeopardized by the independence of others.

The Rāmānujists and Vedāntists of a few other schools, on the other hand, have preferred theism. The Rāmānujists hold that the individual selves, distinct from one another and from God, are all still adjectival to God, and believe that God and all these adjectival selves have formed one grand unity. Of this grand unity, God forms the central part—he is the substantive to which these selves, and the world, too, cling as adjectives. The Rāmānujists warn, however, that the relation between God, on the one hand, and the individual selves and the world, on the other, is no form of identity-in-difference. Much along the lines of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, they hold that, if two things are identical, they cannot be different at the same time, and vice versa, though they admit at the same time that this does not preclude the possibility of these factors forming a unity. In the case, for example, of a man with a stick in his hand, the man and the stick, though each a distinct thing, have formed a unity, viz., the man-with-the-stick. Such unities may sometimes be very close (*apṛthaksiddhi* = inseparability), as in the case of a blue flower, where the flower and the blue color, each distinct from the other, form such a close system that it is impossible to divorce one of them from the other. The example of loose unity (*pṛthaksiddhi* = separability) is the man-with-the-stick. The unity that God and the individual selves have formed is a close one, according to the Rāmānujists. Often, indeed, Rāmānuja has compared

---

uals would also be born or die, or that, if one individual were deaf or lame, others, too, would have the same lot, is either pointing to the simple truth that, like individuals, their selves, too, are many, or arguing to its plurality from the *sākṣin*hood of the selves.

[7] Severance not as in death. For, according to Indians, death is not the end of the self's journey. There are repeated births and deaths. Hence, severance of all connections means such absolute severance as is calculated to prevent further birth. Again, most of the Indian thinkers hold that an individual even after death, remains with a subtle body which is almost a permanent appendage around which different grosser and grosser elements accumulate to form grosser and grosser bodies.

the relation between God and the individual selves with that between a master and his servants or that between a king and his subjects, between the soul and the body, etc., almost suggesting that the unity formed need not be a close one. But this is only a loose way of speaking. What he means is perhaps that God, the substantival part of the unity, could remain without reference to individual selves but never does remain so, his remaining alone being a mere possibility that never, even from the metaphysical point of view, can mature into actuality. With the Advaitist, on the other hand, this possibility indicates actual metaphysical transcendence.

The Vedāntists of some other schools, viz., the Bhāskarites and Nimbārkists, have argued, however, in favor of identity-in-difference. The notion of identity-in-difference has always troubled the Indian mind. Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika thinkers and the Rāmānujists have openly denounced it as self-contradictory, and those who have favored the concept have always had to defend their case. They have defended it in one of the three following ways:

(1) Logic cannot denounce what is, after all, a patent fact. Is not identity-in-difference evident in the cases of substance and its characters, material cause (stuff) and its effects (modes), parts and their whole, etc?

If the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika has, in such cases, proposed to replace identity-in-difference by what it calls inherence (*samavāya*), this is not merely a gratuitous complication of the issue; it involves another difficulty, viz., that the relation of this inherence with that to which something stands in that inherence relation goes unexplained. Rāmānuja's attempt to replace identity-in-difference by what he calls "unity of differents" is no less defective, for he, too, has faltered over clear cases like the relation between a substance and its attributes and could bypass the difficulty only by postulating the hasty notion of close unity (*apṛthaksiddhi*).

(2) Others, less defiant of the Law of Contradiction, have defended identity-in-difference by holding that the two things between which this relation holds are identical in one way (i.e., from one point of view) and different in another (i.e., from another point of view).

(3) The third way of defending identity-in-difference is to argue that, though ultimately (from the *pāramārthika*—ultimate—point of view) identity-in-difference is untenable (because self-contradictory), we in our daily life put up with it, which means that it has provisional, pragmatic (*vyāvahārika*) value.

The first of these three defenses was offered by the Bhāskarites and Nimbārkists, and, to some extent, by the Sāṁkhya. The second way of defense was advocated by the Mīmāṁsakas, and, again, sometimes by the Sāṁkhya; and the third was the way of many Advaita thinkers.

The problem of plurality or otherwise of individuals and their relation to God or the Absolute is one that concerns only the essence of individuals, i.e., their selves. So long, however, as individuals are understood as body-self or body-mind-self complexes, there is no denial anywhere in Indian philosophy of their plurality and difference from God. Except in metaphysics, again, which concerns the essence of the individual, Indians have not generally underrated the status of the body and the mind. Full compliments are paid to these in *artha-śāstra* (economics and politics), *daṇḍa-nīti* (science of government), *āyur-veda* (medicine), *kāma-śāstra* (science of living and enjoyment), and different other *vidyās* (sciences and arts); and, though the philosophical ideal is always regarded as the highest for the individual, so much so that other ideals have been subordinated to it and placed in proper perspective, in actual life the average Indian has not been as unbalancedly otherworldly as he is believed to be by people in the West. Regarding the philosophical ideal, again, there have been, as we have already seen and shall see more fully later, all kinds of views, of which the Advaita view is just one, and the average Indian's life has not been less influenced by any of these views than by the Advaita one. One must not forget also that materialism, which had for ages been dominant in India in some form or other, has always been a problem for all other Indian thinkers. As we have already said, there has never been *one* Indian view of the status of the individual, except in the sense stated previously. The systems that have influenced Indian life most are Śaivism, Śāktism, and Vaiṣṇavism in their different forms, and they were mostly for the plurality of individuals and some significant difference somewhere between them and God (or the Absolute).[8]

IV. DOCTRINE OF INACTION AND ITS REFUTATION[9]

The only school of Indian philosophy that has preached inaction as the ultimate goal of life is the Advaita Vedānta, and undoubtedly this doctrine has had some influence on Indian life in general. But there are two points to be noted in this connection. First, no other system has preached this doctrine, and in the whole field of philosophical literature it has more often been opposed than supported. Second, even as the Advaita preaches it, there is always the prefatory warning that this inaction is only for those who have attained liberation. Until that liberation is attained, every man is called upon to perform moral and spiritual action, and it is clearly said in the Advaita that performance of such actions is a necessary prerequisite for earning the right (*adhikāra*) to inaction, so that the common charge against the Advaita that it has left no scope for morality and religion is so far unfounded.

---

[8] Kashmir Śaivism, however, developed along Advaita lines. Indian life was largely influenced by Buddhism also (and probably by Jainism, too), and, though later Buddhism practically disappeared from India, many Buddhist concepts have, in disguise, continued in the Yoga, Śāivism, and Śaktism, and, some add, in the Advaita Vedānta also.

[9] This section is in answer to the third objection by Westerners to the Indian view of the individual cited earlier in this paper.

If, in spite of all this, the doctrine of inaction has sometimes appealed to the lay Hindu public, this can be traced, in most cases, to political debacles. One cannot also deny altogether that, to some extent, the Advaita philosophy itself was responsible for that. Often it extended the scope of inaction by prescribing it even for those who are on the path to liberation, not actually liberated. The esoteric exercises (*sādhana*) which they are to practice have often been designated as cognitive (*jñāna-sādhana*), as opposed to the performance of moral actions and the worship of God (*karma-sādhana*). If others have argued that *sādhana* itself cannot but be an action, the Advaita has gone the length of saying that it is only a pseudo-action (*bidhicchāyā*), i.e., something which is really of the nature of cognition, though spoken of (perhaps necessarily) in terms of action. The Advaita idea is that the individual on the way to liberation is only to seek discovery of the Absolute, and discovery, or seeking discovery, is a cognitive affair.

Liberation is freedom from all bondage. The Advaita holds that freedom proper is found only in a knowledge situation which is, or at least tends to be, free from attachment, even to the ego. Knowledge of X is not primarily *I knowing* X; it is equivalent to *X is X* or *it is X*. This is true as much of reflective knowledge as of unreflective knowledge: the I that is evident in reflection is only another X—another object or a self-evident entity; and whatever of subjective I-feeling accompanies reflection—in the form "*I know X*"—and whatever still less might accompany even unreflective knowledge—is what, as unwanted in a cognitive situation, ought to disappear, according to the Advaita Vedānta. Of action, on the other hand, the subjective I-feeling is an integral factor. Action, almost by definition, is some agent acting. Action can never be impersonal; of its very nature it is egocentric; and, unlike what is desirable in cognition, there is no question of this egocentricity's disappearance. Hence, according to the Advaita philosopher, no action is free, and action cannot, therefore, belong to the esence of the individual.

The Advaita alone has held this view. No other system has subscribed to it in this extreme form. Very few of them have, it is true, denied that liberation is a stage of cognition in that the self as the essence of the individual comes to be discovered,[10] but none has said that it is nothing else. They hold that, besides cognitive freedom, there is freedom of action also. For them, therefore, there is no denial of the things of the world, for, in the absence of such things, no action is possible. Every action is some manipulation of things in the world, and free action, as we have seen, is only that type of manipulation which as not proceeding through attachment (*rāga*) and repulsion (*dveṣa*) is not entirely determined by Nature. Free actions, actions, viz., which are moral and spiritual, are thus constructive and forward-looking, not acts of mere withdrawal. The best representation of this view is found in the concept of action which is absolutely disinterested (*niṣkāma-karma*) in the *Bhagavad-gītā.* Śaṁkara's interpretation of this *niṣkāma-karma* as but a form of cognition does not appear to be convincing, and no other interpreter (unless he is an Advaitist) has understood it that way.

Indians speak of three approaches to liberation (*mukti*), viz., cognitive (the way of *jñāna*, i.e., knowledge), actional (the way of *karma*, i.e., action), and emotional (the way of *bhakti*, i.e., love, respect, etc.).[11]

Mukti attained in the cognitive way is only discovery (rediscovery) of the self as the essence of the individual, and beyond this discovery there is nothing else for the liberated individual to know or do. For one who attains *mukti* through *karma*, however, there is no cessation of action. He has indeed got entirely beyond the clutches of *rāga* and *dveṣa*, but he continues his *niṣkama-karmas*, i.e., his duties and spiritual activities—actions, in other words, which are for the sake of duty only and also those which are meant for the well-being of others (including God and gods). In *mukti* attained by the way of emotion, on the other hand, the purified individual (the self) is placed in proper relation to God, and, through that, to other selves—purified or not. It is only in pure cognitive *mukti* that the question of the individual's relation to other individuals loses all meaning, the discovery of the self = the Absolute being the sole end. But in *mukti* attained in other ways there inevitably arises the problem of adjusting oneself to others.

A vital weakness of Indian philosophy should here be frankly admitted. Indian philosophers who advocate *mukti* through action or emotion have not, however, discussed as systematically as they should the problem of the relation of the liberated individual to other individuals, liberated or not, or, in the light of this, the relations that should bind unliberated individuals to one another. Even Advaita philosophers have manifested this weakness in another way. Normally they should not consider the relation of the liberated individual to other individuals. But sometimes, unable to avoid the problem, they have discussed whether one's own liberation only or others', too, should be the ideal of one's life.

---

[10] A few schools of Bengal Vaiṣṇavism deny even this. They have denounced cognition as having anything to do with liberation and have relied mainly on sublimated emotion and, secondarily, on good action.

[11] The monism of the Advaita Vedānta can be understood only from the point of view of *jñāna-mārga*, and not from the point of view of *karma-mārga* or *bhakti-mārga*. In order to explain this, I here discuss the three *mārgas* and show how those who acknowledge *karma-mārga* or *bhakti-mārga*, whether with or without *jñāna-mārga*, have been compelled to vote for plurality.

In Indian philosophy this weakness has manifested itself in still another way. Most Indian systems[12] have, uncritically enough, combined all the three approaches. This synthetic view is called *"samuccaya-vāda."* The weakness here lies in the fact that these systems, somehow conscious of some disparity between cognition, action, and emotion, have, instead of working it out, slurred over it and allowed the three approaches to combine without further ado. For, it is more than evident—and the Advaita and, to some extent, the Bengal Vaiṣṇavas already referred to depend upon it—that the further one proceeds along the cognitive, the actional, or the emotional path, the further these three diverge: cognition, seeking to discover the self, looks more and more inward; action proceeds more and more outward; and emotion, unable to be at peace with either, alternates between the two. It is not without reason, therefore, that the Advaita doctrine of inaction—a necessary consequence of cognitive *mukti*—has found favor with a large section of educated Indians.

It is interesting to see, again, how with his extreme attitude even the Advaita philosopher has sometimes faltered. We have already seen how incongruously he has allowed action for the *jīvan-muktas.* His God (as distinct from *Brahman*) also, who is otherwise completely free, acts. He creates, sustains, and destroys the world.

True, according to the Advaita, God, as distinct from *Brahman*, has still retained cosmic nescience (*māyā*), though as wielded by him it cannot bind him; and the *jīvan-muktas*, similarly, we are told, have *māyā* still left in them. But, so far as *māyā* does not bind a self, and, if sometimes the self can behave as even its master, why need the Advaita thinker take so much trouble to get rid of this innocuous *māyā*? The heavens would not fall if even in its fullest freedom the self could retain *māyā* and use it.

The lack of interest on the part of the non-Advaita philosophers to keep *jñāna* and *karma* as apart as they really are and their hasty theory of synthesis (*samuccaya*) have done one permanent mischief. It is that the intrinsic outwardness of *karma*, due to which the freer a *karma* is the more outward and encompassing it should be, has been overlooked, not merely by philosophers, but equally by the lay public, for whom the easy theory of *samuccaya* has had a natural appeal. The result is that the lay public, as much as the philosophers in India, has taken it almost for granted that the higher and freer our *karma* becomes the more inward it grows, the highest one being meditation on the self or God or both. *Karma* intended for *mukti* has thus been largely confused with *jñāna*; and the *karmas* that proceed outward—social, political, and moral actions—are not considered as spiritual, i.e., intrinsic to *mukti* (*antaranga-sādhana*). The only merit these *karmas* are said to have is that they prepare us—much as measured quantities of food and water do—for undertaking spiritual work. They are taken as extrinsic, though helpful, to spiritual action or liberation—they are called *vahiranga-sādhanas* (external discipline), as contrasted with *antaranga-sādhana* (internal discipline).

---

[12] With the exception of the Advaita Vedānta and the extreme Vaiṣṇava systems in Bengal already referred to.

G. P. MALALASEKERA

The Status of the Individual in Theravāda Buddhism

ONE OF THE MOST SIGNIFICANT FEATURES of Buddhism is that its founder, the Buddha, was a man—an extraordinary one, it is true—and died as a man. Everything about him was unequivocally within the domain of Nature. What he had done, every other human being could do also, if he chose to and was prepared to make the requisite effort. The whole drama of salvation, as depicted by the Buddha, takes place on this earth, on the stage of life as lived in this world. "Within this fathom-long body," he declared, "are the world and the origin of the world, and the ceasing of the world, and the path leading to its cessation." The world in which the problem is posed and also the solution to it is found is none other than the familiar, everyday world, in which our mortal life completes its brief span. To the Buddha, the world is the scene of human endeavor; the significance that attaches to things derives from the meaning of human life. What is man, and what should he make of his life in this world so as to achieve the supreme value that life affords? These are the problems which the Buddha set himself to solve and to which he found the answer.

The Buddha was a ceaseless searcher for the truth about things as they really are. It was this intense desire to find out the truth that drove him from his father's palace, where the indulgence of luxury gave him no peace, to undertake the most austere penances that imagination could conceive. When these, too, failed to give him satisfaction, he turned his mental eye inward, resolved to find therein, in the depths of his own being, that which the outer world had denied him. He had the daring to demand to know of life itself its right to exist. Truthfulness toward oneself, seriousness of search regardless of consequences, an unfailing sense of reality—these were the qualities which brought an end to his quest, the discovery which became for him a unique teaching.

This teaching he gave to the world as a way of life, telling men and women how they should employ this existence in order to achieve supreme happiness. But he recognized that the question of how cannot be satisfactorily answered without a knowledge of the what—the question, What am I? I must know what I am and what are the things and beings outside me. I must learn my relation to the external world. I must apprehend the meaning and significance of life before I can possess a genuine canon and standard for my behavior, for my morality. It is only in virtue of conscious cognition that any act, whether it be in doing or in leaving undone, acquires moral value. There can be no real morality without comprehension, without, in fact, a world conception.

Now, the essence of all cognition is the individual. Every act of cognition is always something individual, personal, pertaining to me alone. Even were all men to cognize alike, the content of the cognition would still be the possession of each and every single person. Thus cognition separates. The realization of this fact in its ultimate sense is in Buddhism called wisdom or insight (*paññā*), the understanding of reality (*tathatā*), i.e., that which it is, a fact.

But, besides cognition, there is another function of human nature which can be summarized as emotion. Considered from this point of view, morality, the good life, is founded upon the right feeling of correlation which finds expression in our attitudes toward others. Its proper cultivation is made manifest in every form of compassion, the instinctive feeling of kinship and identity with all that live and breathe, the perfection of compassion (*karuṇā*). These two qualities, wisdom and compassion, are in Buddhism mutually complementary, and their perfection culminates in enlightenment (*bodhi*), whose embodiment is the Buddha, the Enlightened or Awakened One.

An individual is a being, i.e., something that is, but, in the Buddha's teaching, the individual's being is, in fact, a *becoming*, a coming-to-be, something that happens, i.e., an event, a process. And, whenever there is process, whenever anything happens, there must be adequate cause for it to happen. It is in order to explain the adequate cause that the Buddha formulated his teaching of *kamma* (action), the law of cause and effect. And, since in the Buddha's philosophy every cause is itself the effect of an anterior, prior cause and comes to be only in dependence upon such anterior cause, the Buddha further expanded his teaching of *kamma* into what is known as the doctrine of dependent origination, or conditioned simultaneous arising (*paṭicca samuppāda*).

Buddhism includes all things that exist under one term, "*sankhāra*," a term considered the epistemological keyword of its philosophy. It means that which is compounded or conditioned; also their compounding and conditioning. All *sankhārā* are processes, divided into two categories, the living and the dead. The living processes are maintained while the living maintain themselves. Every process which we call existence can be analyzed into the elements of which it is composed, such elements being given the name of *dhammā*, which etymologically means that which has or "bears" certain qualities. Nothing exists apart from *dhammā*.

In this analysis, the human being was found to consist of two parts, *rūpa* and *nāma*, loosely translated as corporeality (matter) and mind, *rūpa* representing the physical elements and *nāma* the mental ones. Matter is composed of the four "elementary" qualities of extension, cohesion, caloricity (temperature), and vibration. The mental elements are similarly divided into four groups: feelings, sensations, or "receptions" (*vedanā*); "perceptions" or ideas (*saññā*); "mental activities," "complexes," "confections," "discriminations," (*sankhārā*); and cognition, "conception," consciousness, (*viññāna*). Matter (*rūpa*) and these four divisions of mind (*nāma*) are never found singly but only in conglomerations or aggregates (*khandhā*).

The five aggregates together constitute what is called the "I" or "personality" or the "individual." The aggregates are not parts or pieces of the individual but phases or forms of development, something like the shape, color, and smell of a flower. Even the sense organs and the organs of the body are likewise really forms of development or manifestations, since they all originate from one common source. There is no "stuff" or substratum as such but only manifestations, energies, activities, processes. In Buddhist thought, to speak of matter as apart from energy would be like speaking of one side of a sheet of paper imagined by itself.

Every living being, since it is a process, is described as a flux, a flowing, a stretching forth, a continuity (*santāna*), or, more frequently, as a combustion, a flame. There is no "substance," no "self" or "soul," underlying the process, unifying it. What we call the "I" or the "personality" or the individual, i.e., what appears to be unitary, is in reality not an entity but a function. It is like a burning flame in which one may distinguish a number of layers of color but these layers are not parts laid out after the fashion of pieces in a mosaic, alongside one another. They are a continuity of changes. So, also, with the five *khandhā*; they are a continuous, unbroken process of action, of which it is expressly said that they constitute a burning. In all of them an arising and a passing away are to be cognized; they are forms of action, processes of mental-corporeal "nutrition" or "sustenance" in which the corporeal as well as the mental forms of grasping (*upādāna*) fall together into one conceptual unity. A fire can burn only as long as it lays hold of new fuel; so, also, the process of individuality is a constant arising, an ever renewed laying hold, a grasping, of the objects of its attachment.

In theistic religions, every living being exists by virtue of the manifestation in him of a universal force, as a transcendent, an Absolute, called God or *Brahman.* In Buddhism, every living being exists by virtue of an individual force, peculiar to him alone. This force is called by the Buddha the *kamma* of each living being. *Kamma* means action, working, activity. It is, in quite a literal sense, an in-force, an energy, by virtue of which a living being manifests activity after its own unique fashion and in its own unique way reacts upon the external world, thus making him an individuality, a personality. Every living being is a singly determined existence. He is unique by virtue of his actions, his *kamma.* His *kamma* exists, possesses being, solely in dependence upon its material. In the case of *kamma*, the relevant materials are the *khandhā*, or aggregates, already described.

In every moment of the process which is called life or existence, I am the force of *kamma* itself, wholly and entirely the embodiment of my *kamma*, my actions of body, speech, and mind. There is no being, no enduring substantial self or soul, beyond and beneath these happenings, these activities, which constitute my experience. The teaching of "becoming" is the principle which the Buddha emphasized from the very start. He taught a phenomenalistic philosophy very much like that which more than twenty centuries later David Hume expressed in almost identical terms: "I never can catch myself at any time without a perception and never can observe anything but the perception. . . . What we call mind is nothing but a heap or bundle of different perceptions united together by certain relations."[1] There is no enduring entity, no "constant" derived from some external source, but only out-and-out processes constantly in motion, representing at every moment of their existence a fresh biological value. As in a flame there is nothing hidden or concealed, its activity constituting its entire being, so in the I-process there is nothing concealed, nothing standing behind it, no "sub-stance." Its activity constitutes its entire being and this activity in its entirety is disclosed in consciousness to the individual himself and to him only.

Generally speaking, things are so constituted that with them concept and object are separable; it is possible to manipulate the concept apart from the object. But, there is one thing in the world in which, according to Buddhism, no such separation is possible—I myself. That which I conceive myself as, that even I myself am, and every attempt to form a concept is just a form of myself. I myself am the unique, pure reality of the world. This is the basis of the whole teaching of "no-soul" (*anatta*) in Buddhism.

Existence is action itself in process. Action (*kamma*) is that which gives to the process its coherence and its continuity. As such, it presents itself to me, the individual, as consciousness. Consciousness, however, is not *kamma*, but *kamma* in the course of its self-acting development becomes consciousness. Consciousness is the ultimate value in which at every moment of its existence the form of the energy and the energy itself merge and mingle. Consequently, it is that which gives to the I-process not only conceptual but also actual continuity. It is in this sense that the Buddha says, in one context, that *cetanā* (thinking or consciousness) is *kamma* (action), and *kamma* is *cetanā.* It is in this sense also that the oft-recurring formula has to be understood: "In dependence upon individuality (*nāma-rūpa*) arises consciousness (*viññāna*); in dependence upon consciousness arises individuality."[2]

---

[1] *A Treatise of Human Nature*, Book I, Part 4.

The I-process in all its activities, corporeal and mental, is a constant growing-up of life itself, an arising and a perpetual refreshing. It is a self-charging process. In a flame, each moment of its existence represents a specific degree of heat which is the power to set up a succeeding moment of ignition. This continues for as long as inflammable matter, fuel, continues. With the calling into life of a new ignition-moment a new degree of heat is produced which passes anew into living energy, thus forming a repetition of the whole procedure.

The process of life in an individual is likewise a self-sustaining process. *Kamma* (action) does not have to receive an impetus from outside to come into activity; it is activity itself. *Kamma* does not, like a cord of some solid substance, thread itself through this process, constituting what might be called a soul, any more than the lightning in the firmament has a cord to join the flashes together. In life, there is no I that experiences, no I that thinks, speaks, does. I do not have these as my functions, but this doing, speaking, thinking, itself I am. Buddhism does not deny the existence of a personality or a "soul" in the empirical self. What it does deny is a permanent individuality, an unchanging "self." A man's personality is at any given moment a fact (*sacca*), but it does not correspond to any fixed entity in man, something that persists while all else changes. In Buddhism, to be real does not mean to be permanent in that sense.

It is the thirst for life, the craving for it, which upholds life, causing it again and again to spring up anew, and which is life itself. In the flame, it is the heat of the flame which upholds the flame and is the flame itself. This thirst for life (*tanhā*) manifests itself as clinging or grasping (*upādāna*). "Personality, they say. But what does the Exalted One say is the person?" To which the answer is given: "The five forms of clinging is the personality, the Exalted One has said — the clinging to body, to sensations, to perceptions, to mental activities, to consciousness." And, when asked how this personality arises, the answer is, "The thirst for life that leads to rebirth, bound up with lust and craving, now here, now there, reveling in delight. This, the Exalted One has said, is the arising of personality."

---

[2] *Saṁyutta-nikāya,* Part II, Book II, chap. XII, secs. 3–4.

Thus, in every moment of my life I myself fashion the next moment with the present life and the life that shall follow it. I am, and I become, in the most literal sense, the architect of my own fate, of my destiny. "The self is Lord of the self, who else is the Lord?" Every individual is a thing unique by virtue of his actions and the result of these actions.

What happens at the death of an individual? In Buddhism, death is nothing but living in a new environment. Whenever an existence disintegrates, the *kamma* by virtue of which it has been "burning" takes hold anew in a new location, and there sets alight a new I-process that unfolds itself into a new personality which is neither the same as the old one nor yet another but is a continuance from which both absolute diversity and absolute identity are excluded. As fuel is necessary for the flame, so a new existence needs new "fuel." What is the "fuel" when the flame is carried by the wind? The wind itself, says the Buddha. When a being leaves one body and arises in another, the "fuel" is the craving for life itself.[3] As the igniting spark becomes the flame by developing itself, so does *kamma* become the new form of existence.

This continuance is again a unique process in the case of each individual. The fact of my birth derives not from parents nor from God but from my own previous dying. Dying is nothing but a backward view of birth, and birth nothing but a forward view of death. I take rise in my parents only in the same sense as the fountain takes its rise in the hill. Heirs of deeds, the Buddha calls living beings, not heirs of father and mother. They spring from the womb of *kamma.* At every moment of my existence I am the final member of a beginningless series in a self-sustaining process. "A world without end is this round of birth and death," says the Buddha. "No beginning can be seen of those beings hindered by ignorance, bound by craving, running the round of birth and death."

Such a process can never have a beginning, because then it would not be a self-sustaining thing but a product of something else. To seek a beginning of life is like chasing after a horizon which ever recedes. But, can we say there is a first beginning to life? Yes, in the same way as we can say the spring welling from the rock is the first beginning of the river. It is the first beginning when one objectifies the river as an identity. It should sound no more strange to say that life is beginningless than to say, as all theistic religions do, that God is beginningless.

---

[3] *Ibid.*, Part V, Book II, chap. XLV, sec.9.

Every single moment of existence is something unique. It is a mathematical instant (*khaṇa*), the moment of an action's efficiency. Although the moments that constitute an individual's life are not connected with each other by any pervading stuff, there is, nevertheless, as has already been shown, a connection between them. It is the fact that their manifestations are subject to definite laws, the laws of causation. The flow of life is not a haphazard process. Every single moment in it is a "dependently-originating" moment, i.e., it depends for its origin on the moment that precedes it. Thus, existence becomes dependent existence and is expressed by the formula, "If there is this, there comes to be that."[4] Strictly speaking, there is no causality at all, no production of one from the other. The relation is one of "consecution," in which there is no destruction of one thing and no creation of another, no influx of one substance into another, but only a constant, uninterrupted, infinitely graduated change. In the case of each individual, his individuality persists, and he is a separate personality, his separateness consisting in the individualism of the sequence of *kamma*—causation.

Discrimination between individuals is recognized by the Buddha when he says: "And I saw, looking at the world with the awakened eye, beings of noble kind and of common kind, acute of mind and obtuse of mind, well endowed and ill endowed, quick to understand and slow to understand. . . ." And he goes on: "It is like some Lotus flowers which grow in deep, muddy water, while others push up toward the surface of the water, and yet others emerge from the water and stand up free from the water."[5]

One of the Buddhist texts is called *Puggala-paññatti* (Designation of Human Types) and deals with the various types of individuals that exist in the world. But such discrimination is between different natures, on the basis of achievement and spiritual development, and not on such adventitious things as caste or class. "Not by birth does one become noble or lowly but by actions" was the Buddha's "lion roar."

Not only is man his own master and the master of his fate and destiny, but, in his capacity for attaining the highest spiritual development, that of enlightenment, man is higher than even the gods. It is his sole responsibility to work out his own emancipation from the fetters that bind him. This life has value in itself, independently of any life hereafter or even a belief in it, because it is as a human being in this world that *nibbāna*, the Buddhist goal of supreme happiness, can be won. No man is so debased that he is beyond redemption. Well known is the story of the brigand, Angulimāla, who, having committed ninety-nine murders, met the Buddha while on his way to kill his own mother. The Buddha rescued him from his evil ways, and Angulimāla became an *arahant*, a perfect saint, and one of the most famous of the Buddha's disciples. The Buddha, in judging human individuals capable of realizing a perfected humanity, independent of any transcendental outlook, raised life to a very high value. It is the qualitative estimate of life, however, that is emphasized, the life of individuals ever lifting the world to higher insights and nobler issues.

---

[4] *Majjhima-nikāya*, Part II, sec. 32; *Saṁyutta-nikāya*, Part II, Book II, chap. XII, sec. 23.

[5] *Mahāvagga-vinaya*, Book I, chap. V, secs. 2ff.

The world into which we are born as individuals is, according to Buddhism, a world full of *dukkha*. "*Dukkha*" is most frequently but misleadingly translated as pain, sorrow, suffering, misery, the opposite of well-being. It is true that there is a very great deal of unhappiness in the world, and that fact has to be accepted by everyone. But the Buddhist conception of *dukkha* involves more than mere suffering and pain. It involves also the element of imperfection, the incompleteness that life exhibits, the conflict between our wishes and our attainments. It is not merely the intermittent frustration of our desires but a quality permeating experience even for the most fortunate of us, the sense of our alienation from the world, what some call "anguish" and Thoreau describes as "quiet desperation."

But, in accordance with the law of cause and effect, enunciated by the Buddha as a universal principle, *dukkha*, too, has a cause which can be controlled and ultimately eliminated. The cause of *dukkha* is called "*tanhā*," generally, but wrongly, translated as desire. *Tanhā* is, rather, what might be called thirst, the craving of the limited, individual, living creature seeking to gratify itself in its separateness and to use the external world as a means to satisfy its self-centered needs. The evil in man's life is man-made and, therefore, eradicable by man, without outside interference. In Buddhism, there is no such thing as original sin, no innate depravity, and no one is foreordained to be doomed. There is, likewise, no atonement and no forgiveness of sins, because there is no one who can forgive, and because a transgression, once committed, cannot be redeemed. Every cause has its inevitable effect; all we can do is to find out and understand the cause and take steps to remove it, if we want it removed.

The morality of Buddhism consists of the path prescribed by the Buddha. The individual, however, is completely free to follow whatever path he chooses. The Buddha claims no monopoly as guide; he is only a *kaliyāna mitta* (good friend) to those who seek his advice and are willing to profit by his experience. The need of the four freedoms for human happiness was recognized by the Buddha many centuries before the Atlantic Charter. Freedom of worship, freedom to question the efficacy of any dogma whatsoever, should be a basic human right. He called his own teaching the "come-and-see" doctrine, the teaching which invites investigation before approval. Hence the absence of religious persecution in Buddhist lands. A man should also be free to speak his thoughts, provided his speech is free from hatred and slander, truthful, in proper time and place, and likely to be of profit to himself or to others or to both.

Fear, according to the Buddha, results from the feeling of bondage. Freedom is every man's birthright, freedom from bondage both physical and spiritual. The whole purpose of the Buddha's teaching is, according to him, to teach men how to be free, perfectly, supremely free, in every conceivable way. "Even as the great ocean has but one taste, the taste of salt, so has this doctrine and discipline but one taste, the taste of freedom."[6] The injunction everywhere is for men and women to "get free."

The Buddha was a great believer in democracy. The Order of Monks which he founded is the oldest democratic institution in the world. Every decision taken therein is guided by the votes of those present. No one can be made to suffer a penalty for any offense, even after he is found guilty by a committee of his peers, unless the offender admits his guilt of his own free will. In the Order, the Buddha claimed no greater privilege than was voluntarily afforded to him as teacher. When the time came for him to leave this life, he stoutly refused to appoint a successor, leaving it to the monks themselves to choose their own head, if they so desired.

What does Buddhism have to say regarding free will? The question does not seem ever to have been asked of the Buddha, but, if he had been asked, he would probably have answered that the question does not arise or that it is inaccurately put. There can be no such thing as a free will outside the causal sequence which constitutes the world process. All that can be said in this connection is to ask, when an individual acts, does he do so through deliberate choice or through whim or caprice? Our actions are generally impulsive; desires are often immediately translated into deeds without a thought of the implications involved. What the Buddha would have us do is to act with mindfulness, analyzing motives before allowing them to influence conduct, thus allowing an interval of inactivity between thought and deed, intention and execution. The cultivation of this quality of awareness (*sati*) is one of the basic principles of Buddhist meditation. It is freedom of choice which such awareness will help to achieve that makes us free and enables us to achieve emancipation from all bondage. Self-discipline and mindfulness are the virtues that give to an individual confidence, dignity, and decorum and make him a true nobleman (*ariya*).

---

[6] *Dīgha-nikāya*, Part III, secs. 180–193.

Though every individual is, in Buddhism, a unique phenomenon, no individual can be an island unto himself in the sense that he can exist alone, without being a member of the human community. The very word "*kulaputta*," clansman, used to indicate the layman, is an acknowledgment of this fact. There are four basic needs which have to be supplied for anyone to have even the barest minimum necessary for existence: clothing, food, shelter, and medicine. In normal life, these can be obtained only through communal living. Even the ascetic, living far away from the haunts of men, like the "lone-dwelling rhinoceros," has occasionally to visit human habitation in search of salt and acid foods.

Because of this essential dependence on society, the individual develops social relationships and obligations which he has to honor and satisfy. But, because society is nothing apart from the individuals that constitute it, society, too, has its obligations to the individual. Six such mutual relationships are specifically mentioned in a discourse of the Buddha. They are the relationships between parents and children, between the educator and the educated, between husband and wife, between friends, relatives, and neighbors, between employer and employee, between the religious and the laity. To give but one example of such a relationship—that between husband and wife: the husband should always honor his wife and never be wanting in respect to her; he should love her and be faithful to her; he should secure her a dignified position and a comfortable life; and he should win her goodwill by timely gifts, including jewelry. The wife, in her turn, should supervise and look after household affairs; she should entertain guests, visitors, friends, relatives, and employees; she should love her husband and be faithful to him; she should protect his interests and safeguard his welfare; she should be skilled and energetic in all her activities. Love between husband and wife is called "*sadāra brahme cariya*," sacred family life, such a relationship being considered almost religious or sacred.

It should be mentioned in passing that in a truly Buddhist society, though a husband, as head of the household, has certain privileges, there is no discrimination between men and women. There has never been any system of seclusion of women in Buddhist lands. The Buddha declared that what a man can do a woman can do equally well, sometimes even better.[7]

---

[7] A practical example of this is that the first female prime minister in history comes from the Buddhist country of Ceylon.

The individual is told that in his actions he should always be mindful of their effects on those around him. Happiness, declares the Buddha, can never be the result of selfishness. "Work for the welfare both of yourself and of others" (*ubhinnam attham caratha*) is a constantly recurring theme. Basic morality consists in abstaining from five wrong actions: killing and hurting life, theft, wrong indulgence in sensual pleasures, speech that is false or otherwise wrong, and intoxicants and drugs that cause heedlessness. All these things are considered evil because of the harm they do, not only to oneself, but also to others. Abstinence from them is called observance of the Five Precepts. This is regarded as the minimum requirement of the good life. The first precept deals with the sanctity of life, both one's own and that of others. The second precept enjoins due regard for the rights of others, with regard to both their property and also everything else that is rightfully theirs. The third is to prevent men, not only from overindulgence, but also from being a burden on society by appropriating more than their proper share of the good things of life. The fourth is essential for the maintenance of trust and confidence and good relationship with others. The fifth is, among other things, to prevent oneself from being a nuisance to others.

Because one has to depend on the community of fellow men for one's welfare, the debt one incurs thereby is immense. The only way of repaying it is by service to humanity. This is a duty enjoined on monk and layman alike. The monk discharges this duty by being an exemplar of the good life and acting as counsellor and friend in solving human problems, the layman in various other ways open to him. The good man's life should be a life of dedication, both to himself and to others. When, soon after the Buddha's enlightenment, the Great Brahmā appeared before him to salute him and sing his praises, among the things he said was that the Buddha could now consider himself as being *anana*, completely free from his "debt" to the world. The path to this "debtlessness" has to be trodden for a long time with unceasing earnest effort. It is not a path already created for someone to tread on it. Each step has to be created by the traveler by his own treading.

Religion has sometimes been defined as an estimate of human life based on a hypothesis and suffused by an aspiration. What, then, in Buddhism, is the aspiration of the individual? The ultimate goal of the good life is supreme happiness, to be achieved here on this earth, in this human life, and not after death in some faraway heaven. This goal is called *nibbāna.*

"*Nibbāna*" literally means ceasing to be, extinction, like the blowing out of a candle. Extinction it undoubtedly is, of the fires of lust, hatred, infatuation, and all other passions and torments. What is extinguished is selfish desire and the craving for and the need of continued rebirth. But it does not mean either a state of escape from the unbearable sorrows of life into nothingness or sheer annihilation. It includes the realization that one has achieved an ardently sought emancipation, a hitherto unexperienced freedom. It is a conscious, positive experience, having in it the qualities of peace, joy, insight, and love. The freedom and the joy come from the realization that all bondage has been destroyed. The insight comes from the true understanding of reality made possible by the destruction of cramping desires and attachments. The love is the free and compassionate outpouring of ourselves to others without asking anything in return, an all-embracing love that knows no bounds, love for "all the universe in all its heights and depths and breadth," free from all possessiveness and making no demands on the person or object that is loved, a loving oneness with others with the releasing joy that it brings.[8]

The individual who has attained *nibbāna* is described as "*brahma-bhūta*," become divine or one with the highest (God) and "*damma-bhūta*," one with the Absolute or with Actuality.[9] *Nibbāna* is the only thing which is not a *sankhāra*, a compound, a complex of elements. It is, therefore, the only thing that is unchangeable and eternal. It is, however, a *dhamma*, and, since the old formula says all *dhammā* are devoid of self (*sabbe dhammā anatta*), there is no abiding self either.

What happens to the individual who has attained *nibbāna* when he dies and his body is cremated? He is described as having gone into *parinibbāna*, i.e., *nibbāna* without any residue whatsoever of the *khandhā*, the aggregates. *Parinibbāna* is *nibbāna* without corporeality, the transition of sorrowlessness into timelessness, changelessness, perfect peace. While *nibbāna* is still colored by the last dregs of individuality, *parinibbāna* is not so besmirched. It is a condition "where there is neither arising, nor passing away, nor dying; neither cause nor effect; neither change nor standing still."[10] And yet, it is not complete annihilation. When the Buddha was charged with being a nihilist, he said that nihilism was one of the extremes which he emphatically condemned. Even to the man of knowledge it has never been raised—the curtain that conceals the "other side." It is revealed only to him who has gone there. By no stretch of thinking can it be reached, because it lies beyond all thought.

According to the teaching of the Buddha, every man makes his own *nibbāna* and his own *parinibbāna*. All indeed lies in us: the entire world, with its arising and its passing away. As the beginning of the world is individual, so also is its ending.

---

[8] *Sutta-nipata*, verse 1076. [9] See *Udāna*, VIII. 1. [10] *Ibid.*

YOSHIFUMI UEDA[a]

The World and the Individual in Mahāyāna Buddhist Philosophy

I. THE FUNDAMENTAL WAY OF THINKING IN BUDDHIST PHILOSOPHY

THERE IS A UNIQUE WAY OF THINKING in Buddhist philosophy which is not found in any other philosophy. Since in early Buddhism this unique way of thinking existed in an immature, naïve form[1] whose special characteristic was not clearly distinguishable, it was open to several differing interpretations. Consequently, it was difficult to determine which among the various interpretations was the correct one. It was in Mahāyāna Buddhism that this way of thinking appeared in a form clear enough not to allow differing interpretations. From the Prajñāpāramitā Sūtras, through the Mādhyamika, the Yogācāra, and Zen,[b] to the Shin[c] Buddhism of Shinran,[d] who expounded faith in Amida Buddha, all Māhāyana Buddhist philosophies, with the exception of a few,[2] have followed this way of thinking. Since they follow this way of thinking, they belong to the Mahāyāna tradition. If one should take away this way of thinking, it would not be an overstatement to say that the whole point of view had thereby lost its essence as Mahāyāna Buddhist philosophy. To say that almost all Mahāyāna Buddhist philosophies follow this way of thinking means that they have all originated in or have been derived from one and the same concept of reality-body (*dharmakāya*).[3]

If Aristotelian logic is meant by the word "logic," this Buddhist way of thinking will probably not be considered logical. However, this is clearly one way of thinking, and, if we should wish to include in the broad meaning of "philosophy" a way of thinking that is unique to Asian peoples, then we must recognize a type of logic that is non-Aristotelian. Perhaps we need not necessarily call it "logic." It is simply that, should we not recognize that we have here a unique way of thinking and should we immediately decide that its propositions are not valid simply because they go against Aristotelian logic, it would be impossible to understand Buddhist philosophy. This way of thinking is truly difficult to understand for those who have been trained in philosophies which base their thinking upon Aristotelian logic. And, since we shall follow this way of thinking in our consideration of the problem, "The World and the Individual," we must consider here why Buddhist philosophers had to develop this way of thinking.

---

[1] For example, see Pali Text Society's *Pāli-English Dictionary* edited by T. W. Rhys Davids and William Stede, on the term, "*sankhāra*" as ". . . one of the most difficult terms in Buddhist metaphysics, in which the blending of the subjective-objective view of the world and of happening, peculiar to the East, is so complete that it is almost impossible for Occidental terminology to get at the root of its meaning in a translation."

[2] There are a few in later Indian Mahāyāna Buddhism who are not in accord with this way of thinking.

[3] The *Mahāyāna-saṁgraha* (Taishō Vol. 31, No. 1595, p. 1736) states: "The correct teaching of the Mahāyāna is that which has been streamed out of the pure world of Reality (*dharmadhātu*)."

The focus of the problems pursued by Buddhist philosophers has been our true self. They pursued the true self to its limits and were finally able to realize it through a unique experience. This way of thinking was born within that experience. It goes without saying that most people and many philosophies think it is possible to know ourselves—through self-reflection. However, if we consider this very carefully, we will see that the self grasped through reflection is a conceptualized self and that our true selves, i.e., the self as it really is, can never be grasped through reflection. Those philosophies which think it is possible to cognize the self through reflection establish self-cognition on an assumption. The problem is whether or not that assumption may be permitted. One of the leading philosophers of Japan during the first half of this century, Seiichi Hatano,[e] had the following to say concerning self-cognition.[4]

> Parallel to the cognition of the objective world, the subject also knows itself. As is stated above, objects are expressions of the subject and contain the factor of selfhood which is disclosed in them. The subject does not express itself except as object or in objects. This is the reason why the subject can know its own self. When the objects, that is, the expressions of the subject, become the symbols of the subject: that is, when the subject gets acquainted with its own self, and the hidden self or the center of the knowing act and the disclosed self or the known self are separated and opposed and, at the same time, maintain or realize their identity, the subject knows itself. . . .
>
> Of course, while we talk and think in this manner, we are obliged to stand at the level of reflection. And while distinguishing the factor of the life of experience, i.e., of real existence, from that of reflection, i.e., of ideal content, we establish a relationship of the two. So the former, i.e., the real existence, may also be introduced into the

---

[4] S. Hatano, *Time and Eternity*, Ichirō Suzuki[m] trans. (Tokyo: Japanese National Commission for UNESCO, 1963), pp. 29, 35–36. Although the lines quoted here are the same as those quoted in my "Thinking in Buddhist Philosophy," in *Philosophical Studies of Japan* (Tokyo: Japanese National Commission for UNESCO, 1964), Vol. 5, I have cited them again since the latter is still in press.

> content of conceptual cognition. This is, however, the very difficulty one must face when he seeks for the source of experience. But it is a problem which one can no longer solve at the level of reflection. It is the very basic fact of life and there is no other way than to be in it and to live through it. A closer observation will show us that, as we have seen in the cognition of the self, all the difficulties in identifying the hidden, really existing subject with the disclosed, ideal subject belong, after all, to the same category. They may all equally be reduced to what we call the transcendental identity of the subject. It is the identity of the subject of basic experience and that of reflection, in other words, the identity of the really existing subject and the subject which is expressed in reference to concepts in their objective phase. That is, it is the identity of the cognizing subject [really existing subject] and the subject which is cognized (ideal, conceptual subject). Thus as this identity is primarily assumed as a prerequisite of reflection, it is not a matter of comprehension, but is a basic fact of life that should be experienced as we live through it.

The attitude expressed in Hatano's consideration of the problem is sound, and a penetrating insight faithful to the facts is advanced. As long as we take the standpoint of reflection, we cannot help but come to the same conclusion as Hatano. However, if we look at the problem from the standpoint of Buddhist philosophy, we can ascertain whether or not "this identity . . . assumed as a prerequisite of reflection" can be established. The reason we can do so is that Buddhist philosophers have succeeded in "knowing" the really existing subject without transformation into an ideal, conceptual content, and, since they were able to cognize the true self, they were able to know just what constituted the identity between the subject which knows and the subject which is known in the self-cognition of the true self.

What is the nature of this identity between the subject which knows and the subject which is known in the self-cognition of the true self? In the self-cognition of the true self, since the really existing subject knows itself, what knows and what is known are both the same real self—they are completely one and the same. Nevertheless, since the act of knowing is thereby established, the differentiation of the knower and the known must be established within this one and the same subject. The fact that there is one and the same self and at the same time that there is the differentiation of the knower and the known is a logical contradiction, but, in order to establish the self-cognition of the true self, such a contradictory relationship must be capable of establishment. Buddhist philosophers put their greatest effort and endeavor into establishing in reality this kind of experience, and into finding a way of thinking through which this experience can be expressed. When Asaṅga and Vasubandhu spoke of differentiation of non-differentiation, i.e., the subsequently realized wisdom (*tat-pṛṣṭha-labdha-jñāna*), and when Pai-chang

Huai-hai[f] said, "Awaking to the Here-Now," it was of the experience of the realization of the true, real self. Nāgārjuna's "highest wisdom" (*prajñā-pāramitā*) is nothing other than this experience. This experience is established when there is no differentiation of subject and object, i.e., when one has gone through the experience of non-differentiation (*nirvikalpa*). What is realized in this non-differentiated experience is called "fundamental wisdom" (*mūla-jñāna*).[5] When this fundamental wisdom develops further and the differentiation of the knower and the known arises, though without losing its non-differentiation, the realization of the true self is established. This is what Asaṅga called "the subsequently realized wisdom."

Since this simultaneous relationship between the non-differentiation and the differentiation of the knower and the known is logically contradictory, it is completely different in nature from that identity which had to be assumed as a prerequisite of self-cognition from the standpoint of reflection. When it is seen that this non-differentiation must be a complex structure which includes contradiction, it can be seen that the identity necessarily assumed as a prerequisite of self-cognition from the standpoint of reflection is not a true one. In other words, the identity between the ideal, conceptual subject and the really existing subject (known through reflection) cannot be established, and it is clear that the former (the ideal, conceptual subject) does not manifest the latter (the really existing subject).

"*Prajñā*" (the term Nāgārjuna uses), or "the subsequently realized wisdom" (Asaṅga's and Vasubandhu's expression), is the wisdom established upon pursuing and realizing the true self. In this wisdom, one can know, not only the really existing self as it is, but also each thing in the world as it really is. This is because, when one realizes the real self, one at the same time touches reality itself; to know the real self means, at the same time, to know reality. A thing known as it really exists is nothing other than reality known as it is. To know reality can be nothing other than to know ourselves and all the things in the world as they really exist and become. In this manner, the wisdom that can know the real self can also know everything in the world as it really exists and really becomes, i.e., it can know things completely objectively. We shall consider this more in detail in the following.

In the self-cognition of the self, the knower and the known are the same self, i.e., the same subject. Herein there is only the subject; there is no object. With this meaning, it is subject-only (*vijñānamātra*).[6] This subject-only has a twofold structure. That is, it has the aspect of the differentiation of the knower and the known, i.e., the affirmation of the subject and the negation of the object, and it has the aspect of the non-differentiation or identity of the knower and the known. Although subject-only shows that it is not an object, i.e., the known, if it were simply a subject, there would not be the least meaning of "the known." If this were the case, since there would be the meaning of a knowing subject only and no meaning of a known subject, it could not be said that the self knows the self. How can the meaning of a known subject be included in subject-only? It is the other aspect of subject-only, i.e., it is nothing other than the known which is included in the non-differentiation of the knower and the known. However, since this known is identified with the knower, its meaning is not completely manifest. In order to manifest completely the meaning of this known, it must be made clear that it is not the knower—in other words, there must be the negation of the knower. Accordingly, since the knower is truly the self, or the subject, the negation of the knower is non-self, or non-subject, i.e., the object. In this manner, in order that the meaning of the known, which is included in subject-only, may be completely manifest, the object must be affirmed and the subject negated. That is, object-only must be established. Only in this manner can the true self first be known as it really exists, i.e., become the known. This is the reason that Vasubandhu said subject-only (*vijñānamātra*) is non-subject (=no-mind=*acitta*).[7] That subject-only is object-only he expressed as "subject seen as things in the world" (*artha-pratibhāsaṁ-vijñānam*).[8] No-mind has the same meaning as non-self (*anātman*).

---

[5] The substance of fundamental wisdom is the *dharmakāya*. The *dharmakāya*'s characteristic is "the non-duality of the conditioned and the non-conditioned" (Asaṅga, *Mahāyāna-saṁgraha*, Taishō, Vol. 31, No. 1592, p. 25b).

[6] This is a term used by Yogācāra philosophers. D. T. Suzuki[n] calls it "pure subjectivity."

As to the meaning of object-only, although it means that the true self is known, it is nothing other than reality being known. And reality is not merely the self; it is all things in the world. Object-only means that, besides all things in the world, there is no subject opposed to them. And yet the fact that this thing is an object shows that this is that which is known. Accordingly, that the subject knows all things becomes the relation of all things (reality) as they are known by themselves. Here, the identity of the knower with the known is included. It is not that the subject is existent outside the object and sees it as an object. Rather, the subject, being non-existent other than as an object, knows all things. The subject, as it were, being non-existent, sees the object. This is nothing other than being free of all subjective and partial views and seeing things just as they are. Seeing the self as it is is not different from seeing things as they are; neither is it anything other than seeing reality as it is. It is only because the self is the knower and things are not the knower that knowing the self as it is is called "subject-only" and that things known as they are are called "object-only." However, since the self as reality is no different from things, subject-only simultaneously includes the meaning of object-only. And, since the self as reality is the knower, the identity of the knower and the known is included in the fact of things being known. Accordingly, if there is no subject-only, object-only cannot be established, either.

---

[7] *Triṁśikā-vijñaptimātratāsiddhi*, ed. par S. Lévi, verse 29. See my article, "What is Idealism in Buddhist Philosophy," in C. A. Moore, ed., "Idealism in World Perspective" (in preparation) for a more detailed exposition of the theory of *vijñaptimātratā*.

[8] See my "Thinking in Buddhist Philosophy" for more concerning the meaning of "*artha-pratibhāsaṁ-vijñānam*."

Subject-only, i.e., non-self, is nothing other than the true self, which has cognized itself. At the same time, it cognizes the world just as it is (object-only). And, on the other hand, in order that things in the world can be known just as each is or becomes (object-only), subject-only, i.e., the non-existence of the object, must be established, too. This is the meaning of Seng-chao's[g] "All things in the world, though real, are formless,"[9] and Zen's "To see the form of the formless." The true self is non-self, and things as they really are are formless forms. The so-called fourfold consideration of Rinzai (Lin-chi,[h] died 867), a famous Zen Master, shows this subject-only and object-only in four phrases:

(i) Object only
(ii) Subject only
(iii) Both subject and object negated
(iv) Both subject and object affirmed

The true self is this kind of subject, and really existing things are this kind of object. When one knows the self and the things in the world in this unique way, one knows *tathatā* (suchness). *Tathatā* has many synonyms: *śūnyatā* (emptiness), *animittam* (the formless), *dharmatā* (things as they really are), *bhūtakoṭiḥ* (extent of reality), *paramārthatā* (objects as known in supreme wisdom), *dharmadhātuḥ* (realm of things as they really are).[10] In addition to these, the following, which were previously given, are also synonyms: *vijñāna (=vijñāpti)-mātratā* or *=cittamātratā* (subject-only or mind-only) and *acitta* (no-mind).

One of the greatest Buddhist philosophers of Japan, Dōgen,[i] had the following to say. "To study Buddhism is to study oneself. To study oneself is to forget oneself. To forget oneself is to realize oneself as all things [in the world]. To realize oneself as all things is to strip off both one's own mind and body and the mind and body of others."[11] Here, what was said before—that Buddhist philosophy began with the problem of knowing one's true self, that the self-cognition of one's true self (subject-only) is non-self, that this is object-only, and that this is freedom—is expounded in a way different from that of Rinzai and in a clearer manner. The first original philosopher to be respected as such after the transplantation of Western philosophy into Japan and whose name is known even in other countries is Kitarō Nishida.[j] That his thought has something in common with the foregoing thought of Buddhist philosophy can be seen in his words: "Our true self is the basic substance of the universe, and, when we know the true self we not only unite with the good of mankind, but we merge with the basic substance of the universe and spiritually unite with the divine mind."[12]

---

[9] Taishō, Vol. 45, No. 1859, p. 154c. Although the phrase quoted here is the same as that quoted in my "Thinking in Buddhist Philosophy" (see note 4), I have cited it again since the article is still in press.

[10] Maitreya, *Madhyānta-vibhāga*, ed. par Susumu Yamaguchi,[o] p. 49; Asaṅga, *Mahāyāna-saṁgraha*, Taishō, Vol. 31, No. 1592, p. 191c.

That an individual knows his true self means that the universe awakens to itself from itself. The individual's self-cognition is not simply a phenomenon in the consciousness of an individual, but indeed a fact of the universe. When he knows things in the world, it is not merely the individual himself who knows, but the universe; and, when things are known by him, the universe knows itself from within itself. When he knows things, this brings about the self-awakening of the universe from within itself, and this is nothing other than the development and growth of the universe. It is the becoming of the universe.

We have pursued in the foregoing the fundamental way of thinking in Buddhist philosophy. All the problems of Mahāyāna Buddhist philosophy are considered on this base, so that one cannot consider other problems without touching upon it. As we have seen in the foregoing, the relationship between the knower and the known is not simply an epistemological problem but is fundamentally a metaphysical one. "To be" and "to know" cannot be discussed apart from each other. (And, as hinted at the end of the last paragraph, "to be" and "to become" cannot be considered apart from each other.) Next, let us consider the relationship of the individual and the world from the aspect of the relationship between the one and the many.

---

[11] Dōgen, *Shōbōgenzō*,[p] chapter on Genjō Kōan;[q] Taishō, Vol. 82, No. 2582, p. 23c. Although the lines quoted here are the same as those quoted in my "Thinking in Buddhist Philosophy" (see note 4), I have cited them again since the article is still in press.

[12] Kitarō Nishida, *Zen no Kenkyū*[r] (A Study of Good) (2nd ed. Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 1924), p. 261.

II. THE ONE AND THE MANY

In Buddhist philosophy, the logic of the relationship between the individual and the world is grasped as the relationship in which "the one enters the many and the many enter the one" (one is one and not many, many are many and not one, and yet at the same time the one is identical with the many, and the many are identical with the one[13]). The one and the many are in a mutually negating opposition at the same time as they are one and the same. This is a case of differentiation of non-differentiation. But why is the relationship between the individual and the world like this? First, the individual, because he is born, lives, and dies in the world, is completely within the world. That the individual is established within the world as a historical product is because the one enters into the world as the many. Second, however, at the same time, the historical world is being built by the creative power emanating from the individual. The world exists, not only as an object seen by the individual, but, at the same time, as something being created by each individual it is in the process of becoming. The individual is not simply a seer, but also an actor. As something being created by this actor, the many are included in the one. This is stated as "the many enter into the one." The individual and the world are mutually created by each other.

That this relationship is established is due to the facts that the individual is not simply one among many but is also the one as a negation of the many, and that the many are not simply a collection of ones but are the many as a negation of the one. To say that the individual is not simply one among many but is the negation of the many means that the individual is the subject. An individual viewed as a speck in society is an objectified individual. A man can survey a society which is made up of many people as an object. In what respect is this man different from the others in this situation? It is due, of course, to the fact that he is a subject who is seeing and creating the society. When he is subject, all the other persons are object; he alone is affirmed as subject, and all the others are negated. This is the aspect in which the many enter into the one, or it is the one as a negation of the many. This one is an affirmed self or the aspect of the existence of the subject, and the aspect of the non-existence of society or the historical world.

To say that the many are not simply a collection of ones but are the many as a negation of the one means that society is established with the negation of the individual. Each individual has to give up his own welfare when the welfare of his whole society requires it. This is the aspect in which the one enters the many, or it is the many as a negation of the one. This one is a negated self or the aspect of the non-existence of the subject (*anātman*, non-self), and the aspect of the existence of the society or the historical world.

---

[13] Fa-tsang, *Hua-yen-i-ch'eng-chiao-i-fên-chi-cheng*[s] (*Kegon-ichijō-kyōgiōbunzai-shō*) (A System of Kegon Philosophy), Taishō, Vol. 45, No. 1866, p. 503b.

The Buddhist philosopher who made the framework of this mutual relationship of the one and the many clearest is Fa-tsang[k] (643–712) of the Hua-yen[l] school. He calls this the relationship of mutually becoming a lord and vassals.[14] In the aspect in which the many enter the one, each individual is, respectively, the center of the universe. When individual A is the lord, all other individuals, and Nature, or the whole world, are the vassals. At the same time, A, with respect to B or C, is a vassal. All individuals are at the same time lords and vassals. In this situation, the world of the many does not refer only to the assembly of men, with Nature unconsidered. There is no thought of a realm of matter severed from spirit or life. The concept of a body separated from mind, or of matter separated from spirit or life, was unknown to the early and Mahāyāna Buddhist philosophers. Material things, too, are grasped as things inseparable from spirit or life. All things are considered as personalities.

When the relationship between the individual and the world is grasped as the relationship in which the many are negated in the one and the one is negated in the many, it is probably the most radical manner of grasping that relationship. The individual does not refer to each respective human being, but to *the subject.* And the very subject is the true life. That life observed from the outside is not true life is seen in the fact that our own death can never be the same to us as is that of others. In the respect that the one enters the many, this is not monism; and, in the respect that the many enter the one, this is not pluralism in the usual sense. Since the establishment at the same time of the mutual negation and identity of the one and the many, in other words, of the relationship of differentiation of non-differentiation between the one and the many, as seen previously, is nothing other than the other aspect of the establishment at the same time of the mutual negation and identity of the subject and object, the opposition of monism and pluralism in the history of Western philosophy might be considered to be based on a way of thought quite different from that of Buddhist philosophy. In Buddhist philosophy, since subjectivism is transcended due to the concept of the non-existence of the subject, i.e., non-self or no-mind, idealism was not established; and, because of the negation of the concept of a real existence transcending the subject due to the concept of the non-existence of the object, realism was not established.

---

[14] *Ibid.*, p. 505c and also, Fa-tsang, *Hua-yen-ching-t'an-hsüan-chi*[t] (Kegon-gyō-tangen-ki) (A Commentary on the Avataṁsaka Sūtra), Taishō, Vol. 35, No. 1733, pp. 123b, 124a.

The delineation given above of the framework of the establishment at the same time of the mutual negation and identity between the subject and object follows the interpretation of men belonging to the early Yogācāra, i.e., Maitreya, Asaṅga, Vasubandhu, Sthiramati, and Paramārtha,[15] while the delineation of the framework of the one entering the many and the many entering the one follows the interpretation of Fa-tsang. The reason for this is that these men have best clarified the logic of these relationships. Neither of the two concepts can be established without the other. Fundamentally they are one. This single thought in its naïve form is Nāgārjuna's idea. "Form (*rūpa*) is emptiness (*śūnyatā*), and the very emptiness is form." Form and emptiness are identical, yet, at the same time, they stand in mutually negating opposition.

If we desire to delve deeper than this into the logic of the relationship of the individual and the world, or the one and the many, we must enter into a consideration of Buddhist philosophy's most difficult problem, "time and eternity." With a consideration of this problem, the place of the individual as the center of the world of becoming would become even clearer; but, since it would be impossible to give an elucidation of this problem in the time available, I should like to leave it for a later occasion.

[a] 上田義文
[b] 禪
[c] 眞宗
[d] 親鸞
[e] 波多野精一
[f] 百丈懷海
[g] 僧肇
[h] 臨濟
[i] 道元
[j] 西田幾多郎
[k] 法藏
[l] 華嚴
[m] 鈴木一郎
[n] 鈴木大拙
[o] 山口益
[p] 正法眼藏
[q] 現成公案
[r] 善の研究
[s] 華嚴一乘教義分齊章
[t] 華嚴經探玄記

---

[15] For details see my article, "What is Idealism in Buddhist Philosophy," *op. cit.*

JOHN N. FINDLAY

The Diremptive Tendencies of Western Philosophy

HEGEL, DISCUSSING SOME OF the most beautiful passages in the *Bhagavad-gītā*, in which Kṛṣṇa declares his identity with the self of all beings, with sun, moon, the letter A, the syllable *Om*, with the delusive *māyā*, which men find so hard to transcend, makes the following characteristic remarks:

> The All which Krishna pronounces himself to be, is as little as the Eleatic One or the Spinozistic Substance, *everything*. This everything, the endlessly many sensuous plurality of the finite, is in all these ideas set down as the *accidental*, which has no being in and for itself, but has its truth in the substance, the One, which, in distinction from such accidental being, alone is divine, is God. Indian religion, however, goes on to the notion of Brahma, the pure unity of thought-in-itself, in which the empirical everything of the world, as well as the proximate substantialities called gods, vanish. . . . But the unity of God, of a spiritual God, is so little concrete in itself, so powerless—so to say—that the Indian religion, by an immense confusion, is also the maddest of polytheisms. . . . For that unity, insofar as it is intrinsically abstract and therefore empty, itself puts what is concrete outside of itself and gives it independence, whether as a multitude of gods or of empirical this-world singulars.[1]

In this passage, Hegel expresses one of the most characteristic urges of Western philosophy, the desire for "true unities" which are not the mere product of abstraction or external colligation, but which are unities in and for themselves, which represent the genuine and not the fictitious furniture of the world. It is not enough in philosophy to have unities which arise because we ignore or blur essential differentiations, or because we link things together in some arbitrary, personal manner, or because we treat gaps as if they were fillings, or names as if they were things named: what we want are unities which are in some sense solid and authentic. That this notion of solid authenticity is a clear one need not be maintained: it may itself prove to be the most vacuous of chimeras. It has dominated thought in the West, however, as only an idea can dominate when it is kept unquestioned in the margin, and seldom dragged into the light of day. And it is in terms of this idea that there is a tendency to see in such all-embracing unities of Oriental thought as have been put forth in the *Bhagavad-gītā* something merely abstract and empty, which may verbally unite and cement the world, but which leaves its disarrayed fragmentation unaltered, or which passes beyond it to an empty consummation which is nothing but a name. Whatever unity we desire, we do not desire that, the night in which every cow is black and is lost in the surrounding blackness.

---

[1] Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, *System der Philosophie, Dritter Teil, Die Philosophie des Geistes*, Sämtliche Werke, Jubiläumsausgabe, Bd. 10 (Stuttgart: Frommanns Verlag, 1929), pp. 463–466, 575.

It may further be said to be characteristic of Western philosophy—though not, of course, without important exceptions—that its unities tend to be many and small, rather than single (or few) and widely embracing. Such Western philosophers, for example, as have treated "entities of reason" as "true unities" have seen them less as cementing, than as divisive and dissolving, factors: they break up concrete things rather than link them together. The "friends of the Ideas" are, as Plato says, *kata smikra diathrauontes,*[2] i.e., they chop ordinary things up into little bits, each a separate *eidos* or the copy of a separate *eidos*; they turn them into illusory combinations, where each *eidos* seems to be many by virtue of its association with other *eidē* in bodies and actions.[3] The *eidē* are, as Aristotle rightly maintained, ideal individuals, and the effect of their overpowering individuality is to deprive ordinary individuals of authenticity. If there is a Form for that embracing individual the cosmos and perhaps for the Soul, our actual world retains a looseness and disorder of structure that are absent from its *eidos*, and the Soul, at least in its earthly incarnation, is encrusted with as many barnacles as the sea-god Glaucus. If behind the fragmented forms there are vague unifying presences such as the One, the Good, the Great-and-small, etc., they play an enigmatic, equivocal part in the whole picture.

If we turn to that modern "friend of the Forms," Bertrand Russell, we see similar divisive forces at work, though they operate differently at different stages of his development. Common-or-garden things become "collections of appearances"[4] or "bundles of properties" [5]; space resolves itself (at least in Russell's earliest, most interesting days) into a brilliant dust of variously distant points;[6] and the only genuine complex unities which have not the dubious status of mere aggregates are held to be "propositions," [7] which in their turn become decimated by the departure of falsehoods and higher-order statements into the complex facts which are unities of simples.[8] These Russellian views are, of course, the original of Wittgenstein's later logical atomism, in which every statement about complexes is analyzable without residue into a statement about their constituent parts, into those statements which completely describe such complexes.[9]

---

[2] Plato, *Sophistes*, 246c.

[3] Plato, *Republic*, 476a.

[4] Bernard Arthur William Russell, *The Analysis of Mind* (London: George Allen & Unwin, Ltd., 1921), p. 100.

[5] Bernard Arthur William Russell, *An Inquiry into Meaning and Truth* (London: George Allen & Unwin, Ltd., 1940), p. 128.

[6] Bernard Arthur William Russell, *Principles of Mathematics* (2nd ed., London: George Allen & Unwin, Ltd., 1951), pp. 423, 445.

[7] *Ibid.*, pp. 135–136, 138–141.

Western philosophy has, however, sought its authentic unities in the "real" rather than in the ideal realm—they are individuals rather than universals—and there is the same tendency here as in the ideal case to restrict authenticity to fairly small rather than to widely spreading units. The "true unities" are variously taken to be the eternal, indivisible, separate atoms—whether the void which separates them is unitary or divisible may be left undecided—or they are the "natural" individuals of Academic and Aristotelian tradition, cows, trees, men, particles of earth, fire, etc., that we see or suppose. In the seventeenth century, Leibniz found the pattern of true unity in the individual conscious mind, the only thing that could embrace all its present and future modifications without breaking up into them as its parts, and so was superior to all mere colligations, and thus to extended things, which, despite a surface show of unity, really amounted to little more than such colligations.[10] Our own age has preferred the still smaller unit of the physical or sensible or somewhat mystically described "event," with its unspecified spatial spread and its anthropomorphically specified duration of "a few seconds."

Even the philosopher whose logic least encourages fragmentation, who believes in "totality," the built-in presence of everything in everything, as the essential characteristic of the highest, "notional" thought, nonetheless gives a self-diremptive tendency an essential place in his Absolute, and is in some ways more anarchically individualistic, more concessive to strife and discontinuity, than almost any other philosopher. Hegel is a thinker who believes in real universals, which actively pervade and dominate their instances, but they are universals, unlike the Platonic, whose nature it is to be specified and individualized, inevitably in disjoined, dispersed incompatible, variously imperfect and contingent ways, and which are one only because they are one in such a many.[11] Hegel similarly believes in the eternal Idea of self-conscious Spirit, of Rational Mind conscious of itself as the be-all and end-all of everything, but this Idea remains an "abstraction," not "the true God," except as it involves itself in the living process of positing its "other," the world, and in achieving union with its "other" in the form of Spirit.[12] The rationality of self-conscious Spirit is certainly something shared by all men, something which binds them together into a single spiritual "we," but this common rationality achieves its final, "absolute" form only in the activities of individuals, in their aesthetic visions, their religious acts of worship, their moments of philosophical enlightenment. If our common rationality is divine or of God, "God is God only so far as he knows himself: his self-knowledge is further his self-consciousness in man and man's knowledge of God which proceeds to man's self-knowledge in God." [13] It is even arguable that Hegel believes in Absolute Spirit only as something as much contemporary as it is also eternal.

---

[8] Bernard Arthur William Russell (with Alfred North Whitehead), *Principia Mathematica* (2nd ed., Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1926), Vol. I, pp. 43–44.

[9] Ludwig Wittgenstein, *Tractatus Logico-philosophicus* (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1961), 2.0201, pp. 10–11.

[10] Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz, *Lettres à Arnauld* (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1952), pp. 39–45.

Philosophy, which for Hegel is Absolute Spirit, is also said to be "its own time comprehended in thought," and the warning is added that "it is just as silly to suppose that any philosophy goes beyond its contemporary world as that an individual can jump beyond his time." [14] The overarching rational unity of Spirit is therefore essentially dispersed among separate individual men who learn from one another in time—it has, says Hegel, "impenetrable atomic subjectivity," which is as much *not* exclusive individuality[15]—and Hegel makes it plain that such personal dispersion is essential to its overarching, connective functions. The life-and-death struggle leading to enslavement of class by class, for instance, is an essential stage in the development of those higher forms of self-consciousness in which men fully acknowledge one another and each other's rational claims. "Each," says Hegel, "is the means through which each mediately connects and closes with itself, and each . . . is self-existent only through such mediation. Minds acknowledge minds as mutually acknowledging one another." [16] Even at the level of unconscious things, we find Hegel preferring a view of reality as a set of mutually provoking substances, each of which requires the other's solicitation to bring out its own peculiar contribution, and which is therefore profoundly free in being thus outwardly provoked and harried, rather than the view of reality as a single total thing or substance, of which finite things are the vanishing surface phases. We may say that Hegel follows the Leibnizian plan of concentrating the whole in each of its countless components rather than the Spinozistic plan of losing the parts in the whole.[17] It follows from all this that the philosopher who of all Western philosophers most stressed that "the truth is the whole" is not to be looked on as one who disregarded the claims of individuality in general, or of multiplied and dispersed individuality in particular.

---

[11] Hegel, *System der Philosophie, Erster Teil, Die Logik*, Sämtliche Werke, Jubiläumsausgabe, Bd. 8 (Stuttgart: Frommanns Verlag, 1929), pp. 163, 179, 358–361, 381–382.

[12] Hegel, *Die Phänomenologie des Geistes*, Sämtliche Werke, Jubiläumsausgabe, Bd. 2 (Stuttgart: Frommanns Verlag, 1927), pp. 584–587.

[13] Hegel, *System der Philosophie, Dritter Teil, Die Philosophie des Geistes*, pp. 454, 564.

[14] Hegel, *Grundlinien der Philosophie des Rechts*, Sämtliche Werke, Jubiläumsausgabe, Bd. 7 (Stuttgart: Frommanns Verlag, 1928), p. 35.

[15] Hegel, *Die Wissenschaft der Logik*, Sämtliche Werke, Jubiläumsausgabe, Bd. 5 (Stuttgart: Frommanns Verlag, 1928), p. 327.

[16] Hegel, *Die Phänomenologie des Geistes*, p. 150.

If one looks for a Western philosopher who really believes in one all-comprehensive unity rather than in many dispersed unities, then, apart from such great eccentrics as Erigena and Bruno, the only salient examples are to be found in Spinoza and in those relatively few minds that fell deeply under his influence: the most important of these are possibly Schelling and Bradley. It is gratuitous to say with Hegel[18] that Spinoza's subordination of the individual to the one Substance arises from his Jewish origin, for there is nothing radically unifying in the thought of the Jews: Jewish thought dwells on gulfs, peculiarities, exclusions, arbitrarinesses, special dispensations, and revelations, rather than on what is all-inclusive, inescapable, and single. Nonetheless, Spinozism represents a foreign element in Western thought, which is shown by the shock which his "hideous hypothesis" excited in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. If that shock yielded to sympathy in the Romantic epoch and in the nineteenth century as a whole, this is due to the fact that that century was itself a unique century. In its later decades its tendencies toward monism were in part explained by the universal bulldozing onslaught of a simplifying deterministic, materialistic naturalism and of a similarly simplifying boundless free commercialism. In the writings of Bradley we have the supreme modern expression of Spinozism. Whatever is less than "the whole" is a mutilated fragment torn from context: only when such "mutilation" is wholly overcome have we anything that we can call "reality." Spinozism here achieved something like the position of a great tradition, for Bradley was also greatly influenced by Hegel, and, despite Bradley's disclaimers, it was to Hegel and Hegelianism that the "mutilation doctrine" with its added stress on "coherence," "internal relations," and the honorific use of the non-Hegelian term "universe" was attributed. And from Hegel this attribution was extended to Kant, Plato, and other Western philosophers. But, for Hegel, diremption and mutilation were an essential aspect of the life of the Absolute: it was only insofar as the world was torn apart into mutually exclusive elements that the healing of the diremption could be consciously carried out, in which healing the whole being of the Absolute consisted.[19]

---

[17] Hegel, *System der Philosophie, Erster Teil, Die Logik*, pp. 150–156, 337–347.
[18] *Ibid.*, Sec. 151, Zusatz, p. 339.

It will now be worth while to stress the diremptive individualism of Western philosophy by considering the contributions of one very great, quite recent philosopher, Ludwig Wittgenstein. In him what we may call the fragmenting tendency of Western philosophy reaches a limit: it may, in fact, be said to over-reach itself and to take on the character of its opposite. For it is a consequence of fragmentation, of course, that, if it is so utter as to suppress all contrary wholeness, it ceases to be fragmentation at all: the fragment becomes the whole, all there is or possibly could be. The radical atomism of Wittgenstein's first work, the *Tractatus Logico-philosophicus,* has been commented on above: as the absolute contrary of Spinozism, which nonetheless has something of the Spinozistic method and emotional atmosphere, it fitly bears (in its English version) a Spinozistic title. The work has not the originality that its remarkable style suggests, since the roots of its doctrine that there can be no genuine complex unities other than "facts," whose constituents therefore must be utterly simple, is to be found in Russell's 1903 *Principles of Mathematics,* one of the few philosophical books that we know Wittgenstein thoroughly read and digested.[20] What is characteristic of Wittgenstein is the inferred colorlessness[21] of his simple objects, their intrinsic characterlessness, all their character presumably lying in their connections with other objects, a simplicity so profound that it quite empties of content the simples for whose simplicity it is so concerned, and leaves us with nothing but termless connections. What is likewise characteristic is the doctrine of the radical independence, the mutual externality, of these ultimate factual connections:[22] none of them entails or excludes any other, entailment or exclusion being the prerogative of propositional signs covering wide overlapping or non-overlapping arrays of possible facts, and involving only a seeming passage from one independent fact or possible fact to another.[23] But such independence and externality admit of just as much of what would ordinarily be called "internality" as one chooses, since one can simply strike from "logical space," from the range of allowable ultimate connections, any sort of connection one feels to be senseless, e.g., the combination of blue and green, so that the independence of the remaining possibilities remains as unfettered as before. It is, in fact, impossible from reading the *Tractatus* to determine the sort of world it prefigures: it might be as tightly restricted as the color-relations it sometimes mentions[24] or as ideally loose as a set of mathematical permutations and combinations. Possibly this lack of bias is a merit, but it does not accord with what it says of itself.

---

[19] Hegel, *Die Phänomenologie des Geistes*, p. 23.

[20] Said by Ludwig Wittgenstein to me.

[21] Ludwig Wittgenstein, *Tractatus Logico-philosophicus* (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1961), 2.0232, pp. 10–11.

[22] *Ibid.*, 1.21, pp. 6–7.

[23] *Ibid.*, 5.124, pp. 74–75.

In the later work of Wittgenstein the dogmatic atomism of the *Tractatus* is subjected to severe criticism, and the notion is put forward that it is entirely a matter of the language we use, and of the particular purposes of that language, whether something counts as simple or complex. The metaphysical argument that there must be ultimate existent simples to guarantee the sense of complex assertions is entirely abandoned. A broom, it is argued, is profoundly simple and unanalyzable in the practical language of the kitchen, and it would be absurd to substitute for the intelligible order "Bring me the broom" the unintelligible order "Bring me the broomstick and the brush which is fitted to it."[25] The atomism of the former theory still appears, however, in the notion of an indefinite multiplicity of uses of language, of language-games, games such as giving orders, describing, reporting, story-telling, joking, translating, even asking, thanking, cursing, greeting, praying.[26] Each of these was paradoxically thought of by Wittgenstein as capable of being a more or less self-contained performance, and as capable in such self-containedness of throwing light on the complex performance of actual speech. The notion of greeting or praying as capable of a self-contained linguistic existence without its respective immensely complex social and cognitive background is one of the curiosities of philosophy, a fit successor to the doctrine of simple objects simply connected as the sense-making underpinning of discourse. And with this diremption of speech into separate performances went the further denial of common and pervasive elements in thought and speech: all was a matter of "family resemblances," of unnumbered distinct resemblances which overlap and run crisscross like the fibers of a rope.[27] This strange view is also self-destroying, since, if genuinely common and universal elements cannot be thought or spoken of, it makes no sense to deny their presence, nor to assert that what appears thus simply pervasive is really multiple and overlapping (if only because the overlapping strands of meaning set a new standard of simplicity). The so-called "family resemblances" become in fact the norm of a new simplicity, and we are back where we were.

---

[24] *Ibid.*, 2.0131, pp. 8–9; 2.0251, pp. 12–13; 4.123, 4.124, pp. 52–53.

[25] Wittgenstein, *Philosophical Investigations* (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1953), Sec. 60, p. 29.

[26] *Ibid.*, Sec. 24, p. 12.

[27] *Ibid.*, Sec. 67, p. 32.

This particular *elenchus* was not one that Wittgenstein ever explicitly recognized, but there was another which he did explicitly recognize with extremely interesting consequences. Wittgenstein believed in the diremption of conscious persons far more completely and profoundly than any previous philosopher. He practiced doubt in a region where even Descartes had never dreamed of it, the malign genius never having been a malign automaton, and he devoted an immense amount of thought and imaginative experiment to showing that no sense could be given to the possibility of entering another's mind, sharing another's sensations, contemplating his images, etc.[28] Though he strangely held that the barrier which prevented such entry was linguistic or grammatical, he could not make the linguistic adjustment to surmount it, and the performances of entering other people's experiences which are reported to take place in *yoga* or in Buddhist *jhāna* (concentration) would be ruled out as internally self-contradictory. It follows that the world of one's discourse, if one dares to breathe such a consequence, is necessarily a solipsistic world, in which all data and objects and interlocutors are necessarily one's own familiars. But, even at the time of the *Tractatus*, Wittgenstein saw this solipsism to be self-destroying: if one can talk of nothing but what is one's own, the words "one's own" lose all their meaning, since there is no other world or use of words with which they could be contrasted. Solipsism may show itself but it cannot be said. Or, as it is also put, solipsism, developed to the limit, swings over into pure realism: the self becomes an extensionless point, and all that remains over is a world of objects.[29] Solipsism becomes something which is so true, so basic, that it can no longer be uttered, except by employing a philosophically exaggerated use of language which can have merit only as countering other more misguided exaggerations.[30]

But this solipsism which has turned into pure realism now suffers a further transformation. The language which describes the world of objects can no longer be thought of as a private language, but is plainly the common language of the speaking beings who inhabit that world, who play descriptive, predictive, and other similar language-games with one another in regard to its contents. A purely private use of language in a world that no longer has a place for contrasted privacies is altogether excluded: it has no proper, testable connection with the world. It is one of the immense ironies of philosophy that what may be called Wittgenstein's refutation of solipsism and solipsistic language, at which so many British and American philosophers have grasped with such enthusiasm, is the invention of a philosopher who is probably the one absolute solipsist who has ever existed, who probably sincerely thought that his own experiences were all there was or ever could be, and whose denial of private languages is a necessary, if tortuous, consequence of this solipsism. The things I have said no doubt require more justification, more textual and biographical documentation, than I can give them here: the change wrought by Wittgenstein in Western philosophy is, however, too important to be passed over. What I have said does not, of course, denigrate Wittgenstein's contribution. Great philosophers are those who by the sharpness with which they feel difficulties and distinctions promote the dialogue, the dialectic, of philosophy. Seen in this light, Wittgenstein's greatness is beyond all question.

---

[28] Wittgenstein, *The Blue and Brown Books* (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1960), pp. 48–54.

[29] Wittgenstein, *Tractatus Logico-philosophicus*, 5.64, pp. 116–117.

[30] Wittgenstein, *The Blue and Brown Books*, pp. 58–59.

It is time, however, to bring my historical excursus, dogmatic through the sheer impossibility of complete support, to a close. Western philosophical thought has been overwhelmingly diremptive, and in some extreme cases such diremption has been self-destroying, has removed its own disunion through destroying the connections which alone make disunion significant. What, however, do we recommend on the matter? Are we to endorse our Western approaches, or are we to plead for that Spinozism which makes everything tight and seamless and single, or for the even more blanketing unification which makes all the baseless iridescence of a *Nirguṇa Brahman* or some similarly conceived negative ultimate? Or are we to be very modern and say that it is all a matter of language and linguistic emphasis, of the light in which we choose to look on the world and talk about it, and that it is "altogether our affair" whether we speak of things diremptively and individualistically, or tightly and Spinozistically, or with the all-obliterating negativity of certain Eastern thought?

I think that the proper answer to these questions—and here I am trying to speak on behalf of the Western tradition as a whole—is, first, that it does not do to be so very modern: some modes of conception certainly fit the world and are truer to it and our experience of it than others. It is not merely a question of linguistic advantage or of some special cognitive purpose whether we see things as apart and many or as welded together and single. And I shall show my hand at the outset by saying that I regard all utterly diremptive philosophies as distorted and self-destroying, just as I regard all wholly unifying philosophies as equally so. Differentiation on a background that connects and unifies seems to be, not only psychologically and epistemologically, but—dare I say it?—ontologically, necessary. Something even of the Hegelian "built-inness" of one thing in another, of the Spinozistic rejection of "mutilation," of the impossibility of getting anything "quite on its own" and of making clear statements just about it and nothing else, I should regard as essential to all sound and sensitive philosophy, and as setting a limit to the exact formalization of any subject-matter or the guillotine-like use of the Principle of Contradiction. The Principle of Contradiction is a flawless principle, except that a significant notion or assertion seldom quite lives up to the clear-cut use of negation that it presupposes. I should regard it as equally essential, however, that we should meditate on the schisms, gulfs, barriers, cleavages, oppositions, inconsequences, and other divisive factors which are obvious in the world, which are in fact the essential complement of its connectedness, and which permit and encourage us to consider separate objects, regions, levels, properties, alternatives, issues, etc., etc., without dragging in what is irrelevant. To take but two examples from very different fields, it is absurd, on the one hand, to consider only the externalizing, divisive features of space and time, and to ignore their connective features: if they set things apart, sometimes interject gulfs and barriers between them, they also link them all by continuous routes in virtue of which they may literally be said to pass over into one another and to be not fully separable even for thought. It is in the same way absurd to fail to recognize the gross ground-level impenetrability of our separate selves, which is forced on us by a necessity deeper than grammar, but it is just as absurd to fail to recognize that there is nothing whatever that we all more clearly and luminously understand than precisely this impenetrability—even children recognize it in their talk about their own and other people's thoughts—and that in understanding it we also transcend it. Persons may not be penetrable to one another, but they acknowledge one another and cannot, in fact, be without such acknowledgement. Sheer monisms and splintered atomisms represent the two opposed poles of the philosophically unacceptable, but to say this is not to say where the bland equator really lies.

Here I am afraid I must come out in favor of the tradition I represent: the world of our actual experience—of *saṁsāra*, if you like—seems to be much more amenable to divisive, fragmenting treatment than to unifying treatment: it is much more a place of holes, bunkers, and loose earth than of smooth lawnlike continuities. And I am utterly against any attempt to escape from these undoubted characteristics of our experience by any flight of abstraction, by simply disregarding what is most obvious in experience and the world. To say that the division of things is delusive is to grant reality to a delusion, and to add that this delusion is itself delusive is to return to a simple affirmation of the content of the first delusion. This much of rigorous applicability will I grant to the Law of Double Negation: I see no meaningful way of affirming the delusiveness of a delusion without reaffirming the content of the original delusion. And it is clear, moreover, that whatever sense, dignity, and worth attaches to ultimate unity and continuity, attaches to it only in virtue of its somehow preserving the rich variety of our dislocated existence, rather than merely eliminating it. I have once or twice amused classes by successively and slowly erasing the many words and diagrams I have put on the blackboard. While the erasure proceeds, there can be, if one suggests it, a marvelous sense of simplification, of liberation from confusion, of return to primal unity and emptiness: like a Buddhist *arhat*, one feels free as the air. When the erasure is completed the result is merely dull: the board's blankness is a blankness with no glorious contrasts within it.

But, though I am utterly against any flight of abstraction from our dirempted world, I am not at all against the possibility of a flight from it that represents a real state of experience, and one that does not obliterate, but somehow preserves, the rich variety that our dirempted world offers. I do not, in fact, find it inconceivable that our dirempted experience has a contrast in another much more profoundly unified type of experience in which mutual built-inness and interpenetration are more pervasive, and there are not as many things that permit one to treat them in isolation. Certain of our ordinary waking thoughts, as well as certain of the thoughts we have in dreams, manifest unparalleled concentrations of content without the slightest detailed, separate illustration, and it is not hard to conceive an experience that is almost totally of this type. It would be an experience which in a sense implied the dirempted dealings of this life, and was in a sense parasitic upon it—though I am not sure that the parasitism might not be conceived as mutual—but which presented them all in a totally new light or manner, possibly rather as Proust presented his personal history in his marvelous novel. I am ready to conceive that in that "other life" we might encounter, for instance, types rather than individuals, not abstract Platonic Forms, but figures ready to pass into closely parallel figures with the fluidity we experience in dreams. The line between the publicly real and the private and imaginary might be much less rigid than it is in our present experience, and we might be "disembodied" in the sense of being able to vary our bodily form at will. And it is a pleasing fantasy that the identity of angels may be less rigorously exclusive than the identity of men: meeting Gabriel may in effect mean meeting Ithuriel and Uriel, and the puzzles raised by Wittgenstein about feeling the pain and joy of others may simply be a laughable reflection of our present state. Certain fine passages in Plotinus, not his empty rhetoric about the One, but his descriptions of life in the "intelligible world," similarly tend to persuade me that there may be kinds of experience much more profoundly interfused and unified than our own, and I sometimes faintly look forward to experiencing them, or of becoming part of something that experiences them, in the "life to come." I am also willing to entertain the hypothesis that the world might regularly alternate from some such unitary experience as I have indicated to the dirempted experience we now enjoy. Possibly Empedocles was right in thinking that the world regularly passed from a state in which all things were together to a state in which all things were divided and dispersed, and vice versa, and the Indian doctrine of world cycles points in a similar direction. But, whatever one believes, the unitive state must be a real experience, not an empty negation of experience, and it must be richly differentiated as is our present experience, though without its isolation and separation of elements. There may, in fact, be a state in which God or *Brahman* really enjoys in concentrated union the whole of what he has dispersedly undergone or been. But, if such a state is possible, which I am far from affirming, it is not our present state; we live in a world-age in which there may be gods, but in which there certainly is no God or none worth having. In our world the many and separate are more in evidence than the One, and the advantage goes to the sort of philosophy that more plainly recognizes this fact.

I may say, in conclusion, that I recognize many of my statements to be controversial: I have made them to arouse controversy. I also fully recognize the impossibility of saying anything wholly true about so indefinite and dispersed an entity as "Western philosophy." And I am not at all ignorant of the fact that there are Eastern schools of thought as subtly dirpermptive as the Western systems I have mentioned. I only doubt whether they ever achieve as fine a balance between unity and diremption as certain great Western systems. Let no one think, however, that, to the extent to which I know it, I do not greatly respect and admire Eastern thought.

Book Reviews

Books reviewed here are limited to those in the field of Oriental and comparative philosophy. Authors and publishers are encouraged to send review copies of appropriate books to the Editor.

PROCEEDINGS OF THE DELHI PHILOSOPHICAL COLLOQUIUM, OCTOBER 10–19, 1962. New Delhi: India International Centre, n.d. Pp. 142. Rs. 6/-.

The Delhi Philosophical Colloquium assembled thirteen of the most promising philosophers of India, plunged them into intense discussion, and thereby gave encouragement to philosophical activity in contemporary India. Twelve formal papers were presented and criticized in discussions led by Max Black. The papers, reports of the discussions (which include reports of two additional talks initiated by Black on "The Logic of Loose Concepts" and "The Nature of Scientific Explanation," and an introductory speech by N. V. Banerjee) are included in the proceedings under review. Included in the volume, along with photographs of participants, a congratulatory letter by S. Radhakrishnan, a description of the inaugural function, and *vitae* of the participants, is a page entitled "Assessment." Judging from this "assessment," the papers, and the discussions, the conference achieved its goal.

The papers themselves are not of great value. None is a philosophical "must." Although several are interesting, only one comes up to the quality found in first-rate Western journals. However, those curious about young (aged 30–35) philosophers in India will find the book valuable. The thirteen participants were especially selected and so the proceedings give a good impression of the problems, techniques, and abilities of the philosophically promising younger thinkers of India.

The outstanding feature of all but one of the papers is that they belong to contemporary analytical philosophy. Yet the Indian tradition shows through in the choice of topics: four papers are on moral philosophy, four have to do with the philosophy of mind, and three with the nature of philosophy.

Even the paper on logic, being concerned with the law of contradiction, has a traditional ring to it. On the other hand, there are no papers on the philosophy of mathematics, nor on the philosophy of language, nor on the philosophy of science. Although the writers show themselves to be well acquainted with analytical philosophy, it is not clear that they possess a genuine understanding of it. Rather than demonstrate this by examining every paper, I will single out typical faults in specific papers.

Many of the papers suffered from being too broad in scope. Either most of the paper was devoted to surveying the field, so that the author had little space for his own contribution, or the topic itself was too ambitious. The latter is the case with Mrs. Margaret Chatterjee's "Metaphors and Metaphysical Thinking." The paper raises important questions about the use of metaphors in metaphysical writings, e.g., are they "inevitable—and this not only for reasons of style" (p. 26). The discussion of examples is also very interesting. Nonetheless, the specific questions of the paper deserve a more penetrating analysis. Take the question just quoted. Not only does Mrs. Chatterjee fail to provide a clear answer, but she fails to establish whether this is a psychological question or a semantic question. Nor does she raise the possibility that her question (however understood) may be unanswerable due to the vagueness of the term "metaphysics." This lack of depth, present in many of the other papers also, is surprising. For analytical philosophers, whom these Indians emulate, restrict their investigations in order to preserve precision and depth.

Broadness and imprecision were the chief faults of the papers, but several contained inaccuracies and confusions. In "Some Notes on Defining Philosophy," N. K. Devaraja writes of analytical philosophers: "Nor did these philosophers ever entertain the suspicion that a statement concerning the nature of philosophy might be a typical example of the sort of statements that constituted philosophical discourse" (p. 21).

But what of the *Tractatus* (which he had just cited)? This work declared itself (and its own philosophical statements about philosophy) to be nonsense.

Shivjeevan Bhattacharyya seems confused when he explains in "Logic and Ontology" how "A person can, unknowingly, hold self-contradictory beliefs" (p. 100). For he writes:

> . . . it is impossible to think about any self-contradictory object, but if the person forgets what he has previously thought then his previous thought and his later thought do not constitute *one* thought; they remain two separate thoughts which in themselves are not self-contradictory. They become self-contradictory only when he tries to fuse them together into one thought (p. 100).

Surely this answer is not to the point. For Bhattacharyya says merely that someone can believe a statement and its negation at different times. Seeing a problem here at all presupposes very strong assumptions about the mind. A person can state an outright contradiction; hence, he should be able to think one, or even believe one if he is stupid enough. On the other hand, many intelligent people have maintained contradictions without being aware of the fact. In 1940, Quine, for example, proposed a set theory which was shortly discovered to be inconsistent. Frege did this twice in his lifetime. This was due to the subtlety of their contradictions. They only implied patent contradictions, but they were contradictions all the same: a contradiction is logically derivable from contradictions only.

J. D. Swamidasan in "Unified Ethics" writes interestingly about justifying moral statements. Recent moral philosophers have compared ethical reasoning to scientific reasoning. Science is seen by contemporary philosophy of science as a vast system of hypotheses, some linked more directly to experience than others. The system as a whole is evaluated in the fact of experience with pragmatic criteria forming the basis for accepting, modifying, or rejecting the whole. Moral philosophers see one's ethical belief as also forming a huge system, sometimes called a way of life. One justifies his individual ethical principles by referring to his way of life. But how does one rationally justify his own way of life? Contemporary meta-ethics asserts that no justification is possible. Having accepted everything which preceded this claim, Swamidasan disagrees. He states that one can—as in science—rationally justify his own way of life by appealing to pragmatic criteria (p. 74). One shows that his way of life is best suited to the social and human needs of his society. Although Swamidasan offers an attractive criticism of current theory, he is weak on two points. The first concerns his proposed justification for ways of life. To justify one's way of life as Swamidasan suggests one must presuppose ethical principles concerning societies. Hence, either one can merely justify part of his way of life by assuming another part, or he must go outside it in order to justify the whole. Although it is certainly sound to assess some other way of life by presupposing one's own, it is surely unsatisfactory to go outside one's way of life to justify it. For one would have to assume principles which he does not accept. The second point concerns Swamidasan's rejection of the current view because it leaves no place for someone to justify his way of life rationally. The meta-ethicists Swamidasan criticized intended to analyze and describe ethical reasoning. Accuracy is the test they must meet. If someone can rationally justify his way of life, current meta-ethics is wrong. But Swamidasan has not shown this. And, given the part that he assents to, it follows that he will not be able to show it.

Rajendra Prasad's "Ethics, Meta-ethics, and the Moral Life" is the best paper in the book. He examines the difference between right actions, ethical judgments, ethical theories, and meta-ethics. He also argues that some meta-ethical claims can have normative or ethical implications (or both). Thus to illustrate the implications of a meta-ethical conversion he writes: "If, for example, to say 'Stealing is wrong' is only to express an emotion of disfavor towards stealing, then I must not call it wrong after becoming an emotivist, if I do not feel the emotion towards it . . ." (p. 43). This argument is not airtight. Schematically it runs:

1) S is wrong if and only if I disfavor S
2) I do not disfavor S
3) Therefore S is not wrong
4) Therefore I must not say S is wrong

The passage from step (3) to step (4) is questionable. It requires another ethical premise which the emotivist in question may not accept. This is true of other of Prasad's claims that implications hold. The putative conclusion does not follow from the explicit premises, and his argument turns on the nature of the implicit ones.

In spite of these criticisms, several of the participants (and this includes all those papers we mentioned) in the conference are quite able. They should be encouraged to write more, and will surely improve greatly if they have more opportunities to engage in intensive discussion and receive firsthand criticism. If they are to do this in India, then conferences such as the one at Delhi are not merely valuable—they are essential.

MICHAEL DAVID RESNIK
University of Hawaii

RECENT JAPANESE PHILOSOPHICAL THOUGHT 1862–1962. By *Gino K. Piovesana*, S.J. Tokyo: Enderle Bookstore, 1963. Pp. iv + 290. $6.00.

Professor Piovesana has written a powerful and scholarly study of modern Japanese thought. His sense of propriety, balance, and justice cannot be praised too highly. There is every reason to think that this book will remain a standard work in English for some years, and it is to be hoped that Japanese philosophers will translate it into Japanese for their own students. Its lucidity and honesty are worthy of attentive emulation. The first monograph in English to limn Japanese philosophy of recent times was that of Kyōson Tsuchida (1927); Piovesana's account is much more complete, replete with important dates, and valuable to any student of comparative thought. It has a good index and a select bibliography of recent works of Japanese philosophy. Bibliographical material throughout the text is usefully and ably arranged in the triple-translation style (Japanese characters, Romanji, and English).

Although the book was not written expressly for American readers, they will be glad to learn that as early as 1872 Masakazu Toyama (1848–1900) studied at the University of Michigan under G. S. Morris (the American idealist philosopher who persuaded John Dewey to teach at the University of Michigan after Dewey had finished his graduate work at Johns Hopkins). Edward S. Morse was appointed to teach zoology in Japan in 1877 when evolutionary doctrine was becoming fashionable. When Morse left Japan in 1879, he persuaded Ernest F. Fenollosa to leave Harvard to teach the history of philosophy in Tokyo University. Fenollosa introduced Bowen's *Modern Philosophy* as a textbook in Tokyo. Francis Wayland's *Elements of Moral Science* was read even before the Meiji Restoration of 1868. D. W. Learned and the Rev. Charles E. Garst influenced moderate socialism after 1880. Garst was an ardent follower of Henry George. The philosophies of James and Dewey were presented in 1888, although Dewey did not lecture in Japan until after the end of World War I. G. T. Ladd, who visited Japan three times, spread the psychology of James.

Ōdō Tanaka (1867–1932) studied abroad for nine years (1890–1899), receiving his degree from the University of Chicago. Upon his return to Japan he taught at Waseda and St. Paul's. Tanaka tried to make pragmatism a philosophy of real social usefulness, according to Piovesana. He called his own philosophy Idealistic Experimentalism, a particularly felicitous choice of terminology for American instrumentalism, for, like instrumentalism, Tanaka's radical actualism showed the practical identity of the ideal and the real with its paucity of stimulus to transcend the over-all structure of the present or even to analyze the real workings of the present in terms of its social-economic-cultural basis.

Despite certain American, English, and French influences in modern Japanese philosophy, it is apparent that the leading Japanese philosophers until quite recently were especially indebted to the transcendentalism and subjectivism of German thought of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. The egotism that Santayana found rooted in German thought is also present in Japanese. Yet, the mitigating factors of Taoistic, Shintō, and Buddhistic elements cannot be overlooked. Many Japanese philosophers of recent times succumbed to the flute of transcendentalism, only to die in Buddhism with the final hope of nothingness (*mu*). Yet, Piovesana is particularly concerned not to underestimate the nuances of Japanese anthroposophy which can be extremely engaging and revealing.

Piovesana devotes thirty-seven pages to the philosophy of Kitarō Nishida (1870–1945), including an exposition of Nishida's notions of pure experience, the logic of place and nothingness, and religious and cultural views. Considerable space is given also to the views of other important Japanese philosophers of recent times: Seiichi Hatano (1877–1950), Tetsurō Watsuji (1889–1960), Hajime Tanabe (1885–1962). Hatano was sent by Waseda University to study German philosophy in 1904. Devoted to the study of philosophy of religion, Hatano analyzed the nature of time in his last book, *Time and Eternity* (1943). Time, as the most essential structure of man, goes through three stages, according to Hatano: (1) through natural time encompassing nature, (2) through cultural time, and (3) through eternity, a community of love (*agapé*) shown in selflessness and generosity toward others.

Watsuji was primarily a writer on ethics. One of his most interesting books is *Fūdo* (1935), which attempts to show the influence of climate on ethics and culture. The monsoon climate leads to mercy and benevolence; the desert to combativeness; and the pastoral to rationality and science. His main ideas were adapted from his study of Husserl and Heidegger. "Society, formed as it is of individuals, is but a dialectical development of self-denying units toward the great void which is social totality" (p. 143), Watsuji maintains, in his anthropological ethics influenced not only by phenomenologists but also by Nishida and Buddhism. As a result of his later studies of this kind, his view was given the name of "social relationism," a conception leading him to Statism before World War II, but revised to fit democratization after the war.

Tanabe was considered an original thinker, according to Piovesana, after he had explained his "logic of species," a concept that was to replace Nishida's logic of place. At first this seemed to lead to a national absolute with little room for individual freedom. Yet, after criticism of his trend toward totalitarianism, Tanabe modified his view by including "absolute nothingness which stems from the individual but affects the species." Tanabe wrote his *Philosophy as Metanoesis* (philosophy as repentance) in 1944 but published it in 1946. It reflected the mood of a defeated ideology that needed to have its heart cleansed. He recommended "philosophy without philosophy," in which repentance was combined with a transcendental perspective. The utopian nature of his solution of the ethical and political question has been clearly recognized, according to Piovesana.

Unfortunately the reader of this review cannot make much sense out of such phrases as "absolute nothingness," "logic of place," "logic of species." This difficulty may be surmounted, however, by the advanced scholarship of those who will read the book.

Since World War II, according to Piovesana, the spread of Marxism is the most noteworthy development in contemporary Japanese thought. The initial spread of Marxism in Japan is due to the initial impetus from Hajime Kawakami (1879–1946), a professor of economics at Tokyo University, whose favorite works were *The New Testament* and Tolstoi's *My Religion.* Writing for the *Osaka Asahi,* he reached a wide audience just as unemployment and poverty were burning issues at the first long plateau of the developing capitalist system in Japan. The Zaibatsu was scandalously busy, as were the early communists in Japan. Kawakami urged that the Japanese communists fight Japanese imperialism in Manchuria, an outlook which gave him the opportunity in 1933 to see the world from the inside of a Japanese prison. But even in prison he stuck to his earlier "Absolute Unselfish Movement," which perplexed the Japanese almost as much as his attempt to combine scientific method and Buddhism. Along with Kawakami was a student of Nishida named Kyoshi Miki (1897–1945), who developed "anthropological Marxism." Going to Germany in 1922, he studied under Rickert and Heidegger. While there he was strongly influenced by Max Weber and Karl Mannheim also. Losing his professorship at Hosei University in Tokyo for giving help to a communist friend, he continued his writing and translating. He translated *German Ideology* as well as the works of Aristotle. Miki, Jun Tosaka, and other left-wingers also earned money by translating parts of the *Catholic Encyclo-*

paedia, which Fr. Kraus of Sophia University allowed, as Piovesana says, out of charity (p. 180). Miki's freedom of interpretation led him toward the view of G. Lukács and Karl Mannheim. His *Philosophy of History* (1932) was influenced by Heidegger's *Sein und Zeit* and resulted in Miki's Husserlian emphasis on intentionality. "For Miki, at this stage, social environment is not quite the same as Marx's determining factor, but rather a field where the subjective man continuously operates in creating new forms" (p. 185).

More orthodox Marxism was developed by forty members of the Society for the Study of Materialism, which was founded in 1932. After six years, the Society and its magazine, *Studies in Materialism,* were dissolved. Their theoretical Marxism, says Piovesana, had advanced beyond that of any Western country: "There is no country, apart from Soviet Russia itself, where Soviet thought has been so thoroughly studied as in Japan" (pp. 187–188). Should the reader question the accuracy of Piovesana's emphasis upon recent Marxism, he may refer to the article by Yasumasa Kuroda, "Recent Japanese Advances in the Human Sciences" (*The American Behavioral Scientist,* VII, 6 [February, 1964], p. 5) for corroboration of this thesis. He may also be reminded that this thesis is put forward by a Jesuit professor rather than a Marxist apologist. This tends to give added weight to his findings.

According to Piovesana, some of the more salient features of Japanese philosophy since 1945 are the following:

1) *Neo-logicism*: a quest for a new logic that somehow combines dialectic, formal logic, and cultural nuances.

2) *Dialecticism*: there has been a use and abuse of dialectic in various senses, not only Hegelian, but Marxian and others (such as that of Buddhism).

3) *Anthropologism*: an attempt to integrate philosophy and some aspects of the less honorable social sciences such as characterology. In this sense it has again taken a lead from recent German philosophies such as that of Heidegger.

4) *Mindism*: strong trends toward informal religious and philosophical spiritualism.

5) *Culturalism*: closely allied with anthropologism but with wider encirclement to include institutions.

6) *Universalism*: probably the strongest trend toward an ecumenical movement in philosophy is that of the Japanese in recent years. Certainly this is partially due to Japan being the recipient of the atomic bomb which has sensitized the Japanese philosophers to the one-world situation and the shrunken globe.

Among his concluding remarks, Piovesana attempts to survey the birth and diffusion of ideas and philosophies. This is of great interest to comparative philosophers and historians. Its conclusions are negative, however. We cannot explain, he believes, the development of philosophers and philosophy culturally or economically. "We must go further and consider who tilled the [cultural] soil [and] what was the inner quality of the seed, namely the creativity and novel approach of the great thinker" (p. 245).

DALE RIEPE
State University of New York at Buffalo

Books Received

Books listed are not limited to those in the field of Oriental and comparative philosophy. The style for each listing conforms to that used in the book itself. Readers who wish to review any of the books should communicate with the Editor.

THE WORLD'S LIVING RELIGIONS. By *Archie J. Bahm.* Laurel Edition 9704. New York: Dell Publishing Co., Inc., 1964. Pp. 384. 75 cents. Paper.

CORRECT THINKING & STANDARD IDEOLOGY. By *L. N. Bhatt.* Delhi: S. P. Dhawan, 1964. Pp. viii + 144. Rs. 5.00.

TRADITIONAL INDIA. By *O. L. Chavarria-Aguilar.* A Spectrum Book. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1964. Pp. vi + 153. $1.95. Paper.

INDIA: A PERSONAL GUIDE. By *William Davenport.* Garden City, N. Y.: Doubleday & Company, Inc., 1964: Pp. xix + 388. $5.95.

AN ANTHOLOGY OF BUDDHIST SANSKRIT TEXTS. Edited by *Nalinaksha Dutt.* New Delhi: Sahitya Akademi, 1962. Pp. xxiii + 143. Rs. 7.50. Deluxe edition: Rs. 10.00.

CONTEMPORARY MORAL ISSUES. Edited by *Harry K. Girvetz.* 2nd printing. Santa Barbara: University of California, 1964. Pp. xi + 372. (No Price.)

BUDDHA AND THE GOSPEL OF BUDDHISM. By *Ananda Coomaraswamy.* New Hyde Park, N.J.: University Books, Inc., 1964. Pp. ix + 369. $10.00.

RELIGION IN SOUTH ASIA. Edited by *Edward B. Harper.* Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1964. Pp. 199. $6.50.

IN THE HOPE OF NIBBANA. AN ESSAY ON THERAVADA BUDDHIST ETHICS. By *Winston L. King,* La Salle: Open Court, 1964. Pp. x + 298. $6.00.

I CHING. BOOK OF CHANGES. Translated by *James Legge.* Edited with Introduction and Study Guide by *Ch'u Chai* with *Winberg Chai.* New Hyde Park, N.Y.: University Books, 1964. Pp. ci + 448. $10.00.

INTRODUCTION TO YOGA PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICES. By *Sachindra Kumar Majumdar.* New Hyde Park, N.Y.: University Books, Inc., 1964. Pp. 318. $7.50.

RESURGENT INDIA. By *Sisirkumar Mitra.* Bombay, New Delhi, Calcutta, Madras, London, New York: Allied Publishers Private Ltd., 1963. Pp. iii + 432. Rs. 26.00.

HISTORY OF ISLAMIC ORIGINS OF WESTERN EDUCATION. WITH AN INTRODUCTION TO MEDIEVAL MUSLIM EDUCATION. By *Mehdi Nakosteen.* Boulder: University of Colorado Press, 1964. Pp. xxii + 360. $8.00.

TOWARDS UNIVERSAL HUMANISM. By *Prem Nath.* Jullundur City: S. L. Jain, for S. Nagin & Co., 1964. Pp. 32. $2.00. Paper.

THE SELF IN INDIAN PHILOSOPHY. By *Troy W. Organ.* The Hague: Mouton & Co., 1964. Pp. 184. Paper.

THE SPIRITUAL HERITAGE OF INDIA. A COMPREHENSIVE EXPOSITION OF INDIAN PHILOSOPHY AND RELIGION. By *Swami Prabhavananda* with the assistance of *Frederick Manchester.* Anchor Books A419. Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday & Company, Inc., 1964. Pp. xxii + 449. $1.45. Paper.

ETHICS AND THE HUMAN COMMUNITY. By *Melvin Rader.* New York, Chicago, San Francisco, Toronto, London: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1964. Pp. vii + 468.

THE FLUTE CALLS STILL. By *Dilip Kumar Roy* and *Indira Devi.* Poona: Shri Mohanlal J. Shahani, 1964. Pp. xx + 358. Rs. 6.50.

MAN IN THE NEW WORLD. By *K. G. Saiyidain.* New York: Taplinger Publishing Co., Inc., 1964. Pp. vii + 111. $3.75.

MY VIEW OF THE WORLD. By *Edwin Schrödinger.* Translated from the German by *Cecily Hastings.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1964. Pp. viii + 109. $3.50.

IN SEARCH OF WEALTH AND POWER. YEN FU AND THE WEST. By *Benjamin Schwartz.* Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1964. Pp. xx + 298. $5.95.

THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE DEPARTMENT OF HUMANITIES. SERIES OF PHILOSOPHY. Vol. XXXI. Edited by *Seminar of Philosophy.* Tokyo: University of Tokyo Press, 1963. Pp. 278. (No Price.)

AN INTRODUCTION TO ZEN BUDDHISM. By *D. T. Suzuki.* Foreword by *C. G. Jung.* An Evergreen Black Cat Book, BC-66. New York: Grove Press, Inc. Pp. 132. 95 cents. Paper.

MILLENNIAL DREAMS IN ACTION (ESSAYS IN COMPARATIVE STUDY). Edited by *Sylvia L. Thrupp.* The Hague: Mouton & Co., 1962. Pp. 229.

BEYOND THEOLOGY. THE ART OF GODMANSHIP. By *Alan Watts.* New York: Pantheon Books, 1964. Pp. xii + 236. $4.95.

ALL ELSE IS BONDAGE. "NON-VOLITIONAL LIVING." By *Wei Wu Wei.* Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 1964. Pp. xi + 55. HK $5.00. Paper.

PHILOSOPHY IN PROCESS. By *Paul Weiss.* (Fascicle 2.) Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press, 1964. Pp. 57–120. $1.25. Paper.

PHILOSOPHY IN PROCESS. By *Paul Weiss.* (Fascicle 3.) Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press, 1964. Pp. 121–184. $1.25. Paper.

Current Periodicals

Articles listed here are specifically within the field of Oriental and comparative philosophy except, occasionally, when a full table of contents is published to indicate the scope of a particular journal. Titles in Chinese and Japanese journals have been translated. The style for each listing conforms to that used in the publication itself. Editors and authors are requested to submit suitable material.

THE ADVENT (Pondicherry), XXI (2), April, 1964: ANON., Sri Aurobindo and Vedic Interpretation. A. B. PURANI, On Art and Beauty: The Ladder of Aesthetic Experience.

THE ADYAR LIBRARY BULLETIN (Madras), XXVIII (1–2), May, 1964: K. A. SUBRAMANIA IYER, Bhartṛhari on Vyākaraṇa as a Means of Attaining Mokṣa.

THE ARYAN PATH (Bombay), XXXV (4), April, 1964: NAMRATĀ, The Realism of Spiritual Ethics. EDWARD THORNTON, Jungian Psychology and the Vedanta. ROBERT POWELL, Knowledge and Language.

XXXV (5), May, 1964: HUGH I'A FAUSSET, At Home With the Unconscious. SARBESWAR DAS, The Buddhist Influence on Strindberg.

XXXV (6), June, 1964: NAMRATA, Some Reflections on Time. HUGH I'A FAUSSET, At Home with the Unconscious: Further Reflections. BHIKSHU SANGHARAKSHITA, The Stages of the Path in Buddhism, III.

BULLETIN OF THE INSTITUTE OF TRADITIONAL CULTURES (Madras), (Part I), 1964: ANON., A Cooperative Economic System and Hindu Idealism.

BULLETIN OF THE RAMAKRISHNA MISSION INSTITUTE OF CULTURE (Calcutta), XV (4), April, 1964: JOHN T. REID, Paths to Indo-American Cultural Understanding.

XV (5), May, 1964.

XV (6), June, 1964.

BUNGAKU [Aesthetics], 32 (4), April, 1964.

32 (5), May, 1964.

32 (6), June, 1964.

BUNKA [Culture] (Sendai), 28 (1), Spring, 1964: E. HOLZEN, Hegel und Orient. O. KANAYA, S. MACHIDA, On the Method of the History of Chinese Philosophy.

CHING FENG [Quarterly Notes on Christianity and Chinese Religion and Culture] (Hong Kong), VIII (2), Spring, 1964: CHAN WING-TSIT, New Currents in Chinese Thought.

THE CHUNG CHI JOURNAL (Hong Kong), 3 (2), May, 1964.

CO-EXISTENCE (Ontario), May, 1964.

DARSHANA INTERNATIONAL (Moradabad), IV (2), April, 1964: K. C. VARADACHARI, Logic of the Mīmāmsā. JAMES B. KLEE, The Absolute and the Relative. FRANK R. HARRISON, Aristotle and Analogy. H. M. JOSHI, Indian Approach to Psychology. ARUL JOSEPH, The Mystic Lyric of Tagore. A. KANNAN, An Approach to the Study of Man.

EAST AND WEST (Rome), 14 (3–4), September-December, 1963.

FRANCE-ASIE (Tokyo), XIX (180), July, August, September, 1963: JUSTUS M. VAN DER KROFF, The Indonesian Political Tradition. XIX, (181), October-November, 1963: A. RANGANATHAN, Ananda K. Coomaraswamy—an Essay in Interpretation.

IN THE LIBRARY (Rome), 14 (3–4), September-December, 1963.

THE INDO-ASIAN CULTURE (New Delhi), XII (4), April, 1964: SUNITI KUMAR CHATTERJI, Role of Oriental Studies in the Humanities. A. C. SEN, Who Drew Asoka to Buddhism? SWAMI PARAMATMANANDA, Swami Vivekananda's Ideal of Man-making.

IYYUN (Israel), 14 (2–3–4), 15 (1–2), April, 1963—April, 1964: MARTIN BUBER, Humanism of Faith. YEHOSHUA BAR-HILLEL, The Betrayal of the Logicians. F. WELTSCH, The Absolute Ascent. R. J. ZWI WERBLOWSKY, On the Mystical Rejection of Mystical Illuminations.

JADAVPUR JOURNAL OF COMPARATIVE LITERATURE (Jadavpur), 3, 1963: SABURO OTA, Comparative Literature in Japan.

THE JOURNAL OF AESTHETICS AND ART CRITICISM (Cleveland), XXII (4), Summer, 1964: SUSANNE K. LANGER, Abstraction in Art. VERA MASLOW, Georg Lukács and the Unconscious.

JOURNAL OF THE AMERICAN ORIENTAL SOCIETY (Baltimore), 83 (4), September-December, 1963: AZIZ AHMAD, Epic and Counter-Epic in Medieval India. GENJUN H. SASAKI, The Historical Evolution of the Concept of Negation: Nekhamma and Naiṣkramya.

THE JOURNAL OF ASIAN STUDIES (Ann Arbor), XXIII (3), May, 1964: WILLIAM W. LOCKWOOD, Adam Smith and Asia. JUN ETŌ, An Undercurrent in Modern Japanese Literature.

XXIII, June, 1964: DAVID G. MANDELBAUM, Introduction: Process and Structure in South Asian Religion. PAULINE MAHAR KOLENDA, Religious Anxiety and Hindu Fate.

JOURNAL OF THE HISTORY OF IDEAS (New York), XXV (2), April-June, 1964: WALLACE E. ANDERSON, Jonathan Edwards on Immaterialism.

JOURNAL OF INDIAN AND BUDDHIST STUDIES [Indogaku Bukkyōgaku Kenkyū] (Tokyo), XII (2), March, 1964: KUMATARO KAWADA, On the Fourfold Truth in *Laṅkāvatāra Sūtra.* SHUNKYO KATSUMATA, On the Development of Kūkai's Thought of Identity of Human Existence and Buddhahood. TETSUEI SATO, Formation of T'ien-t'ai's Four Types of Samādhi. RYOSHU MICHIHATA, The Egalitarian Morality in Chinese Buddhism. MASAMITSU SOEJIMA, An Ethical Study of *Prajñāpāramitā-hṛdaya.* JIKAI FUJIYOSHI, Ambedkar's View of Buddhism. SHOHEI BABA, On *Jñāna-māyā* in the *Gaṇḍavyūha-sūtra.* RYŪSEI FUJI, A Critical Analysis of Two Traditional Interpretations of Consciousness Only in the *Daśabhūmi-śāstra* School. SHUNEI HIRAI, On the Formation of Chi-tsang's Thought as Seen From the Concept of Twofold-Truth. HAJIME NAKAMURA, A Report on Indian and Buddhist Studies in Europe and America. SHOZEN KUMOI, The Present Activities of Indology and Buddhology in Europe.

JOURNAL OF THE ORIENTAL INSTITUTE (Baroda), XIII (3), March, 1964.

THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY (New York), LXI (1), January 2, 1964: GEORGE SANTAYANA, WITH PREFATORY NOTE BY DANIEL CORY, On the False Steps of Philosophy.

LXI (7), March 26, 1964.

LXI (8), April 9, 1964: J. E. LLEWELYN, Three Conceptions of Faith.
MURRAY KITELEY, The Grammars of 'Believe.'

LXI (9), April 23, 1964.

LXI (10), May 7, 1964: RICHARD SHARVY, Tautology and Fatalism.
STEVEN CAHN, Fatalistic Arguments.

LXI (11), May 21, 1964.

LXI (12), June 11, 1964.

LXI (13), June 25, 1964.

LXI (14), July 1964: IRVING THALBERG, Freedom of Action and Freedom of Will.

LXI (15), August 6, 1964.

LXI (18), October 1, 1964: HUSTON SMITH, Do Drugs Have Religious Import?

LITERATURE EAST AND WEST (New Paltz, N.Y.), VIII (2-3), Spring and Summer, 1964.

THE MAHA BODHI (Calcutta), 72 (6), June, 1964: A. R. KULKARNI, The Revival of Buddhism in India: Its Significance.

THE MIDDLE WAY (London), XXXIX (1), May, 1964: CHRISTMAS HUMPHREYS, Basic Buddhism—I. G. J. YORKE, The Development of Ch'an and Zen. JOHN GARRIE, The Ancient Way.

THE MOUNTAIN PATH (Madras), I (1), January, 1964: ABDULLAH QUTBUDDIN, Aspects of Islam: Is Sufism Islamic? WEI WU WEI, "I am not, but the Universe is My Self"—Logical Analysis of this Intuition.

THE MUSLIM WORLD (Hartford), LIV (2), April, 1964: LEON ZOLONDEK, Al-Ṭahtāwī & Political Freedom.

PACIFIC PHILOSOPHY FORUM (Stockton), 3 (4), May, 1965: ELMER GELINAS, Life After Death. CHARLES A. BAYLIS, Tranquility is Not Enough. MASAO ABE, A Living-Dying Life.

THE PAKISTAN PHILOSOPHICAL JOURNAL (Lahore), VIII (4), April, 1964: FAZLUR RAHMAN, Fundamental Ideas in the Philosophy of Value. A. WAHHAB, Some Trends in Recent Moral Theories. H. G. HADLEY, Relativity Theory and Hindu Philosophy. M. BASHARAT ALI, The Sociology of the Science of the Qur'an. M. BASHARAT ALI, Religion and Culture.

THE PERSONALIST (Los Angeles), XLV (2), April, 1964: ELISEO VIVAS, Notes on Truth. SHELDON P. PETERFREUND, The Status of Contemporary Meta-Ethics. ROBERT S. DICKENS, Berdyaev's Concept of Creativity.

THE PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY (Madras), XXXVII (1), April, 1964: A. G. JAVADEKAR, Constructive Reinterpretation of Advaita Vedanta. A. S. CUA, Existence and Self-Knowledge. G. R. MALKANI, Ontological Reflections—IV (Absolute Reality or God). KALYAN KUMAR BAGCHI, The Philosophy of K. C. Bhattacharyya in the Light of Edmund Husserl's Phenomenology. R. C. PANDEYA, Meanings of 'Meaning." AJIT KUMAR SINHA, Philosophical Implications of Scientific Cosmology.

THE PHILOSOPHICAL REVIEW (Ithaca), LXXII (3), October, 1963: D. M. ARMSTRONG, Is Introspective Knowledge Incorrigible?

LXXIII (2), April, 1964: CHARLES PARSONS, Infinity and Kant's Conception of the "Possibility of Experience."

THE PLAIN VIEW (London), XV (1), May, 1964: J. W. SHAW, Myths of Mind in Recent Philosophy.

PRABUDDHA BHARATA [Awakened India] (Calcutta), LXIX, April, 1964: ANIMA SEN GUPTA, Śaṅkara and Rāmānuja: A Comparative Study. PRITHWI SINGH PARIHAR, Science and Philosophy. K. P. S. CHOUDHARY, Vedic Mysticism. BRAJ BIHARI NIGAM, The Concept of Personality.

LXIX, May, 1964: S. K. NANDI, On Aesthetic and Ethical Values, I. SWAMI VIMALANANDA, Does India want An Austere Civilization and a Spiritual System? A. C. BOSE, The Concept of Saṁjñāna (Concord) in the Vedas.

LXIX, June, 1964: SWAMI VIMALANANDA, Does India Want an Austere Civilization and a Spiritual System? S. K. NANDI, On Aesthetic and Ethical Values, II. P. S. SASTRI, The Foundational Principle in Man and the Universe.

THE REVIEW OF METAPHYSICS (New Haven), XVII (4), June, 1964: KARSTEN HARRIES, The Gnoseo-Ontological Circle and the End of Ontology. CHARLES HARTSHORNE, What the Ontological Proof Does Not Do.

REVUE DE THÉOLOGIE ET DE PHILOSOPHIE (Lausanne), XCVII (II), 1964: CHARLES GAGNEBIN, La pensée de Plotin, une philosophie de la vie spirituelle. ANDRÉ BIÉLER, La parole et l'image.

XCVII (III), 1964.

THE SOUTHERN JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY (Memphis), II (1), Spring, 1964: CHARLES G. WERNER, Science and Philosophy.

STUDIES IN ISLAM (New Delhi), 1 (1), January, 1964: M. ZUBAYR SIDDIQI, The Importance of Hadīth As a Source of Islamic Law. T. B. IRVING, God's Oneness.

TAMIL CULTURE (Madras), XI (1), January-March, 1964: M. ANDRONOV, Materials for a Bibliography of Dravidian Linguistics.

TIJDSCHRIFT VOOR FILOSOFIE (Utrecht), 26 (2), June, 1964: KWEE SWAN-LIAT, Het wijsgerig subject in Oost en West.

THE VEDANTA KESARI (Madras), L (12), April, 1964: MARIA BURGI, Science and Vivekananda. T. S. DEVADOSS, The Ideal of Service as Expounded by Swami Vivekananda. KAMAKSH DASA R. SOMASUNDARAM AIYAR, Reason and Intuition.

LI (1), May, 1964: T. M. P. MAHADEVAN, Parables and Aphorisms in the Upanishads.

LI (2), June, 1964: SWAMI GNANESWARANANDA, Concentration as a Means to Realization of Brahman. P. K. SUNDARAM, A Peep into the Recent Trends in Philosophy in the West.

THE VISVABHARATI QUARTERLY (Calcutta), 28 (2), 1962–1963: MARSHALL, Bridge to Indian Thought. RABINDRANATH TAGORE, Importance of the Individual in the History of India. 28 (4), 1963–1964: A. D. LITMAN, Rabindranath Tagore.